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THE CONTRIBUTORS

HEDLEY BULL is Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit of the Foreign Office, London. He was formerly Reader in International Relations in the University of London.

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON is Professor of Government and a Faculty Member of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. He has written *The Soldier and the State* (1957) and *The Common Defense* (1961), and is coauthor of *Political Power: USA/USSR* (1964). He is now engaged in a study of comparative political modernization in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

J. ROLAND PENNOCK is Chairman of the Department and Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College. His most recent books are *Self-Government in Modernizing Nations* (1964), which he edited, and *Political Science: An Introduction* (1964), of which he is coauthor. He is also the editor of *NOMOS*, the yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy.

H. GORDON SKILLING is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto. His books include *Communism National and International: Eastern Europe After Stalin* (1964) and *The Government and Politics of Communist East Europe* (1966), and he is now preparing a study of the history of Czechoslovak communism.

JAMES H. BILLINGTON is the author of the newly published book *The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Modern Russian Culture*. He is Professor of History at Princeton and a Faculty Associate of the Center of International Studies.

DINA A. ZINNES is on leave this year from Indiana University, where she is Assistant Professor of Government, to work on the application of mathematical models to the data considered in her present article. She is coauthor of *Content Analysis* (1963) and a contributor to *Insights and Indicators in World Politics* (forthcoming).

JOHN W. LEWIS, Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University and Cornell Director of the London-Cornell Project for Social Research in China and Southeast Asia, is the author of *Leadership in Communist China* (1963) and editor of *Major Doctrines of Communist China* (1964). He is currently working on a study of urban political development of the North China city of Tangshan.

JAMES N. ROSENAU is Professor of Political Science at Douglass College, Rutgers University, and a Research Associate of the Center of International Studies at Princeton. He is the author of *National Leadership and Foreign Policy* (1963) and editor of *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (1964). He is presently working on a volume to be called *Citizenship Between Elections: An Inquiry into the Mobilizable and Attentive American*.

E. V. WALTER is Professor of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts at Boston. He has written essays and reviews for both social science journals and literary periodicals, is coauthor of *Power and Civilization: Political Thought in the Twentieth Century* (1962), and is now at work on a book entitled *The Dynamics of Terror*.

ROBERT I. ROTBERG is Assistant Professor of History at Harvard, and the author of three books published in 1965: *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia; A Political History of Tropical Africa*; and *Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia*.

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INTERNATIONAL THEORY
The Case for a Classical Approach

By HEDLEY BULL*

I

TWO approaches to the theory of international relations at present compete for our attention. The first of these I shall call the classical approach. By this I do not mean the study and criticism of the "classics" of international relations, the writings of Hobbes, Grotius, Kant, and other great thinkers of the past who have turned their attention to international affairs. Such study does indeed exemplify the classical approach, and it provides a method that is particularly fruitful and important. What I have in mind, however, is something much wider than this: the approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law, and that is characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgment and by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations, that general propositions about this subject must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition, and that these general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin.

Until very recently virtually all attempts at theorizing about international relations have been founded upon the approach I have just described. We can certainly recognize it in the various twentieth-century systematizations of international theory—in works like those of Alfred Zimmern, E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Georg Schwarzenberger, Raymond Aron, and Martin Wight. And it is clearly also the method of their various precursors, whose scattered thoughts and partial treatments they have sought to draw together: political philosophers like Machiavelli and Burke, international lawyers like Vattel and Oppenheim, pamphleteers like Gentz and Cobden, historians like Heeren and Ranke. It is because this approach has so long been the standard one that we may call it classical.

The second approach I shall call the scientific one. I have chosen to call it scientific rather than scientistic so as not to prejudge the issue I wish to discuss by resort to a term of opprobrium. In using this name

* This paper was read to the tenth Bailey Conference on the university teaching of international relations, which met at the London School of Economics in January 1966.

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for the second approach, however, it is the aspirations of those who adopt it that I have in mind rather than their performance. They aspire to a theory of international relations whose propositions are based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict, empirical procedures of verification. Some of them dismiss the classical theories of international relations as worthless, and clearly conceive themselves to be the founders of a wholly new science. Others concede that the products of the classical approach were better than nothing, and perhaps even regard them with a certain affection, as the owner of a 1965 model might look at a vintage motor car. But in either case they hope and believe that their own sort of theory will come wholly to supersede the older type; like the logical positivists when they sought to appropriate English philosophy in the 1930's, or like Mr. McNamara's Whiz Kids when they moved into the Pentagon, they see themselves as tough-minded and expert new men, taking over an effete and woolly discipline, or pseudo-discipline, which has so far managed by some strange quirk to evade the scientific method but has always been bound to succumb to it in the end.

The scientific approach to the theory of international relations, so defined, is present in the theory of international systems, as developed by Morton A. Kaplan and others, in the various international extrapolations of John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's theory of games, in Thomas C. Schelling's theory of bargaining, in Karl W. Deutsch's work on social communication, in William H. Riker's study of political coalitions, in the models of foreign policy-making produced by George A. Modelski and others, in Lewis F. Richardson's mathematical studies of arms races and deadly quarrels, and in the theories of conflict developed by Kenneth Boulding and Anatol Rapoport. It also appears to be an important part of the content of what is called "peace research."[1]

The studies I have named vary enormously in the methods they employ and in the questions to which they are addressed. Their authors, indeed, far from facing the outside world with a united front, com-

[1] See, for example, Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957); Morgenstern, *The Question of National Defense* (New York 1959); Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton 1957); Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven 1962); Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy* (New York 1962); Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origin of War*, ed. Nicolas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco (Pittsburgh 1960), and *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, ed. Quincy Wright and C. C. Lienau (Pittsburgh 1960); Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York 1962); Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Ann Arbor 1960).

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monly regard one another with the hostility of leaders of Marxist sects. There are also, it may be argued, great discrepancies among them in the extent to which they have illuminated our subject. What I have called the scientific approach, moreover, is not present in all of them to the same degree. There are dangers in lumping them all together, and it may be inevitable that criticisms directed at the whole of the genre will be unfair to some parts of it. Nevertheless, all of these studies and fashions embody the scientific approach in some measure, and to discuss this it is necessary to confine our attention to what they have in common.

In the United States in the last ten years the scientific approach has progressed from being a fringe activity in the academic study of international relations to such a position that it is at least possible to argue that it has become the orthodox methodology of the subject. The award in 1963 of the American Political Science Association's prize for the best study of the year to a practitioner of the classical approach (to Inis Claude for his *Power and International Relations*) already had the appearance of a perverse action of the rear guard.

In the British academic community, by contrast, the scientific approach to the theory of international relations has had virtually no impact at all. The only Englishman to have made a major contribution in the new genre—Lewis F. Richardson—worked alone and unrecognized in his lifetime, and when a few years ago his work was exhumed and hailed as that of a great pioneer, it was by American editors addressing themselves to a predominantly American audience. Not only have British students of international relations not sought to contribute to theory in this vein, but, with one or two exceptions, the work of the American and other writers who have ploughed this field has failed to command their respect or even their attention.

If it were clear that this disdain has been founded upon an understanding of the scientific approach and a considered rejection of it there might be no cause for us to revise our attitude. We might even see in our imperviousness to this fashion the proof of the fundamental soundness and solidity of our own approach. The actual position, however, is that we are largely ignorant of what the new literature contains and that our rejection of it stems much less from any reasoned critique than it does from feelings of aesthetic revulsion against its language and methods, irritation at its sometimes arrogant and preposterous claims, frustration at our inability to grasp its meaning or employ its tools, *a priori* confidence that as an intellectual enterprise

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it is bound to fail, and professional insecurity induced by the awful gnawing thought that it might perhaps succeed.

There is no doubt that the writing that has emerged from the scientific approach should be taken seriously. Judged by its own standards of logical precision and scientific rigor its quality is sometimes high. Moreover, however adverse a view we take of this literature, it is impossible to examine it with any degree of care and sympathy and yet to conclude that its contribution to the understanding of international relations is nil. Indeed, given the great concentration of energy and talent that has gone into producing it in recent years, it would be extraordinary if this were otherwise.

It is therefore desirable that if we are to reject the scientific approach we should at the same time pay attention to it and formulate such objections to it as we may have. It has now developed so much momentum that silence toward it, or worse, the facile abuse with which it is sometimes greeted by British reviewers, will no longer suffice to keep it at bay. If, as I believe, the scientific approach should be kept firmly in the background, this can only be accomplished by rational criticism.

II

In setting out to provide such a rational criticism one may begin by dismissing a number of complaints commonly directed at the scientific approach which are beside the point.

One such complaint made of these theorists, especially, perhaps, of Morton Kaplan, is that their writing is tortuous and inelegant. But the fact that Morton Kaplan's book is not a pleasure to read is no more a criticism of the theory of international politics it contains than is the difficulty of reading Einstein a deficiency of the theory of relativity. If Kaplan could be charged with deliberately constructing an unnecessarily obscure terminology, or with employing it clumsily and inefficiently, this would be another matter; but such a charge would be quite misplaced. Kaplan's terminology is a vital part of his whole attempt to construct a rigorous system, and his use of it is precise and economical.

Indeed, while one need not go so far as to regard literary mediocrity as a positive merit in a book about politics, Kaplan's work derives much of its originality and force from precisely this disdain of the tradition that regards historical and political writing as a branch of belles lettres. The power of this tradition reflects the fact that historical and political writing, in addition to serving the purpose of com-

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munication between specialists seeking understanding of the subject, serves such other purposes as education, persuasion, public entertainment, and the exhibition of gentlemanly accomplishments. Kaplan is surely correct in dismissing the literary embellishment that is a proper element in writing for these latter purposes as an irrelevance and an encumbrance in writing for the former.

Another unsatisfactory line of criticism is that which focuses not upon the doctrine of the scientific theorists but upon the motives that have driven them to propound it. Thus it has been observed that those who follow the scientific approach are new scholastics, who have sought refuge in a world of intellectual constructs essentially in order to escape from political reality; that they are natural scientists, mathematicians, and economists *manqués* who, unable to make careers for themselves in their own fields, have moved into another where the going is easier, bringing their techniques with them; that they are interested in elaborating a mathematical or scientific methodology for its own sake—or for the sake of demonstrating their mastery of it to the uninitiated—rather than in illuminating our subject by the use of it; or even that they represent a new form of the cargo cult.

These observations, or some of them, are true or half true, and they help us to understand the character of the new theorizing as an intellectual movement. It is true of any intellectual style or scholarly fashion that it is pursued for a variety of motives of which the disinterested desire for knowledge is only one, and that some of these motives are much removed from any such desire and are even discreditable. But precisely for this reason a discussion of the motivations of theorists does not provide any basis for the defense of one intellectual style against another. It is too easy for the scientifically-minded theorist to turn the tables. Do not those who adhere to the classical approach do so out of a vested interest in their own techniques, a slothful reluctance to learn new ones? Are they not also wedded to a methodology for its own sake, to the art of judgment over and against measurement, and to literary forms as against symbolic ones, clinging to these instruments of their trade like horse cavalrymen in the age of mechanization? Do they not represent an outgoing generation, trained in one set of techniques, expressing its resentment against an incoming generation trained in another? I should need to be surer than I am that my own motives in preparing this paper are wholly disinterested before inviting criticism of them by attacking those of others. We shall be well advised, therefore, to confine our attention to the doctrines themselves.

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Finally, it is a mistake to see in the scientific approach, or in any one of the methods that go to make it up, the instrument of any particular political purpose in foreign or defense policy. In the ranks of the systems theorists, game theorists, communications theorists, and conflict theorists, it is possible to find attitudes ranging from the most conservative to the most radical; nor is there any logical connection between any of the techniques and any particular political attitude. Writers like Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, and Morton Kaplan, who may be broadly described as proestablishment in their attitudes to foreign and defense policy, have been the object of political attacks that hinge upon their use of these techniques. But such attacks take no account of other writers such as Kenneth Boulding, Anatol Rapoport, or J. David Singer, who are dissenters from United States foreign and defense policies but stand intellectually in the same camp. Similarly the current fashion for "peace research" or "conflict resolution" often seems to embody the misconception that the application of these new techniques to the study of international relations is bound to vindicate radical policies or to facilitate their implementation.

However, the scientific approach has contributed and is likely to contribute very little to the theory of international relations, and in so far as it is intended to encroach upon and ultimately displace the classical approach, it is positively harmful. In support of this conclusion I wish to put forward seven propositions.

The first proposition is that by confining themselves to what can be logically or mathematically proved or verified according to strict procedures, the practitioners of the scientific approach are denying themselves the only instruments that are at present available for coming to grips with the substance of the subject. In abstaining from what Morton Kaplan calls "intuitive guesses" or what William Riker calls "wisdom literature" they are committing themselves to a course of intellectual puritanism that keeps them (or would keep them if they really adhered to it) as remote from the substance of international politics as the inmates of a Victorian nunnery were from the study of sex.

To appreciate our reliance upon the capacity for judgment in the theory of international relations we have only to rehearse some of the central questions to which that theory is addressed. Some of these are at least in part moral questions, which cannot by their very nature be given any sort of objective answer, and which can only be probed, clarified, reformulated, and tentatively answered from some arbitrary standpoint, according to the method of philosophy. Others of them

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are empirical questions, but of so elusive a nature that any answer we provide to them will leave some things unsaid, will be no more than an item in a conversation that has yet to be concluded. It is not merely that in *framing* hypotheses in answer to these empirical questions we are dependent upon intuition or judgment (as has often been pointed out, this is as true in the natural as in the social sciences); it is that in the *testing* of them we are utterly dependent upon judgment also, upon a rough and ready observation, of a sort for which there is no room in logic or strict science, that things are this way and not that.

For example, does the collectivity of sovereign states constitute a political society or system, or does it not? If we can speak of a society of sovereign states, does it presuppose a common culture or civilization? And if it does, does such a common culture underlie the world-wide diplomatic framework in which we are attempting to operate now? What is the place of war in international society? Is all private use of force anathema to society's working, or are there just wars which it may tolerate and even require? Does a member state of international society enjoy a right of intervention in the internal affairs of another, and if so in what circumstances? Are sovereign states the sole members of international society, or does it ultimately consist of individual human beings, whose rights and duties override those of the entities who act in their name? To what extent is the course of diplomatic events at any one time determined or circumscribed by the general shape or structure of the international system; by the number, relative weight, and conservative or radical disposition of its constituent states, and by the instruments for getting their way that military technology or the distribution of wealth has put into their hands; by the particular set of rules of the game underlying diplomatic practice at that time? And so on.

These are typical of the questions of which the theory of international relations essentially consists. But the scientific theorists have forsworn the means of coming directly to grips with them. When confronted with them they do one of two things. Either they shy away and devote themselves to peripheral subjects—methodologies for dealing with the subject, logical extrapolations of conceptual frameworks for thinking about it, marginalia of the subject that are susceptible of measurement or direct observation—or they break free of their own code and resort suddenly and without acknowledging that this is what they are doing to the methods of the classical approach—methods that in some cases they employ very badly, their preoccupations and training having left them still strangers to the substance of the subject.

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This congenital inability of the scientific approach to deal with the crux of the subject while yet remaining true to its own terms leads me to an observation about the teaching of the subject in universities. Whatever virtues one might discern in the scientific approach, it is a wholly retrograde development that it should now form the basis of undergraduate courses of instruction in international politics, as in some universities in the United States it now does. The student whose study of international politics consists solely of an introduction to the techniques of systems theory, game theory, simulation, or content analysis is simply shut off from contact with the subject, and is unable to develop any feeling either for the play of international politics or for the moral dilemmas to which it gives rise.

The second proposition I wish to put forward arises out of the first: It is that where practitioners of the scientific approach have succeeded in casting light upon the substance of the subject it has been by stepping beyond the bounds of that approach and employing the classical method. What there is of value in their work consists essentially of judgments that are not established by the mathematical or scientific methods they employ, and which may be arrived at quite independently of them.

Let me take as an example the work of Thomas Schelling, who has contributed as much as and perhaps more than any other thinker of the scientific genre to the theory of international relations. His elaboration of the notion of arms control, the elements of deterrence, the nature of bargaining, the place in international relations of threats of force are of a rare originality and importance and will probably prove to have made a lasting impression on the theory and, indeed, the practice of these matters. At the same time he is an economist by training; he has written studies of a technical nature about game and bargaining theory; and he has sometimes seemed to lend his support to the call for more theory of a scientific sort.

It appears to me that Schelling's illuminating observations about violence and international politics in every case have the status of unprovable and untestable judgments, and that they have not been and could not be demonstrated by his work in formal game and bargaining theory. Schelling happens to combine with his interest in the latter techniques a shrewd political judgment and a philosophical skill in thinking out problems in terms of their basic elements. It is possible that his ideas about international relations have been suggested to him by his technical studies, and he has evidently thought it useful to provide illustrations of his ideas in formal, theoretical exercises.

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Those of his readers who share his interest in these techniques will find it amusing and perhaps profitable to pursue these illustrations. But they are at best a helpful analogy; they do not represent the foundation of his contribution to international politics or the road that must be travelled in order to arrive at it.

My third proposition is that the practitioners of the scientific approach are unlikely to make progress of the sort to which they aspire. Some of the writers I have been discussing would be ready enough to admit that so far only peripheral topics have been dealt with in a rigidly scientific way. But their claim would be that it is not by its performance so far that their approach should be judged, but by the promise it contains of ultimate advance. They may even say that the modesty of their beginnings shows how faithful they are to the example of natural science: Modern physics too, Morton Kaplan tells us, "has reared its present lofty edifice by setting itself problems that it has the tools or techniques to solve."[2]

The hope is essentially that our knowledge of international relations will reach the point at which it becomes genuinely cumulative: that from the present welter of competing terminologies and conceptual frameworks there will eventually emerge a common language, that the various insignificant subjects that have now been scientifically charted will eventually join together and become significant, and that there will then exist a foundation of firm theory on which newcomers to the enterprise will build.

No one can say with certainty that this will not happen, but the prospects are very bleak indeed. The difficulties that the scientific theory has encountered do not appear to arise from the quality that international relations is supposed to have of a "backward" or neglected science, but from characteristics inherent in the subject matter which have been catalogued often enough: the unmanageable number of variables of which any generalization about state behavior must take account; the resistance of the material to controlled experiment; the quality it has of changing before our eyes and slipping between our fingers even as we try to categorize it; the fact that the theories we produce and the affairs that are theorized about are related not only as subject and object but also as cause and effect, thus ensuring that even our most innocent ideas contribute to their own verification or falsification.

A more likely future for the theory of international politics is that

[2] "Problems of Theory Building and Theory Confirmation in International Politics," *World Politics*, XIV (October 1961), 7.

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it will remain indefinitely in the philosophical stage of constant debate about fundamentals; that the works of the new scientific theorists will not prove to be solid substructure on which the next generation will build, but rather that those of them that survive at all will take their place alongside earlier works as partial and uncertain guides to an essentially intractable subject; and that successive thinkers, while learning what they can from what has gone before, will continue to feel impelled to build their own houses of theory from the foundations up.

A fourth proposition that may be advanced against many who belong to the scientific school is that they have done a great disservice to theory in this field by conceiving of it as the construction and manipulation of so-called "models." Theoretical inquiry into an empirical subject normally proceeds by way of the assertion of general connections and distinctions between events in the real world. But it is the practice of many of these writers to cast their theories in the form of a deliberately simplified abstraction from reality, which they then turn over and examine this way and that before considering what modifications must be effected if it is to be applied to the real world. A model in the strict sense is a deductive system of axioms and theorems; so fashionable has the term become, however, that it is commonly used also to refer to what is simply a metaphor or an analogy. It is only the technique of constructing models in the strict sense that is at issue here. However valuable this technique may have proved in economics and other subjects, its use in international politics is to be deplored.

The virtue that is supposed to lie in models is that by liberating us from the restraint of constant reference to reality, they leave us free to set up simple axioms based on a few variables and thenceforward to confine ourselves to rigorous deductive logic, thereby generating wide theoretical insights that will provide broad signposts to guide us in the real world even if they do not fill in the details.

I know of no model that has assisted our understanding of international relations that could not just as well have been expressed as an empirical generalization. This, however, is not the reason why we should abstain from them. The freedom of the model-builder from the discipline of looking at the world is what makes him dangerous; he slips easily into a dogmatism that empirical generalization does not allow, attributing to the model a connection with reality it does not have, and as often as not distorting the model itself by importing additional assumptions about the world in the guise of logical axioms. The very intellectual completeness and logical tidiness of the model-

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building operation lends it an air of authority which is often quite misleading as to its standing as a statement about the real world.

I shall take as an example the most ambitious of all the model-builders, Morton Kaplan. He provides us with models of two historical and four possible international systems, each with its "essential rules" or characteristic behavior. He claims that the models enable him to make predictions—only, it is true, of a high level of generality—about characteristic or modal behavior within the present international system, about whether or not transformations of this system into some other are likely and what form they might take.

The six systems that Kaplan identifies, and the "essential rules" or characteristic behavior of each, are in fact quite commonplace ideas, drawn from the everyday discussion of international affairs, about the general political structure that the world has had or might have. They are the international political system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the present so-called bipolar system, the structure that might exist if the present polarization of power were not moderated by the United Nations and by powerful third parties, the system we might have if the United Nations were to become the predominant political force in a world of still sovereign states, a world state, and a world of many nuclear powers.

In discussing the conditions under which equilibrium is maintained in each of these systems, and in predicting the likelihood and direction of their transformation into different systems, Kaplan appears to resort to a kind of guesswork a good deal more arbitrary than any involved in the style of international theory he wishes to displace. In discussing the two historical systems he uses some pertinent examples from recent history, but there is no reason to assume that behavior in future international systems of this sort is bound to be the same. In discussing the nonhistorical systems, his remarks are either tautological extensions of the definitions he employs, or are quite arbitrarily formulated empirical judgments that do not properly belong to the model at all.

Kaplan's six systems are of course not the only ones possible. He admits, for example, that they do not cover the cases of Greek antiquity or of the Middle Ages, and they do not embrace the infinite variety the future might unveil. What reason, therefore, is there to suppose that transformation of any one of the systems must be into one of the others? The whole enterprise of attempting to predict transformations on the basis of these models requires at every stage that

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we go outside the models themselves and introduce further considerations.

One objection to Kaplan's models, therefore, is that they are not models; they are lacking in internal rigor and consistency. But even if they possessed such qualities, they would not provide the illumination of reality that Kaplan claims for them. We have no means of knowing that the variables excluded from the models will not prove to be crucial. He has provided an intellectual exercise and no more. I should not wish to contend that someone exploring the question of what changes might take place in the present international system, or the question of what might be the shape and structure of a world of many nuclear powers, is unable to quarry some nuggets of value from Kaplan's work. But how much more fruitfully can these questions be explored, how much better indeed might so gifted a person as Kaplan himself have explored them, by paying attention to the actual variety of events in the real world, by taking note of the many elements that are pushing the present international system this way and that, and the large number of political and technical factors that might contrive to mold a world of many nuclear powers in any one of a dozen shapes different from those that can be confined within the bounds of Kaplan's model.

The fashion for constructing models exemplifies a much wider and more long-standing trend in the study of social affairs: the substitution of methodological tools and the question "Are they useful or not?" for the assertion of propositions about the world and the question "Are they true or not?" Endemic though it has become in recent thinking, I believe this change to have been for the worse. The "usefulness" of a tool has in the end to be translated as the truth of a proposition, or a series of propositions, advanced about the world, and the effect of the substitution is simply to obscure the issue of an empirical test and to pave the way for shoddy thinking and the subordination of inquiry to practical utility. However, this is a theme that requires more amplification than it can be given here, and in introducing it I am perhaps taking on more antagonists than I need do for my present purpose.

A fifth proposition is that the work of the scientific school is in some cases distorted and impoverished by a fetish for measurement. For anyone dedicated to scientific precision, quantification of the subject must appear as the supreme ideal, whether it takes the form of the expression of theories themselves in the form of mathematical equations or simply that of the presentation of evidence amassed in quantitative form. Like the Anglican bishop a year or so ago who began

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his sermon on morals by saying that he did not think all sexual intercourse is necessarily wrong, I wish to take a liberal view of this matter. There is nothing inherently objectionable, just as there is nothing logically peculiar, in a theoretical statement about international politics cast in mathematical form. Nor is there any objection to the counting of phenomena that do not differ from one another in any relevant respect, and presenting this as evidence in support of a theory. The difficulty arises where the pursuit of the measurable leads us to ignore relevant differences between the phenomena that are being counted, to impute to what has been counted a significance it does not have, or to be so distracted by the possibilities that do abound in our subject for counting as to be diverted from the qualitative inquiries that are in most cases more fruitful.

I should like to take as an example the work of Karl Deutsch and his pupil Bruce Russett. These writers have sought to investigate the bonds of community that link different nations, and in explaining the cohesiveness or mutual responsiveness that exists between different peoples or different groups within a single people they have especially focused their attention upon social communication, that is to say, upon the flow of persons, goods, and ideas, or of the "messages" they carry. Karl Deutsch, together with a number of collaborators, has provided a study of the extent to which the various peoples of the North Atlantic area are linked by such bonds of community, and he is concerned particularly with the question of the measure in which these peoples form what he calls a "security-community"—that is to say, a group of people who agree that their common problems must be resolved by "peaceful change," and who for a long time have had dependable expectations that their problems will in fact be resolved in this way.[3] Bruce Russett has tackled the more manageable subject of community simply in the relationship between Britain and America, and has sought in particular to determine whether these two peoples have become more or less "responsive" to one another as the twentieth century has progressed.[4]

A feature of the work of both these writers is their presentation of quantitative material as an index of the degree of community that exists between one people and another. They produce figures, for ex-

[3] Deutsch has, of course, been author or part-author of a number of other works besides *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, but apart from his *Political Community at the International Level* (Princeton 1953), this is the one that most comes to grips with the theory of international relations.

[4] *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

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ample, on resources devoted to trade as a proportion of total resources; mail sent abroad, or to a particular destination, as a proportion of total mail; number of diplomatic agreements arrived at with another country as a proportion of total agreements arrived at; student exchanges; "content analysis" of newspapers and learned journals; and so on.

The work of Karl Deutsch and Bruce Russett in this field is certainly original and suggestive. Moreover, these two writers are not uncritical in their use of quantitative analysis. But the prominence they give to it is a source of weakness rather than strength in their arguments. Their counting often ignores (or, if it does not ignore, skates over) the most relevant differences between the units counted: differences between the content of one item of mail and another, the diplomatic importance of one treaty and another, the significance of one inch of newspaper column and another. Differences in these other relevant respects may cancel themselves out, but they also may not; and in practice we are likely to respect these statistics only in cases where they confirm some intuitive impression we already have, as, e.g., where Russett's figures confirm, as many of them do, the very confident judgment we may make that as this century has progressed America has become relatively more important to Britain than Britain is to America. Even so, such a judgment is quite external to the statistics that are provided, and does not establish that they measure anything relevant.

Deutsch and Russett, furthermore, are inclined to attribute to their statistics a place in the total chain of the argument that they do not have. They often seem to assume that there is something so irrefutable and final about a piece of evidence that can be put into figures that they are absolved of the necessity of showing in detail how it supports the general thesis they are seeking to demonstrate. Foreign trade is foreign trade, and a precise measurement of foreign trade is not a precise measurement of anything else unless an explanation is advanced as to why this is so. A number of the crucial but missing links in Deutsch's chain of argument seem to have been lost to sight because of this tendency of those who have succeeded in producing figures to be blinded by the illumination they cast. Are the figures of "communication flow" an index of political community at the international level, or a cause of it? Does the "communication flow" contribute to producing the vital element, in Deutsch's scheme, of "mutual identification," or does the latter arise in some quite different way?

Finally, even if one may concede that statistics have some place in an inquiry into political community and social communication, it ap-

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pears to me that Deutsch and Russett have been distracted by them from the more fruitful parts of the subject. By far the most interesting things that these two writers have to say lie in their attempts to think out the distinguishing features of a community, the different sorts of communities that obtain, the elements that make up the cohesion of a community, the determinants of mutual responsiveness between one people and another. And by far the most pertinent evidence they bring forward lies in the qualitative judgments they are able to bring to bear on history and contemporary affairs.

My sixth proposition is that there is a need for rigor and precision in the theory of international politics, but that the sort of rigor and precision of which the subject admits can be accommodated readily enough within the classical approach. Some of the targets at which the scientific theorists aim their barbs are quite legitimate ones. The classical theory of international relations has often been marked by failure to define terms, to observe logical canons of procedure, or to make assumptions explicit. It has sometimes also, especially when associated with the philosophy of history, sought to pursue into international politics implications of a fundamentally unscientific view of the world. The theory of international relations should undoubtedly attempt to be scientific in the sense of being a coherent, precise, and orderly body of knowledge, and in the sense of being consistent with the philosophical foundations of modern science. Insofar as the scientific approach is a protest against slipshod thinking and dogmatism, or against a residual providentialism, there is everything to be said for it. But much theorizing in the classical mold is not open to this sort of objection. The writings of the great international lawyers from Victoria to Oppenheim (which, it may be argued, form the basis of the traditional literature of the subject) are rigorous and critical. There are plenty of contemporary writers who are logical and rigorous in their approach and yet do not belong to the school I have called the scientific one: Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffmann, and Kenneth Waltz are examples. Moreover, it is not difficult to find cases where writers in the scientific vein have failed to be rigorous and critical in this sense.

My seventh and final proposition is that the practitioners of the scientific approach, by cutting themselves off from history and philosophy, have deprived themselves of the means of self-criticism, and in consequence have a view of their subject and its possibilities that is callow and brash. I hasten to add that this is not true, or not equally true, of them all. But their thinking is certainly characterized by a lack of any sense of inquiry into international politics as a continuing

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tradition to which they are the latest recruits; by an insensitivity to the conditions of recent history that have produced them, provided them with the preoccupations and perspectives they have, and colored these in ways of which they might not be aware; by an absence of any disposition to wonder why, if the fruits their researches promise are so great and the prospects of translating them into action so favorable, this has not been accomplished by anyone before; by an uncritical attitude toward their own assumptions, and especially toward the moral and political attitudes that have a central but unacknowledged position in much of what they say.

The scientific approach to international relations would provide a very suitable subject for the sort of criticism that Bernard Crick has applied to a wider target in his admirable book *The American Science of Politics*—criticism that would, by describing its history and social conditions, isolate the slender and parochial substructure of moral and political assumption that underlies the enterprise.[5] There is little doubt that the conception of a science of international politics, like that of a science of politics generally, has taken root and flourished in the United States because of attitudes towards the practice of international affairs that are especially American—assumptions, in particular about the moral simplicity of problems of foreign policy, the existence of "solutions" to these problems, the receptivity of policy-makers to the fruits of research, and the degree of control and manipulation that can be exerted over the whole diplomatic field by any one country.

III

Having stated the case against the scientific approach I must return to the qualifications I introduced at the outset. I am conscious of having made a shotgun attack upon a whole flock of assorted approaches, where single rifle shots might have brought down the main targets more efficiently and at the same time spared others that may have been damaged unnecessarily. Certainly, there are many more approaches to the theory of international relations than two, and the dichotomy that has served my present purpose obscures many other distinctions that it is important to bear in mind.

Students of international relations are divided by what are in some cases simply barriers of misunderstanding or academic prejudice that cut across the whole field of social studies at the present time. No

[5] *The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions* (Berkeley and London 1959).

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doubt it is desirable that such barriers be lowered. But in the present controversy, eclecticism, masquerading as tolerance, is the greatest danger of all; if we are to be hospitable to every approach (because "something may come of it some day") and extend equal rights to every cliché (because "there is, after all, a grain of truth in what he says"), there will be no end to the absurdities thrust upon us. There are grains of truth to be had from a speaker at Hyde Park Corner or a man on a Clapham omnibus, but the question is "What place do they have in the hierarchy of academic priorities?"

I hope I have made it clear that I see a good deal of merit in a number of the contributions that have been made by theorists who adopt a scientific approach. The argument is not that these contributions are worthless, but that what is of value in them can be accommodated readily enough within the classical approach. Moreover, the distinctive methods and aspirations these theorists have brought to the subject are leading them down a false path, and to all appeals to follow them down it we should remain resolutely deaf.

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POLITICAL MODERNIZATION: AMERICA VS. EUROPE

By SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON*

I. Three Patterns of Modernization

POLITICAL modernization involves, let us assume, three things. First, it involves the rationalization of authority: the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single, secular, national political authority. This change implies that government is the product of man, not of nature or of God, and that a well-ordered society must have a determinate human source of final authority, obedience to whose positive law takes precedence over other obligations. Rationalization of authority means assertion of the external sovereignty of the nation-state against transnational influences and of the internal sovereignty of the national government against local and regional powers. It means national integration and the centralization or accumulation of power in recognized national law-making institutions. Secondly, political modernization involves the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions. Areas of peculiar competence—legal, military, administrative, scientific—become separated from the political realm, and autonomous, specialized, but subordinate, organs arise to discharge those tasks. Administrative hierarchies become more elaborate, more complex, more disciplined. Office and power are distributed more by achievement and less by ascription. Thirdly, political modernization involves increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society and the development of new political institutions—such as political parties and interest associations—to organize this participation. Broadened participation in politics may increase control of the people by the government, as in totalitarian states, or it may increase control of the government by the people, as in some democratic ones. But in all modern states the citizens become directly involved in and affected by governmental affairs. Rationalized authority, differentiated structure, and mass participation thus distinguish modern polities from antecedent polities.

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The political modernization of Western Europe and North America was, of course, spread over many centuries. In general, the broadening of participation in politics came after the rationalization of authority and the differentiation of structure. Significant broadened participation dates from the latter half of the eighteenth century. The rationalization of authority and the differentiation of structure got under way in earnest in the seventeenth century. This article will be primarily concerned with these earlier phases of political modernization in Europe and America.[1]

Three distinct patterns of political modernization can be distinguished: Continental, British, and American. On the Continent the rationalization of authority and the differentiation of structures were dominant trends of the seventeenth century. "It is misleading to summarize in a single phrase any long historical process," Sir George Clark observes, "but the work of monarchy in the seventeenth century may be described as the substitution of a simpler and more unified government for the complexities of feudalism. On one side it was centralization, the bringing of local business under the supervision or control of the government of the capital. This necessarily had as its converse a tendency toward uniformity."[2] It was the age of the great simplifiers, centralizers, and modernizers: Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV, Colbert, and Louvois in France; the Great Elector in Prussia; Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XI in Sweden; Philip IV and Olivares in Spain; and their countless imitators among the lesser realms of the Continent. The modern state replaced the feudal principality; loyalty to the state superseded loyalty to church and to dynasty. "I am more obligated to the state," Louis XIII declared on the famous "Day of Dupes," November 11, 1630, when he rejected the Queen Mother and her claims for family in favor of the Cardinal and his claims for the state. "More than any other single day," Friedrich argues, "it may be called the birthday of the modern state."[3] With the birth of the modern state came the subordination of the church, the suppression of the medieval estates, and the weakening of the aristocracy by the rise of new groups. In addition, the century witnessed the rapid growth and rationalization of state bureaucracies and public services, the

[1] For the sake of clarity, let me make clear the geographical scope I give these terms. With appropriate apologies to Latin Americans and Canadians, I feel compelled by the demands of brevity to use the term "America" to refer to the thirteen colonies that subsequently became the United States of America. By "Europe" I mean Great Britain and the Continent. By "the Continent" I refer to France, the Low Countries, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and the Holy Roman Empire.

[2] *The Seventeenth Century* (New York 1961), 91.

[3] Carl J. Friedrich, *The Age of the Baroque: 1610-1660* (New York 1952), 215-16.

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origin and expansion of standing armies, and the extension and improvement of taxation. In 1600 the medieval political world was still a reality on the Continent; by 1700 it had been replaced by the modern world of nation-states.

The British pattern of evolution was similar in nature to that on the Continent but rather different in results. In Britain, too, church was subordinated to state, authority was centralized, sovereignty asserted internally as well as externally, legal and political institutions differentiated, bureaucracies expanded, and a standing army created. The efforts of the Stuarts, however, to rationalize authority along the lines of continental absolutism provoked a constitutional struggle, from which Parliament eventually emerged the victor. In Britain, as on the Continent, authority was centralized but it was centralized in Parliament rather than in the Crown. This was no less of a revolution than occurred on the Continent and perhaps even more of one.

In America, on the other hand, the political system did not undergo any revolutionary changes at all. Instead, the principal elements of the English sixteenth-century constitution were exported to the New World, took root there, and were given new life at precisely the time they were being abandoned in the home country. These Tudor institutions were still partially medieval in character. The Tudor century saw some steps toward modernization in English politics, particularly the establishment of the supremacy of the state over the church, a heightened sense of national identity and consciousness, and a significant increase in the power of the Crown and the executive establishment. Nonetheless, even in Elizabethan government, the first point of importance is "the fundamental factor of continuity with the Middle Ages."[4] The sixteenth century saw, as Chrimes says, "The Zenith of the Medieval Constitution." The changes introduced by the Tudor monarchs did not have "the effect of breaking down the essential principles of the medieval Constitution, nor even its structure."[5] Among these principles and structures were the idea of the organic union of society and government, the harmony of authorities within government, the subordination of government to fundamental law, the intermingling of the legal and political realms, the balance of power between Crown and Parliament, the complementary representative roles of these two institutions, the vitality of local govern-

[4] A. L. Rowse, *The England of Elizabeth* (New York 1951), 262.

[5] S. B. Chrimes, *English Constitutional History*, 2nd ed. (London 1953), 121-23. See also W. S. Holdsworth, *A History of English Law*, 3rd ed. (London 1945), IV, 209ff.

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mental authorities, and reliance on local forces for the defense of the realm.

The English colonists took these late medieval and Tudor political ideas, practices, and institutions across the Atlantic with them during the great migrations in the first half of the seventeenth century. The patterns of thought and behavior established in the New World developed and grew but did not substantially change during the century and a half of colonihood. The English generation of 1603-1630, Notestein remarks, was "one in which medieval ideas and practices were by no means forgotten and in which new conceptions and new ways of doing things were coming in. The American tradition, or that part derived from England, was at least in some degree established by the early colonists. The English who came over later must have found the English Americans somewhat settled in their ways."[6] The conflict between the colonists and the British government in the middle of the eighteenth century served only to reinforce the colonists' adherence to their traditional patterns. In the words of our greatest constitutional historian, "The colonists retained to a marked and unusual degree the traditions of Tudor England. In all our study of American institutions, colonial and contemporary, institutions of both public law and private law, this fact must be reckoned with. The breach between colonies and mother country was largely a mutual misunderstanding based, in great part, on the fact of this retention of older ideas in the colonies after parliamentary sovereignty had driven them out in the mother country."[7] In the constitutional debates before the American Revolution, the colonists in effect argued the case of the old English constitution against the merits of the new British constitution which had come into existence during the century after they had left the mother country. "Their theory," as Pollard says, "was essentially medieval."[8]

These ancient practices and ideas were embodied in the state constitutions drafted after independence and in the Federal Constitution of 1787. Not only is the American Constitution the oldest written national constitution in the world, but it is also a constitution which in large part simply codified and formalized on the national level prac-

[6] Wallace Notestein, *The English People on the Eve of Colonization: 1603-1630* (New York 1954), xiv. See also Edward S. Corwin, *The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law* (Ithaca 1955), 74.

[7] Charles Howard McIlwain, *The High Court of Parliament and Its Supremacy* (New Haven 1910), 386.

[8] A. F. Pollard, *Factors in American History* (New York 1925), 39. See also McIlwain, *The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation* (Ithaca 1958); and Randolph G. Adams, *Political Ideas of the American Revolution*, 3rd ed. (New York 1958).

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tices and institutions that had long existed on the colonial level. The institutional framework established in 1787 has, in turn, changed remarkably little in 175 years. Hence, the American system "can be properly understood, in its origin, development, workings, and spirit, only in the light of precedents and traditions which run back to the England of the civil wars and the period before the civil wars."[9] The American political system of the twentieth century still bears a closer approximation to the Tudor polity of the sixteenth century than does the British political system of the twentieth century. "Americanisms in politics, like Americanisms in speech," as Henry Jones Ford put it, "are apt to be Anglicisms which died out in England but survived in the new world."[10] The British broke their traditional political patterns in the seventeenth century. The Americans did not do so then and have only partially done so since then. Political modernization in America has thus been strangely attenuated and incomplete. In institutional terms, the American polity has never been underdeveloped, but it has also never been wholly modern.[11] In an age of rationalized authority, functional specialization, mass democracy, and totalitarian dictatorship, the American political system remains a curious anachronism. In today's world, the American political system is unique, if only because it is so antique.

II. The Rationalization of Authority

In seventeenth-century Europe the state replaced fundamental law as the source of political authority, and within each state a single authority replaced the many that had previously existed. America, on the other hand, continued to adhere to fundamental law as both a source of authority for human actions and an authoritative restraint on human behavior. In addition, in America, human authority or sovereignty was never concentrated in a single institution or individual but instead remained dispersed throughout society as a whole and among many organs of the body politic. Traditional patterns of authority were thus decisively broken and replaced in Europe; in America they were reshaped and supplemented but not fundamentally altered. The continued supremacy of law was mated to the decisive rejection of sovereignty.

[9] McIlwain, *High Court*, 388.

[10] *The Rise and Growth of American Politics* (New York 1900), 5. See also James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London 1891), II, 658.

[11] See the distinction between modernization and political development in Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.

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Undoubtedly the most significant difference between modern man and traditional man is in their outlook on man in relation to his environment. In traditional society man accepts his natural and social environment as given. What is ever will be: it is or must be divinely sanctioned; and to attempt to change the permanent and unchanging order of the universe and of society is both blasphemous and impossible. Change is absent or imperceptible in traditional society because men cannot conceive of its existence. Modernity begins when men develop a sense of their own competence, when they begin to think that they can understand nature and society and can then control and change nature and society for their own purposes. Above all, modernization means the rejection of external restraints on men, the Promethean liberation of man from control by gods, fate, and destiny.

This fundamental shift from acceptance to activism manifests itself in many fields. Among the more important is law. For traditional man, law is an external prescription or restraint over which he has little control. Man discovers law but he does not make law. At most he may make supplementary emendations of an unchanging basic law to apply it to specific circumstances. In late medieval Europe, law was variously defined in terms of divine law, natural law, the law of reason, common law, and custom. In all these manifestations it was viewed as a relatively unchanging external authority for and restraint on human action. Particularly in England, the dominant concept was "the characteristic medieval idea of all authority as deriving from the law." As Bracton put it, "Law makes the King."[12] These ideas remained dominant through the Tudor years and were in one form or another at the basis of the writings of Fortescue, St. Germain, Sir Thomas Smith, Hooker, and Coke. Even after the Act of Supremacy, Parliament was still viewed as a law-declaring body, not a law-making body. Even during the first phases of the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century, Prynne argued that "the Principal Liberties, Customs, Laws" of the kingdom, particularly those in the "great Charters," were "FUNDAMENTAL, PERPETUAL, & UNALTERABLE."[13]

The obverse of fundamental law is, of course, the rejection of determinate human sovereignty. For the men of 1600, as Figgis observes, "law is the true sovereign, and they are not under the necessity of considering whether King or Lords or Commons or all three together are the ultimate authority in the state."[14] The sovereignty of law per-

[12] Corwin, 27.

[13] McIlwain, *High Court*, 51ff., 65.

[14] John Neville Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings* (Cambridge 1922), 230. See also Christopher Morris, *Political Thought in England: Tyndale to Hooker* (London 1953), 1.

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mitted a multiplicity of human authorities, since no single human authority was the sole source of law. Man owed obedience to authority, but authority existed in many institutions: king, Parliament, courts, common law, custom, church, people. Sovereignty, indeed, was an alien concept to the Tudor Constitution. No "lawyer or statesman of the Tudor period," as Holdsworth says, "could have given an answer to the question as to the whereabouts of the sovereign power in the English state."[15] Society and government, Crown and people, existed together in harmony in a "single body politic." The Tudor regime, says Chrimes, "was essentially the culmination of the medieval ideals of monarchical government, in alliance with the assent of parliament for certain purposes, and acknowledging the supremacy of the common law where appropriate. No one was concerned about the location of sovereignty within the State."[16] This indifference to sovereignty made the "whole standpoint" of the most notable expounder of the Elizabethan constitution, Sir Thomas Smith, "nearer that of Bracton than that of Bodin."[17]

Fundamental law and the diffusion of authority were incompatible with political modernization. Modernization requires authority for change. Fundamental changes in society and politics come from the purposeful actions of men. Hence authority must reside in men, not in unchanging law. In addition, men must have the power to effect change, and hence authority must be concentrated in some determinate individual or group of men. Fundamental and unchanging law may serve to diffuse authority throughout society and thus to preserve the existing social order. But it cannot serve as authority for change except for lesser changes which can be passed off as restoration. The modernization that began in the sixteenth century on the Continent and in the seventeenth century in England required new concepts of authority, the most significant of which was the simple idea of sovereignty itself, the idea that there is, in the words of Bodin, a "supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law." One formulation of this idea was the new theory, which developed in Europe in the late sixteenth century, of the divine right of kings. Here, in effect, religious and, in that sense, traditional forms were used for modern purposes. "The Divine Right of Kings on its political

[15] Holdsworth, 208.

[16] Chrimes, 122-23. See also J. B. Black, *The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1959), 206.

[17] Figgis, "Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century," *The Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge 1904), III, 748; J. W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (New York 1960), 262.

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side was little more than the popular form of expression for the theory of sovereignty."[18] The doctrine became dominant in France after 1594 and was introduced into England by James I. It admirably served the purposes of the modernizing monarchs of the seventeenth century by giving the sanction of the Almighty to the purposes of the mighty. It was a necessary "transition stage between medieval and modern politics."[19]

In addition, of course, other political theorists responded to the needs of the time by furnishing more "rational" justifications of absolute sovereignty based on the nature of man and the nature of society. On the Continent, Bodin and the Politiques looked to the creation of a supreme royal power which would maintain order and constitute a centralized public authority above parties, sects, and groups, all of which were to exist only on its sufferance. Bodin's *Republic* was published in 1576; Hobbes's *Leviathan*, with its more extreme doctrine of sovereignty, appeared in 1651. Closely linked with the idea of absolute sovereignty was the concept of the state as an entity apart from individual, family, and dynasty. Twentieth-century modernizing Marxists justify their efforts by the needs of the party; seventeenth-century modernizing monarchs justified their actions by "reason of state." The phrase was first popularized by Botero in *Della Ragion di Stato* in 1589. Its essence was briefly defined by another Italian writer in 1614 when he declared, "The reason of state is a necessary violation of the common law for the end of public utility."[20] One by one the European monarchs took to legitimizing themselves and their actions by reference to the state.

In both its religious and its secular versions, in Filmer as well as in Hobbes, the import of the new doctrine of sovereignty was the subject's absolute duty to obey his king. Both versions helped political modernization by legitimizing the concentration of authority and the breakdown of the medieval pluralistic political order. They were the seventeenth-century counterparts of the theories of party supremacy and national sovereignty which are today employed to break down the authority of traditional local, tribal, and religious bodies. In the seventeenth century, mass participation in politics still lay in the future; hence rationalization of authority meant concentration of power in the absolute monarch. In the twentieth century, the broadening of participation and the rationalization of authority occur simultaneously,

[18] Figgis, *Divine Right*, 237.

[19] *Ibid.*, 258. See Allen, 386; McIlwain, ed., *The Political Works of James I* (Cambridge, Mass., 1918).

[20] Pietro A. Canonhiero, quoted in Friedrich, 15-16.

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and hence authority must be concentrated in either a political party or a popular charismatic leader, both of which are capable of arousing the masses as well as challenging traditional sources of authority. In terms of modernization, the seventeenth century's absolute monarch was the functional equivalent of the twentieth century's monolithic party.

On the Continent in the seventeenth century the medieval diffusion of authority among the estates rapidly gave way to the centralization of authority in the monarch. At the beginning of the century, "every country of western Christendom, from Portugal to Finland, and from Ireland to Hungary, had its assemblies of estates."[21] By the end of the century most of these assemblies had been eliminated or greatly reduced in power. In France the last Estates General until the Revolution met in 1615, and the provincial estates, except in Brittany and Languedoc, did not meet after 1650.[22] By the seventeenth century only six of the original twenty-two Spanish kingdoms retained their *cortes*. The *cortes* in Castile was already suppressed; those in Aragon were put down by Philip II; Olivares subdued Catalonia after a long bloody war. In Portugal the *cortes* met for the last time in 1697. In the kingdom of Naples parliamentary proceedings ended in 1642. The Great Elector put down the estates in Brandenburg and Prussia. The estates of Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia had already lost their powers to the Hapsburgs, who were also able during the early part of the century to curtail the powers of the estates in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. The Danish crown became hereditary in 1665; that of Hungary in 1687. Toward the end of the century, Charles XI reestablished absolute rule in Sweden.[23] By 1700 the traditional diffusion of powers had been virtually eliminated from continental Europe. The modernizers and state-builders had triumphed.

The tendencies toward the substitution of sovereignty for law and the centralization of authority also occurred in England. James I sundered the Crown from Parliament, challenged the traditional authority of the law and of the judges, advocated the divine right of kings. Kings, he said, "were the authors and makers of the laws and not the laws of the kings."[24] James was simply attempting to modernize

[21] Clark, 83.

[22] R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton 1959), I, 461: "In 1787 demands were heard for revival of Provincial Estates in various parts of the country. It was a long-delayed reaction against Richelieu and Louis XIV, a demand to make France a constitutional monarchy, not on the English model, but on the model of a France that had long since passed away."

[23] See Clark's summary of constitutional trends, 86-87. See also F. L. Carsten, *Princes and Parliaments in Germany* (Oxford 1959), 436-37; and Holdsworth, 168-72.

[24] "The Trew Law of Free Monarchies," in McIlwain, ed., *Political Works*, 62.

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English government and to move it along the paths already well developed on the Continent. His efforts at political modernization were opposed by Coke and other conservatives who argued in terms of fundamental law and the traditional diffusion of authority. Their claims, however, were out-of-date in the face of the social and political changes taking place. "Coke, like most opponents of the King, had not really grasped the conception of sovereignty; he maintained a position, reasonable enough in the Middle Ages, but impossible in a developed unitary state."[25] Centralization was necessary and at times it seemed that England would follow the continental pattern. But in due course the claims for royal absolutism generated counterclaims for parliamentary supremacy. When James I, Filmer, and Hobbes put the king above law, they inevitably provoked Milton's argument that "the parliament is above all positive law, whether civil or common, makes or unmakes them both." The Long Parliament began the age of parliamentary supremacy. It was then that England saw "practically for the first time a legislative assembly of the modern type,—no longer a mere law-declaring, but a *law-making* machine."[26] Fundamental law suffered the same fate in England that it had on the Continent, but it was replaced by an omnipotent legislature rather than by an absolute monarchy.

American development was strikingly different from that in Europe. At the same time that the modernizing monarchs were suppressing the traditional estates, that men were asserting their power to make law, that Richelieu was building an absolute state in France and Hobbes was proclaiming one in England, the old patterns of fundamental law and diffused authority were transported to a new life in the New World. The traditional view of law continued in America in two forms. First, the idea that man could only declare law and not make law remained strong in America long after it had been supplanted by positive conceptions of law in Europe. In some respects, it persisted right into the twentieth century. Secondly, the old idea of a fundamental law beyond human control was given new authority by identifying it with a written constitution. A written constitution can, of course, be viewed as a contract, deriving its authority from conscious, positive human action. But it may also and even concurrently be viewed as a codification of limitations already imposed upon government by custom and reason. It was in this latter sense that men accepted the idea of fundamental law in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England and embodied it in their colonial charters and

[25] Figgis, *Divine Right*, 232.

[26] McIlwain, *High Court*, 93-96.

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declarations of rights. The combination of both theories created a situation in which "higher law as with renewed youth, entered upon one of the great periods of its history. . . ."[27]

The persistence of fundamental-law doctrines went hand in hand with the rejection of sovereignty. The older ideas of the interplay of society and government and the harmonious balance of the elements of the constitution continued to dominate American political thought. In England, the ideas of the great Tudor political writers, Smith, Hooker, Coke, "were on the way to becoming anachronisms even as they were set down."[28] In America, on the other hand, their doctrines prospered, and Hobbes remained irrelevant. Neither the divine right of kings, nor absolute sovereignty, nor parliamentary supremacy had a place on the western shores of the Atlantic. "Americans may be defined," as Pollard has said, "as that part of the English-speaking world which instinctively revolted against the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State and has, not quite successfully, striven to maintain that attitude from the time of the Pilgrim Fathers to the present day." The eighteenth-century argument of the colonists with the home country was essentially an argument against the legislative sovereignty of Parliament.

> It is this denial of all sovereignty [continues Pollard] which gives its profound and permanent interest to the American Revolution. . . . These are American ideas, but they were English before they were American. They were part of that medieval panoply of thought with which, including the natural equality of man, the view of taxes as grants, the laws of nature and of God, the colonists combatted the sovereignty of Parliament. They had taken these ideas with them when they shook the dust of England off their feet; indeed they left their country in order that they might cleave to these convictions. And now they come back, bringing with them these and other sheaves, to reconvert us to the views which we have held long since but lost awhile.[29]

To the extent that sovereignty was accepted in America it was held to be lodged in "the people." Popular sovereignty, however, is as nebulous a concept as divine sovereignty. The voice of the people is as readily

[27] Corwin, 89.

[28] George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, rev. ed. (New York 1950), 455.

[29] Pp. 31-33. For a perceptive discussion of the implications that this rejection of sovereignty has for the way in which the political system has adapted to the most modern of problems, see Don K. Price, *The Scientific Estate* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), *passim*, but esp. 45-46, 58, 75-78, 165-67.

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identified as is the voice of God. It is thus a latent, passive, and ultimate authority, not a positive and active one.

The difference between American and European development is also manifest in theories and practices of representation. In Europe, the elimination of the medieval representative bodies, the estates, was paralleled by a decline in the legitimacy accorded local interests. On the Continent the absolute monarch represented or embodied the state. Beginning with the French Revolution, he was supplanted by the national assembly which represented or embodied the nation. In both instances, the collective whole had authority and legitimacy: local interests, parochial interests, group interests, as Rousseau argued, lacked legitimacy and hence had no claim to representation in the central organs of the political system.

The rationalization of authority in Britain also produced changes in representation which stand in marked contrast to the continuing American adherence to the older traditional concepts. In sixteenth-century England both king and Parliament had representative functions. The king was "the representative head of the corporate community of the realm."[30] The members of Parliament still had their traditional medieval functions of representing local communities and special interests. In the late medieval Parliament, "the burgess is his town's attorney. His presence at parliament enables him to present petitions for confirmation of charters, the increase of local liberties, and redress of grievances, and to undertake private business in or near London for constituents."[31] Thus, the king represented the community as a whole, while the members of Parliament represented its component parts. The M.P. was responsible to his constituency. Indeed, an act passed during the reign of Henry V required members of Parliament to reside in their constituencies. In the late sixteenth century this legal requirement began to be avoided in practice, but local residence and local ties still remained qualifications for most M.P.'s. "The overwhelming localism of representation in Parliament is its dominant feature," writes Rowse of Elizabethan England, "and gives it vigor and reality. Everywhere the majority of members are local men, either gentry of the country or townsmen. The number of official members, privy councillors and such, is very small, and even they have their roots. . . . An analysis of the representation shows a very small propor-

[30] Samuel H. Beer, "The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical Background," *American Political Science Review*, LI (September 1957), 614.

[31] Faith Thompson, *A Short History of Parliament: 1295-1642* (Minneapolis 1953), 59.

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tion of outsiders, and still smaller of officials."[32] The members not only resided in their constituencies and represented the interests of those constituencies, but they were also paid by their constituencies for their services. Each constituency, moreover, was normally represented by two or three members of Parliament.

The constitutional revolution of the seventeenth century dealt the death blow to this "Old Tory" system of representation. It was replaced by what Beer terms the "Old Whig" system, under which the king lost his active representative functions and the M.P. became "the representative of the whole community, as well as of its component interests."[33] Parliament, as Burke phrased it in the classic statement of the Old Whig theory, is "a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest, that of the whole—where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole." Hence the M.P. should not be bound by authoritative instructions from his constituents and should rather subordinate their interests to the general interest of the entire society. With this new concept came a radical break with the old tradition of local residence and local payment. The last recorded instance of a constituency paying its representatives was in 1678. Increasingly during the seventeenth century, members no longer resided in their constituencies. The statute was "evaded by the admission of strangers to free burghership," and it was finally repealed in 1774.[34] At the same time, the number of multiple-member districts declined, with their complete elimination in 1885. All these developments made Parliament the collective representative of the nation rather than a collection of representatives of individual constituencies. Thus the theory and practice of British representation adjusted to the new fact of parliamentary supremacy.

In America, of course, the Old Tory system took on new life. The colonial representative systems reproduced Tudor practices, and subsequently these were established on a national scale in the Constitution of 1787. America, like Tudor England, had a dual system of representation: the President, like the Tudor king, represented the interests of the community as a whole; the individual members of the legislature owed their primary loyalties to their constituencies. The multimember constituencies which the British had in the sixteenth century were ex-

[32] P. 306. Cf. Pollard, *The Evolution of Parliament*, 2nd ed., rev. (London 1926), 159, who argues that the nationalizing changes began in the late Tudor years.

[33] Beer, 614-15.

[34] Herbert W. Horwill, *The Usages of the American Constitution* (London 1925), 169.

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ported to the colonial legislatures in America, adapted to the upper house of the national legislature, and extended to the state legislatures where they remain in substantial number down to the present.[35] Local residence, which had been a legal requirement and a political fact in Tudor England, became a political requirement and a political fact in America. It reflected "the intense localism . . . which persisted in America after it had been abandoned in the mother country." Many key British political figures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were able to stay in Parliament because they were able to change their constituencies. "What a difference it would have made to the course of English politics," as one commentator observed, "if Great Britain had not thrown off, centuries ago, the medieval practice which America still retains!"[36] Contrariwise, Americans may view with astonishment and disdain the gap that political modernization has created between the British M.P. and his constituents.[37]

III. Differentiation of Structure

In comparing European and American development, a distinction must be made between "functions" and "power." In this article, "power" (in the singular) means influence or control over the actions of others, and "function" refers to particular types of activity, which may be defined in various ways. "Powers" (in the plural) will not be used, since most authors use it to mean "functions." It is thus possible to speak with the Founding Fathers of legislative, executive, and judicial functions, and, with Bagehot, of dignified and efficient functions—and also to speak of legal and political functions, military and civil functions, domestic and foreign functions. Governmental institutions may be equal or unequal in power and specialized or overlapping in function.

In Europe the rationalization of authority and the centralization of power were accompanied by functional differentiation and the emer-

[35] Maurice Klain, "A New Look at the Constituencies: The Need for a Recount and a Reappraisal," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX (December 1955), *passim*, but esp. 1111-13. In 1619 the London Company aped English practice when it summoned to the first Virginia House of Burgesses "two Burgesses from each Plantation freely . . . elected by the inhabitants thereof."

[36] Horwill, 169-70.

[37] See, e.g., the comments of one American newspaperman covering the 1964 general election: "British members of Parliament aren't oriented toward their constituencies. They don't even have to live in them. . . . Constituencies tend to be regarded as political factories to provide fodder for the national consensus in London. An American Congressman may get 1,500 to 2,000 letters a week from people who elect him. A British MP usually gets no more than 10" (Roderick MacLeish, *New York Herald Tribune*, October 11, 1964).

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gence of more specialized governmental institutions and bodies. These developments were, of course, a response to the growing complexity of society and the increasing demands upon government. Administrative, legal, judicial, and military institutions developed as semi-autonomous but subordinate bodies in one way or another responsible to the political bodies (monarch or parliament) which exercised sovereignty. The dispersion of functions among relatively specialized institutions, in turn, encouraged inequalities in power among the institutions. The legislative or law-making function carried with it more power than did the administrative or law-enforcement function.

In medieval government and in Tudor government the differentiation of functions was not very far advanced. A single institution often exercised many functions, and a single function was often dispersed among several institutions. This tended to equalize power among institutions. The government of Tudor England was a "government of *fused* power" (functions)—that is, Parliament, Crown, and other institutions each performed many functions.[38] In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries British government evolved toward a concentration of power and a differentiation of function. In Great Britain, as Pollard argues, "Executive, legislature, and judicature have been evolved from a common origin, and have adapted themselves to specific purposes, because without that specialization of functions English government would have remained rudimentary and inefficient. But there has been no division of sovereignty and no separation of powers."[39]

In America, in contrast, sovereignty was divided, power was separated, and functions were combined in many different institutions. This result was achieved despite rather than because of the theory of the separation of powers (i.e., functions) which was prevalent in the eighteenth century. In its pure form, the assignment of legislative, executive, and judicial functions to separate institutions would give one institution a monopoly of the dominant law-making function and thus would centralize power. This was in part what Locke wanted and even more what Jefferson wanted. The theory was also, of course, found in Montesquieu, but Montesquieu recognized the inequality of power that would result from the strict separation of functions. The "judiciary," he said, "is in some measure next to nothing." Consequently, to obtain a real division of power, Montesquieu divided the legislative function among three institutions representing the three traditional estates of the realm. In practice in America, as in Tudor England, not

[38] McIlwain, *High Court*, xi.

[39] Pollard, *Evolution of Parliament*, 257.

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only was power divided by dividing the legislative function but other functions were also shared among several institutions, thus creating a system of "checks and balances" which equalized power. "The constitutional convention of 1787," as Neustadt has said, "is supposed to have created a government of 'separated powers' [i.e., functions]. It did nothing of the sort. Rather, it created a government of separated institutions *sharing* powers [functions]."[40] Thus America perpetuated a fusion of functions and a division of power, while Europe developed a differentiation of functions and a centralization of power.

In medieval government no distinction existed between legislation and adjudication. On the Continent such institutions as the *Justiza* of Aragon and the French *parlements* exercised important political functions into the sixteenth century. In England, Parliament, an essentially political body, was viewed primarily as a court down to the seventeenth century. The courts of law, as Holdsworth observes, "were, in the days before the functions of government had become specialized, very much more than merely judicial tribunals. In England and elsewhere they were regarded as possessing functions which we may call political, to distinguish them from those purely judicial functions which nowadays are their exclusive functions on the continent, and their principal functions everywhere. That the courts continued to exercise these larger functions, even after departments of government had begun to be differentiated, was due to the continuance of that belief in the supremacy of the law which was the dominant characteristic of the political theory of the Middle Ages."[41]

In England, the supremacy of the law disappeared in the civil wars of the seventeenth century and with it disappeared the mixture of judicial and political functions. English judges followed Bacon rather than Coke and became "lions under the throne" who could not "check or oppose any points of sovereignty." In the eighteenth century, Blackstone could flatly state that no court could declare invalid an act of Parliament, however unreasonable it might be. To admit such a power, he said, "were to set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be subversive of all government."[42] Parliament had evolved from high court to supreme legislature.

In America, on the other hand, the mixture of judicial and political functions remained. The judicial power to declare what the law is be-

[40] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York 1960), 33.

[41] P. 169.

[42] Sir William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, ed. Thomas M. Cooley (Chicago 1876), I, 90.

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came the mixed judicial-legislative power to tell the legislature what the law cannot be. The American doctrine and practice of judicial review were undoubtedly known only in very attenuated form in late sixteenth-century and early seventeenth-century England. Indeed, the whole concept of judicial review implies a distinction between legislative and judicial functions which was not explicitly recognized at that time. It is, nonetheless, clear that Tudor and early Stuart courts did use the common law to "controul" acts of Parliament at least to the point of redefining rather sweepingly the purposes of Parliament. These actions did not represent a conscious doctrine of judicial review so much as they represented the still "undifferentiated fusion of judicial and legislative functions."[43] This fusion of legislative and judicial functions was retained by American courts and was eventually formulated into the doctrine and practice of judicial review. The legislative functions of courts in America, as McIlwain argues, are far greater than those in England, "because the like tendency was there checked by the growth in the seventeenth century of a new doctrine of parliamentary supremacy." Unlike English courts, "American courts still retain much of their Tudor indefiniteness, notwithstanding our separation of departments. They are guided to an extent unknown now in England by questions of policy and expediency."[44] Foreign observers since De Tocqueville have identified the "immense political influence" of the courts as one of the most astonishing and unique characteristics of American government.

The mixing of legal and political functions in American government can also be seen in the consistently prominent role of lawyers in American politics. In fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England lawyers played an important role in the development of parliamentary proceedings, and the alliance between Parliament and the law, in contrast to the separation between the Estates General and the French *parlement*, helped to sustain parliamentary authority.[45] In Elizabethan England, lawyers played an increasingly important role in Parliament. In 1593, for instance, forty-three percent of the members of the House of Commons possessed a legal education. The Speaker and the other leading figures in the House were usually lawyers. Subsequently, the role of lawyers in the British Parliament declined in significance, reaching a low in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century only about twenty percent of the M.P.'s have been lawyers. In

[43] See J. W. Gough, *Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History* (Oxford 1955), 27.
[44] McIlwain, *High Court*, ix, 385-86.
[45] Holdsworth, 174, 184-85, 188-89.

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America, on the other hand, in the colonial governments, in the state governments, and in the national government, the Tudor heritage of lawyer-legislators has continued, with lawyers usually being a majority of the members of American legislative bodies.[46]

Every political system, as Bagehot pointed out, must gain authority and then use authority. In the modern British system these functions are performed by the dignified and efficient parts of the constitution. The assignment of each function to separate institutions is one aspect of the functional differentiation that is part of modernization. It can be seen most clearly, of course, in the case of the so-called constitutional monarchies, but in some degree it is found in almost all modern governments.[47] The American political system, however, like the older European political systems, does not assign dignified and efficient functions to different institutions. All major institutions of the American government—President, Supreme Court, House, Senate, and their state counterparts—combine in varying degrees both types of functions. This combination is, of course, most notable in the Presidency. Almost every other modern political system from the so-called constitutional monarchies of Great Britain and Scandinavia to the parliamentary republics of Italy, Germany, and France before De Gaulle, to the Communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe separates the chief of state from the head of government. In the Soviet system, the differentiation is carried still further to distinguish chief of state from head of government from party chief. In the United States, however, the President unites all three functions, this combination being both a major source of his power and a major limitation on that power, since the requirements of one role often conflict with the demands of another. The combination of roles perpetuates ancient practice. The Presidency was created, as Jefferson declared in 1787, as an "elective monarchy"; the office was designed to embody much of the power of the British king; and the politics that surround it are court politics.[48]

[46] See J. E. Neale, *The Elizabethan House of Commons* (London 1949), 290-95; Rowse, 307; Thompson, 169-73; Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (New York 1954), 28-31; J. F. S. Ross, *Elections and Electors* (London 1955), 444; W. L. Guttsman, *The British Political Elite* (New York 1963), 82, 90, 105; D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London 1960), 127.

[47] Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (London 1949), 3-4. See also Francis X. Sutton, "Representation and the Nature of Political Systems," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, II (October 1959), 7: ". . . the kind of distinction Bagehot made when he talked of the 'dignified' and 'efficient' parts of the English constitution is observed clearly in many states. . . . The discrimination of functions here rests, of course, on an analytical distinction relevant in any political system. It is that between symbolic representation and executive control."

[48] Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, December 20, 1787, *Writings* (Wash-

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The Presidency is, indeed, the only survival in the contemporary world of the constitutional monarchy once prevalent throughout medieval Europe. In the sixteenth century a constitutional monarch was one who reigned and ruled, but who ruled under law ("non sub homine sed sub Deo et lege") with due regard to the rights and liberties of his subjects, the type of monarch that Fortescue had in mind when he distinguished *dominium politicum et regale* from *dominium regale*. In the seventeenth century this old-style constitutional monarch was supplanted by the new-style absolute monarch who placed himself above the law. Subsequently, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the emergence of a new so-called "constitutional monarchy" in which a "dignified" monarch reigned but did not rule. Like the absolute monarch he is a modern invention created in response to the need to fix supreme power in a single organ. The American Presidency, on the other hand, continues the original type of constitutional monarchy. In functions and power, American Presidents are Tudor kings. In institutional role, as well as in personality and talents, Lyndon Johnson far more closely resembles Elizabeth I than does Elizabeth II. Britain preserved the form of the old monarchy, but America preserved the substance. Today America still has a king, Britain only a Crown.

In most modern states the legislative function is in theory in the hands of a large representative assembly, parliament, or supreme soviet. In practice, however, it is performed by a relatively small body of men—a cabinet or presidium—which exercises its power in all fields of governmental activity. In America, however, the legislative function remains divided among three distinct institutions and their subdivisions, much as it was once divided among the different estates and other constituted bodies in late medieval Europe. On the national level this arrangement derives not from the ideas of any European theorist but rather from the "institutional history of the colonies between 1606 and 1776."[49] The relations among burgesses, councils, and

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ington 1903-05), VI, 389-90; Ford, 293. For an elegant—and eloquent—essay on the President as king, see D. W. Brogan, "The Presidency," *Encounter* (January 1964), 3-7. I am in debt to Richard E. Neustadt for insights into the nature of the American monarchy and into the similarities between White House politics and palace politics. See also Pollard, *Factors in American History*, 72-73: ". . . down to this day the Executive in the United States is far more monarchical and monarchy far more personal than in the United Kingdom. 'He' is a single person there, but 'it' is a composite entity in Great Britain."

[49] Benjamin F. Wright, "The Origins of the Separation of Powers in America," *Economics*, XIII (May 1933), 169ff.

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governors in the colonies, in turn, reflected the relations among Crown, Lords, and Commons in the late sixteenth century.

In modern politics, the division of power between two bodies in a legislative assembly generally varies inversely with the effective power of the assembly as a whole. The Supreme Soviet has little power but is truly bicameral; the British Parliament has more power but is effectively unicameral. America, however, is unique in preserving a working bicameralism directly inherited from the sixteenth century. Only in Tudor times did the two houses of Parliament become formally and effectively distinguished, one from the other, on an institutional basis. "The century started with Parliament a unitary institution, truly bi-cameral only in prospect." When it ended, the growth in "the power, position, and prestige of the House of Commons" had made Parliament "a political force with which the Crown and government had to reckon."[50] The sixteenth century represented a peak of bicameralism in English parliamentary history. Each house often quashed bills that had passed the other house, and to resolve their differences the houses resorted to conference committees. Originally used as an "occasional procedure," in 1571 the conference committee was transformed into "a normal habit." In Elizabethan Parliaments, conferences were requested by one or the other house on most bills; the conference delegations were at times instructed not to yield on particular items; and when there were substantial differences between the versions approved by the two houses, the conference committee might substantially rewrite the entire bill, at times at the urging and with the advice of the Queen and her councillors. Although all this sounds very contemporary, it is, in fact, very Tudor, and it is this conference committee procedure that was carried over into the colonial legislatures and then extended to the national level. In Great Britain, however, the practice died out with the rise of cabinet responsibility to the Commons. The last real use of "Free Conferences," where discussion and hence politics were permitted, occurred about 1740.[51]

The participation of two assemblies and the chief executive in the legislative process caused the continuation in America of many other legislative methods familiar to Tudor government. An assembly that legislates must delegate some of its work to subordinate bodies or committees. Committees made their appearance in the Tudor Parlia-

[50] Neale, *Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments* (New York 1958), I, 16-17.

[51] *Ibid.*, 235, 287, 387-88, 412-13; G. F. M. Campion, *An Introduction to the Procedure of the House of Commons* (London 1929), 199; Ada C. McCown, *The Congressional Conference Committee* (New York 1927), 23-37.

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ment in the 1560's and 1570's. The practice of referring bills to committees soon became almost universal, and the committees, as they assumed more and more of the functions of the House, became larger and more often permanent. The committees were also frequently dominated by those with a special interest in the legislation that they considered. Bills concerned with local and regional problems went to committees composed of members from those regions and localities.[52] By the turn of the century the larger committees had evolved into standing committees which considered all matters coming up within a general sphere of business. This procedure reflected the active role of the Commons in the legislative process. The procedure was, in turn, exported to the colonies in the early seventeenth century—particularly to the Virginia House of Burgesses—where it also met a real need, and 150 years later was duplicated in the early sessions of the national Congress. At the same time in England, however, the rise of the cabinet undermined the committee system that had earlier existed in Parliament; the old standing committees of the House of Commons became empty formalities, indistinguishable from Committees of the Whole House, long before they were officially discontinued in 1832.

The division of the legislative function imposed similar duties upon the Speaker in the Tudor House of Commons and in subsequent American legislatures. The Tudor Speaker was a political leader, with a dual allegiance to the Crown and to the House. His success in large measure depended upon how well he could balance and integrate these often conflicting responsibilities. He was the "manager of the King's business" in the House, but he was also the spokesman for the House to the Crown and the defender of its rights and privileges. He could exercise much influence in the House by his control, subject to veto by the House, over the order in which bills were called up for debate and by his influence on the "timing and framing of questions." The struggle between Crown and Parliament in the seventeenth century, however, made it impossible for the Speaker to continue his loyalties to both. His overriding duty was now to the House, and, in due course, the impartiality of Onslow in the eighteenth century (1727-1761) became the norm for Speakers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus in Britain an office that had once been weighted with politics, efficient as well as dignified, radically changed its character and became that of a depoliticized, impartial presiding officer. In America, on the other hand, the political character of the

[52] Rowse, 307.

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Tudor Speakership was perpetuated in the colonial assemblies and eventually in the national House of Representatives.[53]

The sharing of the legislative function among two assemblies and the chief executive gives a strikingly Tudor character to the contemporary American law-making process. In Elizabethan England, Rowse observes, the "relations between Crown and Parliament were more like those between President and Congress than those that subsist in England today."[54] The Tudor monarchs had to badger, wheedle, cajole, and persuade the Commons to give them the legislation they wanted. At times they were confronted by unruly Parliaments which pushed measures the monarch did not want, or debated issues the monarch wished to silence. Generally, of course, the monarch's "legislative program," consisting primarily of requests for funds, was approved. At other times, however, the Commons would rear up and the monarch would have to withdraw or reshape his demands. Burghley, who was in charge of Parliamentary relations for Elizabeth, "kept a close eye on proceedings and received from the Clerks during the session lists showing the stages of all bills in both Houses."[55] Elizabeth regularly attempted to win support in the Commons for her proposals by sending messages and "rumours" to the House, by exhorting and instructing the Speaker on how to handle the business of the House, by "receiving or summoning deputations from the Houses to Whitehall and there rating them in person," and by "descending magnificently upon Parliament in her coach or open chariot and addressing them" personally or through the Lord Keeper.[56]

Although the sovereign did not "lack means of blocking obnoxious bills during their progress through the two Houses," almost every session of Parliament passed some bills that the Crown did not want, and the royal veto was exercised. Although the veto was used more frequently against private bills than against public ones, important public measures might also be stopped by the Crown. During her reign Elizabeth I apparently approved 429 bills and vetoed approximately 71. The veto, however, was not a weapon that the Crown could use without weighing costs and gains: ". . . politics—the art of the possible—were not entirely divorced from Tudor monarchy. Too drastic or ill-considered a use of the royal veto might have stirred up trouble."[57]

[53] Neale, *House of Commons*, 381 and *passim*; Holdsworth, 177; Campion, 11, 52-54.
[54] P. 294.
[55] Neale, *House of Commons*, 411.
[56] Rowse, 294-95.
[57] Neale, *House of Commons*, 410-12, and *Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments*, *passim*. Until the eighteenth century, Privy Councillors, of course, functioned as advisers to the King much as cabinet members now do to the President. Perhaps reflecting both

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The tactics of Henry VIII or Elizabeth I in relation to their Parliaments thus differed little from those of Kennedy or Johnson in relation to their Congresses. A similar distribution of power imposed similar patterns of executive-legislative behavior.

The differentiation of specialized administrative structures also took place much more rapidly in Europe than it did in America. The contrast can be strikingly seen in the case of military institutions. A modern military establishment consists of a standing army recruited voluntarily or through conscription and commanded by a professional officer corps. In Europe a professional officer corps emerged during the first half of the nineteenth century. By 1870 the major continental states had developed most of the principal institutions of professional officership. England, however, lagged behind the Continent in developing military professionalism, and the United States lagged behind Great Britain. Not until the turn of the century did the United States have many of the institutions of professional officership which the European states had acquired many decades earlier. The division of power among governmental institutions perpetuated the mixing of politics and military affairs, and enormously complicated the emergence of a modern system of objective civilian control. Even after World War II, many Americans still adhered to a "fusionist" approach to civil-military relations and believed that military leadership and military institutions should mirror the attitudes and characteristics of civil society.[58]

American reluctance to accept a standing army also contrasts with the much more rapid modernization in Europe. In the sixteenth century European military forces consisted of feudal levies, mercenaries, and local militia. In England the militia was an ancient institution, and the Tudors formally organized it on a county basis under the Lord Lieutenants to take the place of the private retinues of the feudal lords. This development was a step toward "domestic tranquility and military incompetence," and in 1600, "not a single western country had a standing army: the only one in Europe was that of the Turks."[59] By the end of the century, however, all the major European powers had

this similarity and the later drastic change that took place in the British cabinet is the fact that in the United States the executive leadership is still called "the Administration," as it was in eighteenth-century Britain, while in Britain itself, it is now termed "the Government."

[58] See, in general, Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), *passim*.

[59] J. H. Hexter, *Reappraisals in History* (Evanston 1962), 147; and Clark, 84. On the fundamental changes in European military practice, see Michael Roberts, *The Military Revolution: 1560-1660* (Belfast n.d.).

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standing armies. Discipline was greatly improved, uniforms introduced, regulations formalized, weapons standardized, and effective state control extended over the military forces. The French standing army dates from Richelieu; the Prussian from the actions of the Great Elector in 1655; the English from the Restoration of 1660. In England the county militia continued in existence after 1660, but steadily declined in importance.

In America, on the other hand, the militia became the crucial military force at the same time that it was decaying in Europe. It was the natural military system for societies whose needs were defensive rather than offensive and intermittent rather than constant. The seventeenth-century colonists continued, adapted, and improved upon the militia system that had existed in Tudor England. In the next century, they identified militia with popular government and standing armies with monarchical tyranny. "On the military side," as Vagts says, "the war of the American Revolution was in part a revolt against the British standing army. . . ."[60] But in terms of military institutions, it was a reactionary revolt. The standing armies of George III represented modernity; the colonial militias embodied traditionalism. The American commitment to this military traditionalism, however, became all the more complete as a result of the War of Independence. Hostility to standing armies and reliance on the militia as the first line of defense of a free people became popular dogma and constitutional doctrine, even though these were often departed from in practice. Fortunately, however, the threats to security in the nineteenth century were few, and hence the American people were able to go through that century with a happy confidence in an ineffective force protecting them from a nonexistent danger. The militia legacy, however, remained a continuing element in American military affairs far into the much more tumultuous twentieth century. It is concretely manifest today in the political influence and military strength of the National Guard. The idea that an expert military force is better than a citizen-soldier force has yet to win wholehearted acceptance on this side of the Atlantic.

IV. Tudor Polity and Modern Society

The rationalization of authority and the differentiation of structure were thus slower and less complete in America than they were in

[60] Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, rev. ed. (New York 1959), 92. See generally Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," *Military Affairs*, XXII (Summer 1958), 75-82.

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Europe. Such was not the case with the third aspect of political modernization: the broadening of political participation. Here, if anything, America led Europe, although the differences in timing in the expansion of participation were less significant than the differences in the way in which that expansion took place. These contrasts in political evolution were directly related to the prevalence of foreign war and social conflict in Europe as contrasted with America.

On the Continent, the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries were periods of intense struggle and conflict. For only three years during the entire seventeenth century was there a complete absence of fighting on the European Continent. Several of the larger states were more often at war during the century than they were at peace. The wars were usually complex affairs involving many states tied together in dynastic and political alliances. War reached an intensity in the seventeenth century which it had never reached previously and which was exceeded later only in the twentieth century.[61] The prevalence of war directly promoted political modernization. Competition forced the monarchs to build their military strength. The creation of military strength required national unity, the suppression of regional and religious dissidents, the expansion of armies and bureaucracies, and a major increase in state revenues. "The most striking fact" in the history of seventeenth-century conflict, Clark observes, "is the great increase in the size of armies, in the scale of warfare. . . . Just as the modern state was needed to create the standing army, so the army created the modern state, for the influence of the two causes was reciprocal. . . . The growth of the administrative machine and of the arts of government was directed and conditioned by the desire to turn the national and human resources of the country into military power. The general development of European institutions was governed by the fact that the continent was becoming more military, or, we may say, more militaristic."[62] War was the great stimulus to state-building.

In recent years much has been written about "defensive modernization" by the ruling groups in non-Western societies, such as Egypt

[61] Clark, 98; Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago 1942), I, 235-40. See also Clark, *War and Society in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge 1958), *passim*.

[62] *Seventeenth Century*, 99, 101-2. See also Wright, 256: ". . . it would appear that the political order of Europe changed most radically and rapidly in the seventeenth and twentieth centuries when war reached greatest intensity. The seventeenth century witnessed the supersession of feudalism and the Holy Roman Empire by the secular sovereign states of Europe. The twentieth century appears to be witnessing the supersession of the secular sovereign states by something else. Exactly what cannot yet be said."

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under Mohammed Ali, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, and Meiji Japan. In all these cases, intense early efforts at modernization occurred in the military field, and the attempts to adopt European weapons, tactics, and organization led to the modernization of other institutions in society. What was true of these societies was also true of seventeenth-century Europe. The need for security and the desire for expansion prompted the monarchs to develop their military establishments, and the achievement of this goal required them to centralize and to rationalize their political machinery.

Largely because of its insular position, Great Britain was a partial exception to this pattern of war and insecurity. Even so, one major impetus to the centralization of authority in English government came from the efforts of the Stuart kings to collect more taxes to build and man more ships to compete with the French and other continental powers. If it were not for the English Channel, the Stuart centralization probably would have succeeded. In America in the seventeenth century, however, continuing threats came only from the Indians. The nature of this threat, plus the dispersion of the settlements, meant that the principal defense force had to be the settlers themselves organized into militia units. There was little incentive to develop European-type military forces and a European-type state to support and control them.

Civil harmony also contributed significantly to the preservation of Tudor political institutions in America. Those institutions reflected the relative unity and harmony of English society during the sixteenth century. English society, which had been racked by the Wars of the Roses in the fifteenth century, welcomed the opportunity for civil peace that the Tudors afforded. Social conflict was minor during the sixteenth century. The aristocracy had been almost eliminated during the civil wars of the previous century. England was not perhaps a middle-class society but the differences between social classes were less then than they had been earlier and much less than they were to become later. Individual mobility rather than class struggle was the keynote of the Tudor years. "The England of the Tudors was an 'organic state' to a degree unknown before Tudor times, and forgotten almost immediately afterward."[63] Harmony and unity made it unnecessary to fix sovereignty in any particular institution; it could remain dispersed so long as social conflict was minimal.

The only major issue that disrupted the Tudor consensus was, of course, religion. Significantly, in sixteenth-century English history the Act of Supremacy meant the supremacy of the state over the church,

[63] McIlwain, *High Court*, 336; Rowse, 223ff.

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not the supremacy of one governmental institution over another or one class over another. After the brief interlude of the Marian struggles, however, the shrewd politicking and popular appeal of Elizabeth restored a peace among religious groups which was virtually unique in Europe at that time. The balance between Crown and Parliament and the combination of an active monarchy and common law depended upon this social harmony. Meanwhile on the Continent, civil strife had already reached a new intensity before the end of the sixteenth century. France alone had eight civil wars during the thirty-six years between 1562 and 1598, a period roughly comprising the peaceful reign of Elizabeth in England. The following fifty years saw Richelieu's struggles with the Huguenots and the wars of the Fronde. Spain was racked by civil strife, particularly between 1640 and 1652 when Philip IV and Olivares attempted to subdue Catalonia. In Germany, princes and parliaments fought each other. Where, as frequently happened, estates and princes espoused different religions, the controversy over religion inevitably broke the medieval balance of powers between princes and parliaments.[64]

English harmony ended with the sixteenth century. Whether the gentry were rising, falling, or doing both in seventeenth-century England, forces were at work in society disrupting Tudor social peace. The efforts to reestablish something like the Tudor balance broke down before the intensity of social and religious conflict. The brief period of Crown power between 1630 and 1640, for instance, gave way "to a short-lived restoration of something like the Tudor balance of powers during the first year of the Long Parliament (1641). This balance might perhaps have been sustained indefinitely, but for the rise of acute religious differences between the Crown and the militant Puritan party in the Commons."[65] In England, as in France, civil strife led to the demand for strong centralized power to reestablish public order. The breakdown of unity in society gave rise to irresistible forces to reestablish that unity through government.

Both Puritan and Cavalier emigrants to America escaped from English civil strife. The process of fragmentation, in turn, encouraged homogeneity, and homogeneity encouraged "a kind of immobility."[66] In America, environment reinforced heredity, as the common challenges of the frontier combined with the abundance of land to help

[64] Friedrich, 20-21; Sabine, 372-73. [65] Chrimes, 138.

[66] Louis Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies* (New York 1964), 3, 4, 6, 23. Hartz's theory of fragmentation furnishes an excellent general framework for the analysis of the atrophy of settlement colonies, while his concept of the American liberal consensus in large part explains the preservation of Tudor political institutions.

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perpetuate the egalitarian characteristics of Tudor society and the complexity of Tudor political institutions. And paradoxically, as Hartz has pointed out, the framers of the Constitution of 1787 reproduced these institutions on the federal level in the belief that the social divisions and conflict within American society made necessary a complex system of checks and balances. In reality, however, their Constitution was successful only because their view of American society was erroneous. So also, only the absence of significant social divisions permitted the continued transformation of political issues into legal ones through the peculiar institution of judicial review.[67] Divided societies cannot exist without centralized power; consensual societies cannot exist with it.

In continental Europe, as in most contemporary modernizing countries, rationalized authority and centralized power were necessary not only for unity but also for progress. The opposition to modernization came from traditional interests: religious, aristocratic, regional, and local. The centralization of power was necessary to smash the old order, break down the privileges and restraints of feudalism, and free the way for the rise of new social groups and the development of new economic activities. In some degree a coincidence of interest did exist between the absolute monarchs and the rising middle classes. Hence European liberals often viewed favorably the concentration of authority in an absolute monarch, just as modernizers today frequently view favorably the concentration of authority in a single "mass" party.

In America, on the other hand, the absence of feudal social institutions made the centralization of power unnecessary. Since there was no aristocracy to dislodge, there was no need to call into existence a governmental power capable of dislodging it.[68] This great European impetus to political modernization was missing. Society could develop and change without having to overcome the opposition of social classes with a vested interest in the social and economic status quo. The combination of an egalitarian social inheritance plus the plenitude of land and other resources enabled social and economic development to take place more or less spontaneously. Government often helped to promote economic development, but (apart from the abolition of slavery) it played only a minor role in changing social customs and social structure. In modernizing societies, the centralization of power varies di-

[67] Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York 1955), 9-10, 45-46, 85-86, 133-34, 281-82.
[68] *Ibid.*, 43.

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rectly with the resistance to social change. In the United States, where the resistance was little, so also was the centralization.

The differences in social consensus between Europe and America also account for the differences in the manner in which political participation expanded. In Europe this expansion was marked by discontinuities on two levels. On the institutional level, democratization meant the shift of power from monarchical ruler to popular assembly. This shift began in England in the seventeenth century, in France in the eighteenth century, and in Germany in the nineteenth century. On the electoral level, democratization meant the extension of the suffrage for this assembly from aristocracy to upper bourgeoisie, lower bourgeoisie, peasants, and urban workers. The process is clearly seen in the English reform acts of 1832, 1867, 1884, and 1918. In America, on the other hand, no such class differences existed as in England. Suffrage was already widespread in most colonies by independence, and universal white manhood suffrage was a fact in most states by 1830. The unity of society and the division of government meant that the latter was the principal focus of democratization. The American equivalent of the Reform Act of 1832 was the change in the nature of the Electoral College produced by the rise of political parties, and the resulting transformation of the Presidency from an indirectly elected, semi-oligarchical office to a popular one. The other major steps in the expansion of popular participation in the United States involved the extension of the electoral principal to all the state governors, to both houses of the state legislatures, to many state administrative offices and boards, to the judiciary in many states, and to the United States Senate. Thus, in Europe the broadening of participation meant the extension of the suffrage for one institution to all classes of society, while in America it meant the extension of the suffrage by the one class in society to all (or almost all) institutions of government.

In Europe the opposition to modernization within society forced the modernization of the political system. In America, the ease of modernization within society precluded the modernization of the political system. The United States thus combines the world's most modern society with one of the world's most antique polities. The American political experience is distinguished by frequent acts of creation but few, if any, of innovation. Since the Revolution, constitutions have been drafted for thirty-eight new political systems, but the same pattern of government has been repeated over and over again. The new constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii differ only in detail from

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the constitution of Massachusetts, originally drafted by John Adams in 1780. When else in history has such a unique series of opportunities for political experiment and innovation been so almost totally wasted?

This static quality of the political system contrasts with the prevalence of change elsewhere in American society. A distinguishing feature of American culture, Robin Williams has argued, is its positive orientation toward change. In a similar vein, two observers have noted, "In the United States change itself is valued. The new is good; the old is unsatisfactory. Americans gain prestige by being among the first to own next year's automobile; in England, much effort is devoted to keeping twenty-five-year-old cars in operating condition."[69] In three centuries, a few pitifully small and poor rural settlements strung along the Atlantic seaboard and populated in large part by religious exiles were transformed into a huge, urbanized, continental republic, the world's leading economic and military power. America has given the world its most modern and efficient economic organizations. It has pioneered social benefits for the masses: mass production, mass education, mass culture. Economically and socially, everything has been movement and change. Politically, however, the only significant institutional innovation has been federalism, and this, in itself, of course, was made possible only by the traditional hostility to the centralization of authority. Fundamental social and economic change has been combined with political stability and continuity. In a society dedicated to what is shiny new, the polity remains quaintly old.

Modernity is thus not all of a piece. The American experience demonstrates conclusively that some institutions and some aspects of a society may become highly modern while other institutions and other aspects retain much of their traditional form and substance. Indeed, this may be a natural state of affairs. In any system some sort of equilibrium or balance must be maintained between change and continuity. Change in some spheres renders unnecessary or impossible change in others. In America the continuity and stability of government has permitted the rapid change of society, and the rapid change in society has encouraged continuity and stability in government. The relation between polity and society may well be dialectical rather than complementary. In other societies, such as Latin America, a rigid social structure and the absence of social and economic change have been combined with political instability and the weakness of political

[69] Williams, *American Society*, 2nd ed., rev. (New York 1961), 571; Eli Ginzberg and Ewing W. Reilley, *Effecting Change in Large Organizations* (New York 1957), 18-19.

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institutions. A good case can be made, moreover, that the latter is the result of the former.[70]

This combination of modern society and Tudor polity explains much that is otherwise perplexing about political ideas in America. In Europe the conservative is the defender of traditional institutions and values, particularly those in society rather than in government. Conservatism is associated with the church, the aristocracy, social customs, the established social order. The attitude of conservatives toward government is ambivalent: Government is viewed as the guarantor of social order, but it also is viewed as the generator of social change. Society rather than government has been the principal conservative concern. European liberals, on the other hand, have had a much more positive attitude toward government. Like Turgot, Price, and Godwin, they have viewed the centralization of power as the precondition of social reform. They have supported the gathering of power into a single place—first the absolute monarch, then the sovereign assembly—where it can then be used to change society.

In America, on the other hand, these liberal and conservative attitudes have been thoroughly confused and partly reversed. Conservatism has seldom flourished because it has lacked social institutions to conserve. Society is changing and modern, while government, which the conservative views with suspicion, has been relatively unchanging and antique. With a few exceptions, such as a handful of colleges and churches, the oldest institutions in American society are governmental institutions. The absence of established social institutions, in turn, has made it unnecessary for American liberals to espouse the centralization of power as did European liberals. John Adams could combine Montesquieu's polity with Turgot's society much to the bafflement of Turgot. Nineteenth-century Europeans had every reason to be fascinated by America: It united a liberal society which they were yet to experience with a conservative politics which they had in large part forgotten.

V. Tudor Polity and Modernizing Societies

Recently much has been made of the relevance to the currently modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America of the earlier phases of modernization in the United States. It has been argued that the United States was and still should be a revolutionary power. The American Revolution, it has been said, "started a chain reaction"

[70] Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," *Western Political Quarterly*, IX (March 1956), 21-31.

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beginning with the French Revolution and leading on to the Russian Revolution which was "the American Revolution's child, though an unwanted and unacknowledged one."[71] But the effort to see connections and/or parallels between what happened in America in the eighteenth century and what is happening in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere in the twentieth century can only contribute to monstrous misunderstandings of both historical experiences. The American Revolution was not a social revolution like the French, Russian, Chinese, Mexican, or Cuban revolutions; it was a war of independence. Moreover, it was not a war of independence of natives against alien conquerors, like the struggles of the Indonesians against the Dutch, or of the Vietnamese or the Algerians against the French, but was instead a war of settlers against the home country. Any recent parallels are in the relation of the Algerian *colons* to the French Republic or of the Southern Rhodesians to the United Kingdom. It is in these cases, in the last of the European "fragments" to break their European ties, that the eighteenth-century experience of America may be duplicated. These, however, are not parallels of which American liberal intellectuals and statesmen like to be reminded.

The case for the relevance of the American experience to the contemporary modernizing countries has also been couched in terms of the United States as "The First New Nation." The United States, it has been argued, was the first nation "of any consequence to emerge from the colonial dominance of Western Europe as a sovereign state in its own right, and to that extent it shares something in common with the 'emerging nations' of today, no matter how different they may be in other respects."[72] The phrase "new nation," however, fails to distinguish between state and society, and hence misses crucial differences between the American experience and those of the contemporary modernizing countries. The latter are, for the most part, more accurately described by the title of another book: "Old Societies and New States."[73] America, on the other hand, was historically a new society but an old state. Hence the problems of government and political modernization that the contemporary modernizing states face differ fundamentally from those that confronted the United States.

[71] Arnold J. Toynbee, "If We Are To Be the Wave of the Future," *New York Times Magazine*, November 13, 1960, 123.

[72] See Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York 1963), Part I; J. Leiper Freeman, "The Colonial Stage of Development: The American Case," unpubl. paper, Comparative Administration Group, 1963, 4.

[73] See Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York 1963).

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In most countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, modernization faces tremendous social obstacles. The gaps between rich and poor, between modern elite and traditional mass, between the powerful and the weak—gaps that are the common lot of "old societies" trying to modernize today—contrast markedly with the "pleasing uniformity" of the "one estate" that existed in eighteenth-century America. As in seventeenth-century Europe these gaps can be overcome only by the creation of powerful, centralized authority in government. The United States never had to construct such authority in order to modernize its society, and hence its experience has little to offer modernizing countries today. America, De Tocqueville said, "arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution" and "was born equal without having to become so." So also American society was born modern; and it hence was never necessary to construct a government powerful enough to make it so. An antique polity is compatible with a modern society but it is not compatible with the modernization of a traditional society.

The Latin American experience, for instance, is almost exactly the reverse of that of the United States. After independence the United States continued essentially the same political institutions it had had before independence, which were perfectly suited to its society. At independence the Latin American countries inherited and maintained an essentially feudal social structure. They attempted to superimpose on this social structure republican political institutions copied from the United States and revolutionary France. Such institutions had no meaning in a feudal society. These early efforts at republicanism left Latin America with weak governments which until the twentieth century lacked the authority and power to modernize the society. Liberal, pluralistic, democratic governments serve to perpetuate antiquated social structure. Thus in Latin America an inherent conflict exists between the political goals of the United States—elections, democracy, representative government, pluralism, constitutionalism—and its social goals—modernization, reform, social welfare, more equitable distribution of wealth, development of a middle class. In the North American experience these goals did not conflict. In Latin America, they often clash head on. The variations of the North American political system which North Americans would like to reproduce in Latin America are simply too weak, too diffuse, too dispersed to mobilize the political power necessary to bring about fundamental change. Such power can be mobilized by revolution, as it was in Mexico and Cuba, and a historical function of revolutions is to re-

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place weak governments by strong governments capable of achieving social change. The question for Latin America and similarly situated countries is whether other ways short of violent revolution exist for generating the political power necessary to modernize traditional societies.

However it occurs, the accumulation of power necessary for modernization makes the future of democracy rather bleak. Countries, such as France and Prussia, which took the lead in political modernization in the seventeenth century have had difficulty in maintaining stable democracy in the twentieth century. Countries in which the seventeenth-century tendencies toward absolute monarchy were either defeated (England), stalemated (Sweden), or absent (America) later tended to develop more viable democratic institutions. The continued vitality of medieval estates and pluralistic assemblies is associated with subsequent democratic tendencies. "It is no accident, surely," Carsten observes, "that the liberal movement of the nineteenth century was strongest in those areas of Germany where the Estates survived the period of absolute government."[74] Similarly, in seventeenth-century Spain, Catalonia was the principal locus of feudal opposition to the centralizing and rationalizing efforts of Olivares, but in the twentieth century it has been the principal locus of Spanish liberalism and constitutionalism. In eighteenth-century Europe also, the conflict between traditional liberties and modernizing reforms was a pervasive one, and the conservative and even reactionary efforts of the "constituted bodies" to maintain and to restore their privileges laid the basis for later, more popular, resistance against despotism.[75]

If a parallel exists between seventeenth-century modernization and twentieth-century modernization, the implications of the former for the latter are clear. Despite arguments to the contrary, the countries where modernization requires the concentration of power in a single, monolithic, hierarchical, but "mass," party are not likely to be breeding

[74] P. 434; Friedrich, 20-25.

[75] Palmer, *passim*, but esp. 323-407. Of the Belgian revolution of 1787 against Joseph II, Palmer writes (p. 347), "The issue was clear. It was between social change and constitutional liberty. Reform would come at the cost of arbitrary government overriding the articulate will and historic institutions of the country. Or liberty would be preserved at the cost of perpetuating archaic systems of privilege, property, special rights, class structure, ecclesiastical participation in the state. It was a revolution against the innovations of a modernizing government—in a sense, a revolution *against* the Enlightenment. It was not in this respect untypical of the time."

Compare this with David Apter's conclusion that in contemporary Africa "the degree of autocracy which emerges after independence is in virtual proportion to the degree of antagonism the government shows to tradition" (*The Political Kingdom in Uganda* [Princeton 1961], 476).

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grounds for democracy.[76] Mass participation goes hand-in-hand with authoritarian control. As in Guinea and Ghana, it is the twentieth-century weapon of modernizing centralizers against traditional pluralism. Democracy, on the other hand, is more likely in those countries that preserve elements of traditional social and political pluralism. Its prospects are brightest where traditional pluralism is adapted to modern politics, as appears to be the case with the caste associations of India and as may be the case with tribal associations in some parts of Africa. So also, Lebanon, the most democratic Arab country—indeed, perhaps the only democratic Arab country—has a highly traditional politics of confessional pluralism.[77] Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe, the non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both.

In each historical period one type of political system usually seems to its contemporaries to be particularly relevant to the needs and demands of the age. In the era of European state-building in the seventeenth century, the "pattern-state," to use Sir George Clark's phrase, was the Bourbon monarchy of France. Indeed, the new state that emerged in that century, as Clark argues, "may be called the French type of monarchy not only because it reached its strongest and most logical expression in France, but also because it was consciously and deliberately copied elsewhere from the Bourbon model."[78] This type of centralized, absolute monarchy met the paramount needs of the time. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the pattern-state was the British parliamentary system. The countries of Europe then faced the problems of democratization and the incorporation into the polity of the lower social orders. The British system furnished the model for this phase of modernization. Today, in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, political systems face simultaneously the

[76] See Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence* (New York 1961), 159-63; and Ruth Schachter (Morgenthau), "Single-Party Systems in West Africa," *American Political Science Review*, LV (June 1961), 294-307, for the case for the liberal and democratic potential of single-party states. For more realistic evaluations, see Martin L. Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single-Party Tendencies in African Politics," *World Politics*, XV (January 1963), 262-94; and Aristide Zolberg, "The African Mass-Party State in Perspective," unpubl. paper prepared for Annual Meeting, APSA, September 1964.

[77] See Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIII (March 1960), 5-22; Lloyd I. Rudolph, "The Modernity of Tradition: The Democratic Incarnation of Caste in India," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (December 1965), 975-89; and Michael C. Hudson, "Pluralism, Power, and Democracy in Lebanon," unpubl. paper prepared for Annual Meeting, APSA, September 1964.

[78] *Seventeenth Century*, 83, 90-91.

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needs to centralize authority, to differentiate structure, and to broaden participation. The system that seems most relevant to the simultaneous achievement of these goals is a one-party system. If Versailles set the standard for one century and Westminster for another, the Kremlin may well be the most relevant model for the modernizing countries of this century. The heads of minor German principalities aped Louis XIV; the heads of equally small and backward states today may ape Lenin and Mao. The primary need their countries face is the accumulation and concentration of power, not its dispersion, and it is in Moscow and Peking and not in Washington that this lesson is to be learned.

Nor should this irrelevance of the American polity come as a great surprise. Historically foreigners have always found American society more attractive than the American polity. Even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Beloff observes, "the political appeal of the new country was less potent than the social one."[79] De Tocqueville was far more impressed by the democracy of American society and customs than he was by its democratic institutions of government. In the last century Europeans have found much to emulate in American business organization and in American culture, but they have found little reason to copy American political institutions. Parliamentary democracies and one-party dictatorships abound throughout the world. But surely one of the striking features of world politics is the rarity of other political systems based on the American presidential model.

The irrelevance of the American polity to the rest of the world, however, must not be overdone. It is of little use to societies that must modernize a traditional order. But, as the American experience itself demonstrates, a Tudor polity is quite compatible with a modern society. Consequently it is possible, although far from necessary, that as other societies become more fully modern, as the need to disestablish old, traditional, feudal, and local elements declines, the need to maintain a political system capable of modernization may also disappear. Such a system will, of course, have the advantage of tradition and of association with successful social change, so the probabilities are that it will not change greatly. But at least the possibility exists that there may be some evolution toward an American-type system. The "end of ideology" in Western Europe, the mitigation of class conflict, the tendencies toward an "organic society," all suggest that the European countries could now tolerate more dispersed and relaxed political institutions. Some elements of the American system seem to be creeping back into Europe from which they were exported three centuries

[79] Max Beloff, *The Age of Absolutism: 1660-1815* (London 1954), 168-69.

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ago.[80] Judicial review has made a partial and timorous reappearance on the Continent. After De Gaulle, the constitution of the Fifth Republic might well shake down to something not too far removed from the constitution of the American Republic. Mr. Harold Wilson was accused, before and after coming to power, of acting like Mr. President. These are small straws in the wind. They may not mean anything. But if they do mean anything, they mean that the New Europe may eventually come to share some of the old institutions that the New World has preserved from an older Europe.

[80] See, e.g., Stephen Graubard, ed., *A New Europe?* (Boston 1964); Stanley Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America," *Daedalus*, XCIII (Fall 1964), 1249, 1252-53. On the role of the courts see Taylor Cole, "Three Constitutional Courts: A Comparison," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (December 1959), 963-84; and Gottfried Dietze, "America and Europe—Decline and Emergence of Judicial Review," *Virginia Law Review*, XLIV (December 1958), 1233-72.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, AND POLITICAL GOODS

By J. ROLAND PENNOCK*

POLITICAL theorists from Plato to the present have concerned themselves not only with the nature of the polity as we know it, but with how it came to be, what purposes it serves, and by what stages it has developed. The last item, however, has more often than not been slighted. This lack now forces itself on our attention for an obvious reason: Never before have so many "new states" come into being in so short a span of time and never before have students of politics been provided with so many living examples of states at all stages of development, many of them conspicuously failing to perform vital functions, frequently to the extent that disorder and violent change prevail.

The modern approach to this exciting new specimen collection for political scientists makes major use of the concepts of "political development" and "political systems." Each concept presents its difficulties. In the case of political development, it is partly a matter of securing agreement upon definition and partly a matter of avoiding certain implications that easily attach to the term. In the case of "political systems," various writers have felt that the close linkage between systems theory and equilibrium analysis tends to color this approach with a static cast of thought.[1] My aim is to contribute to this discussion by introducing a third term, "political goods," and relating it to the other two. Before discussing this new element, it is essential to the subsequent argument to give a brief sketch of the schema to which it is to be added.

I. Political Development and the Political System

By an act of deliberate oversimplification, economists frequently reduce economic development to a single variable: per capita income. No comparable course is open to the student of political development,

* I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and criticisms, at various stages, from John W. Chapman, Charles E. Gilbert, David G. Smith, and Bryce Wood.

[1] Two recent discussions by leaders in the theoretical elaboration of, respectively, "political development" and "political systems" have dealt with these problems. See Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," *World Politics*, XVII (January 1965), 183-214; and David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965), esp. chap. 2.

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for this phenomenon is not unilinear; it has many facets and dimensions, and none of them is easily measured.[2] At the very least, one must deal with the political culture, with informal political institutions, with governmental and constitutional arrangements, and with the operation of the whole, including the mutual relations of the various elements.

In "systems" terminology, one speaks of the political environment, the inputs (demands and supports), the conversion processes, communications (including feedback), and, to a limited degree, of outputs. Institutionalization and structural differentiation, while they find place in systems theory, tend to be assigned a minor importance.[3]

The political culture comprises a complex of attitudes, sentiments, myths, ideologies, and goals relating to government, to politics, to political roles, and to the entirety (the political system and the society of which it is an aspect). It includes the sense of individual identity and self-respect, and the concepts of rights and duties that characterize the people generally. The state of information and opinion on public matters is also a significant part of it. An inventory of a political culture will note not only the nature, content, and extent or intensity of each of these items but also the way in which they are distributed among the masses and various elites. In short, the political culture

[2] "Political development," "political modernization," and other locutions used to describe the same phenomena all have their drawbacks. It should be made clear that the biological connotations of inevitability, uniform stages, and unvarying patterns are excluded from the term "development" when it is applied to the political realm. Political development may be interrupted and its institutional manifestations may revert in part to earlier patterns, sometimes to the accompaniment of further development on another front—perhaps economic. One thinks of "Tudor despotism" following "Lancastrian constitutionalism." (One might think also of the child who had started to talk but who, on learning to walk, apparently loses the speech capability for several months.) Development may be arrested for long periods, as in Spain and Portugal; it may also be very uneven, with bureaucracy developing at one period at the expense of popular participation—or vice versa; and, of course, it may reverse its direction. See S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (Glencoe 1963), 342-53. Even the organic analogy, which should certainly not be pressed too far, is by no means incompatible with the notion of political deterioration, decay, and, for that matter, illness, and death. These terms supply the means for coping, terminologically, with phenomena that would otherwise call for such strange concepts as "undevelopment," or "backward development."

[3] David Easton, in his *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs 1965), states that "from the point of view of the analysis being developed, structure is definitely secondary, so much so that only incidentally and for secondary purposes need discussion of structures be introduced" (p. 49). Neither "institution" nor "institutionalization" appears in the index of this volume or in that of his *Systems Analysis of Political Life*, nor are they discussed at any length in these volumes. The closest he comes to such a discussion is in the elaboration of the concept of "authorities," while protesting that he is not lapsing into "arid legal formalism" (*A Systems Analysis*, 214).

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itself has many dimensions. One might venture to summarize a large part of what constitutes development of these dimensions by saying that a polity becomes more developed as its political culture achieves a sense of national identity without being reduced to monolithic simplicity and also as it incorporates the prevailing world culture, including as elements of the latter the secularization of politics, achievement orientation, and rationality.

The second dimension (or category of dimensions) of political development comprises the elements of the political system itself, its institutions and organized structures. The informal political and semipolitical institutions that provide the means (if any) for popular participation in politics, ranging from mildest influence to final decision-making, come under this heading. They include elections, political parties, and semipolitical organizations such as labor unions, cooperatives, religious organizations, businessmen's and producers' organizations, youth organizations, and other voluntary organizations exerting political influence. Development in this area is measured by the extent of these provisions for political activity, by the degree to which political activities are differentiated from other forms of social activity, by the extent and depth of popular participation, and by the invention or adoption of methods, such as party competition, for making participation effective. One student has attempted to reduce the notion of political development to popular participation, by speaking of it as "changes in the direction of greater distribution and reciprocity of power."[4]

The informal political institutions would have little point were it not for the formal organs of government, ranging all the way from electoral systems through representative assemblies and electorally accountable political leadership, and including the organs of administration and adjudication. Development here begins with the simple matter of differentiation between structures that are distinctly political and those that are not. Division of labor among governmental organs for such special purposes as tax gathering, adjudication, determination of general policies, and so on, with the boundaries or jurisdictions sharply maintained, constitutes a further stage of political development. So, too, does the creation of devices for limiting arbitrariness and for the protection of rights, for enforcing accountability, and

[4] Frederick W. Frey, "Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey," in Lucian W. Pye, *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 301. He adds to these ingredients the overall level of power, and notes, in a passage suggestive of the difficulties of this subject, that an increase in the distribution of power may have an adverse effect on its overall level (pp. 303, 324).

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for the distribution of power, geographically or otherwise. All elements of the Weberian legal-rational model, such as a bureaucracy characterized by hierarchy, rationality, discipline, professionalization, achievement orientation, and so on, find place here. Bureaucracy, as Talcott Parsons has pointed out, is a powerful adaptive factor for any political system, enabling it to conduct military operations more successfully, to control its natural resources more effectively, to foster productive enterprise, to raise more money through taxation, and to maintain order and control deviant behavior among large and heterogeneous populations.[5] Much the same is true of a universalized legal order.

Whether political and governmental structures are formal or informal, incorporated in the legal structure or not, it is of greatest importance that they should be institutionalized; and the process of institutionalization is as surely part of development as are specialization of function and differentiation of structure. It is when certain forms and procedures become the accepted ways of doing things that they become effective instruments of stability and of legitimation.[6]

Part or all of a particular category of development may remain static or may even deteriorate while others are progressing. By means of a dictatorship, for example, a polity may be attaining greater national integration, not to mention order, stability, and satisfaction of needs, while the institutions (and perhaps even the organizational forms) for popular participation are neglected or suppressed. As was remarked above, one dimension of political development may, under certain circumstances, be elongated while another is truncated. One may find oneself comparing two polities, one of which is highly developed in a given respect (say, popular participation) and stunted in another (say, the rule of law), while the situation in the other polity is quite the reverse. In some such cases it may not be possible to make a sensible judgment that one is politically more developed than the other.[7]

[5] "Evolutionary Universals in Society," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (June 1964), 339-57, at 349.

[6] This point is ably argued by Samuel P. Huntington in "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.

[7] This statement is entirely compatible with the opinion that development in both respects would be more functional, more favorable to the survival of the polity, and for this reason preferable. Parsons, for example, argues that the existence of a definitive link between popular participation and ultimate control of decision-making is so great an aid in building and maintaining support for the political-legal system as a whole and for its outputs (binding rules and decisions) that, for large-scale societies, the "democratic association" is an "evolutionary universal" ("Evolutionary Universals," 340-41, 353-55). Anticipating an objection, he declares, "I realize that to take this position I must maintain that communist totalitarian organization will

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Other dimensions of political development involve the operation of the political system as a whole and the relations among its parts. Generally speaking, it is here that systems analysis has made its greatest contribution, especially through Parsons' elucidation of the functions of a system, such as "pattern maintenance" (including "tension management"), adaptation, and integration.[8]

The concept of legitimacy belongs here. The capacity of a political system to convert power into authority, to secure the popular acceptance of its acts as legitimate and to channel order-threatening struggles for power through the political machine, subjecting them to constitutional restraints, is a measure of its development. A key example, indeed a rather special and particularly important case of the legitimacy factor, is the ability of the system to provide for peaceful and orderly transfers of power.

David Easton identifies "persistence" as perhaps the central feature of a political system—the persistence, that is, not of any particular institutions or forms (thus differentiating the term from "pattern maintenance") but of "some kind of system for making and executing binding decisions."[9] He is not discussing political development as such, but presumably he would judge the development of a political system primarily in terms of its proven capacity to persist. This capacity would involve the ability to satisfy demands, to handle stressful situations, and to maintain support.

Other discussions vary the emphasis slightly by stressing the capacity of the polity to mobilize social forces and to direct the course and rate of social and economic change.[10] But enough has been said to provide the setting for a discussion of "political goods" as an additional dimension of political development, or at least as a category

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probably not fully match 'democracy' in political and integrative capacity in the long run. I do indeed predict that it will prove to be unstable and will either make adjustments in the general direction of elective democracy and a plural party system or 'regress' into generally less advanced and politically less effective forms of organization, failing to advance as rapidly or as far as might otherwise be expected" (p. 356). Incidentally, this statement from the leading systems theorist needs to be taken into account by those who argue that systems theory tends to be static.

[8] See, for instance, Parsons, "Some Highlights of the General Theory of Action," in Roland Young, *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston 1958), 282-301, esp. 292-95.

[9] *A Framework*, 78; also 88, and chap. 6 generally.

[10] Pye, 18. Karl W. Deutsch declares that political development should mean the ability to absorb more and more information from the environment, the ability to respond to and change the environment more effectively, in accordance with needs, and an increase in the range and diversity of the goals that the organization can follow (*The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* [New York 1963], 139-40).

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that needs to be duly taken into account in comparing polities and evaluating their development.

II. Goals, Outputs, Outcomes, and Political Goods

The discussion to this point has been largely confined to environmental and "internal" factors, i.e., to the political culture and to the organization and functioning of the political system rather than to its outputs. Such references as have been made to outputs deal principally with those that operate directly on the system itself, or on the political culture, as by building support for the system ("pattern maintenance"), regulating its own processes ("adaptation"), or maintaining its unity ("integration"). To be sure, it is also recognized that political systems develop their own autonomous political goals and that the attainment of these collective goals is one of their major functions, providing an important measure of their development.[11] But a question arises: Is one goal as good as another or are states to be judged partly by the goals they select? Here we enter the realm of political goods.[12]

Note that we are no longer discussing only "outputs," in the sense of binding policies and decisions; rather, we are considering "*outcomes*." We are talking about the consequences of outputs—consequences for the people, for the society as a whole, or for some subset other than the polity, as, for instance, the economy or the family. We are indeed still dealing with the attainment of political goals, but the focus of attention is upon those goals that satisfy "needs"—not just needs of the state as such, matters that will enable it to persist, but human needs whose fulfillment makes the polity valuable to man, and gives it its justification. I shall call these goals "political goods."

The degree to which a political system achieves these political goods may be considered yet another dimension of political development. The

[11] See Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe 1960), 181-82; Parsons, " 'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe 1959), 83ff.; and Karl von Vorys, "Toward a Concept of Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 358 (March 1965), 14-19, at 19.

[12] The political-development literature is not devoid of references to this aspect of the subject, but for the most part they are brief and almost incidental. Pye, for instance, in the process of listing many of the items discussed in the preceding pages, lists, without elaboration, "a clear recognition of the rights and duties of citizens," and a care for "the public interest" (p. 18). In discussing the problems with which new states in particular are confronted, Almond mentions, along with two problems of the kind discussed above ("national integration" and "political participation"), two substantive problems: "international accommodation" and "welfare distribution" ("Political Systems and Political Change," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VI [June 1963], 3-10, 7).

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important point, however, is that, when we seek to compare a political system either with another political system or with its own past, its output of political goods should constitute one important element in our evaluation.[13]

What is a "political good"? The particular goals pursued by political systems vary greatly from time to time and from place to place. Even the broad purposes they serve may vary somewhat in accordance with the polity's stage of development and its total situation. The maintenance of order and the provision of security for the group as a whole and for its individual members, however, appears to be almost a universal objective of political organization and activity, and it is certainly one of the principal values it supplies. And if indeed a polity does help create order and security it would be hard to deny that, to that extent, it was generating a political good.[14]

Other things being equal, then, I would contend that a political system that provides more security is more "developed" than one that provides less. Certain further comments are in order. In the first place, it is important to point out some of the items covered by that all-important "other things being equal." The extent to which a polity may be able to provide security, especially against attack from without, is only partly subject to its own control. To a certain degree Switzerland's record for security against foreign attack is doubtless attributable to her own policies and their implementation. To an even greater extent, however, it may be the accidents of geography that account for its good record in this regard. Surely one would not wish to give a polity low marks because of matters beyond its control. In fact the whole issue of security against attack from without, in the modern world at least, is so vexed that, save in clear and extreme cases, one would hesitate to give great weight to it in evaluating a state or judging its degree of development. At the same time one recognizes, with Almond, that "international accommodation" is one of the polity's

[13] Not all political goods result strictly from "outputs" of the political system. Some derive directly from the political process, as by-products, so to speak. For instance, political participation is part of the political process; it may help build up political support for the system in the future; it may provide guidance as to demand and need; and at the same time it may contribute directly to the welfare of the individuals concerned by giving them expressive outlets and contributing to their individual development. In these last-mentioned ways, it creates a political good, whether or not the polity had selected this good as one of its goals.

[14] I say "to that extent" because it might be that in a particular situation order is incompatible with other political goods and therefore, while it is good in itself, it should be temporarily sacrificed to make possible the creation of other goods. In such a discussion as this, the all-important qualifier "other things being equal" must be taken as understood even when it is not expressed.

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important functions. "International order," to be sure, would be highly relevant for evaluating the development of the incipient world political system or of such a relatively undeveloped political system as that of NATO or the Organization of American States.

To go beyond security to a consideration of military power as an aspect of political development seems hardly proper. We would not say that the United States is more politically developed than, say, Canada, because it could undoubtedly defeat Canada in war. It is of course more powerful, but its greater power derives from its greater natural and human resources rather than from anything peculiar to the political systems of the two countries. Of course political development may have an effect on military potential. Doubtless superior political development has something to do with the fact that Israel is more than a match for the United Arab Republic, even though the population of the latter is over ten times as great. Obviously other factors, not in themselves political, help account for the difference. Current usage is right, I believe, in not including military might as itself an aspect or measure of political development, while still recognizing that political development will be one factor in determining the military potential of a country.

When it comes to the matter of internal security, however, the situation is quite different. The security a man enjoys in walking the streets at night, the assurance he has of the safety of his house and property, these are matters that are or should be within the state's control. Save under the most unusual circumstances—chaos created by some natural catastrophe, for example—it would appear to be altogether proper to rank a state higher, on developmental or other scales of evaluation, in proportion as its record for providing this kind of security is good.

From security, a relatively precise concept, we may move to "welfare," one of the most vague. I include here both material welfare and the more intangible elements of psychic or spiritual welfare. In the final analysis everything that contributes to happiness or contentment should probably find a home here if it is not included under one of the more specific headings.

The extent to which welfare is to be attributed to the political system is of course a matter for study in each case. For the most part, the poverty of the Eskimos can hardly be attributed to their political organization, or lack of it. Nor can the polity of Kuwait take credit for the high per capita income of its people. How far the state *assumes* responsibility for matters having to do with many aspects of welfare

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varies greatly with circumstances. Yet that variance itself often reflects the degree of political development, although it is also a function of the way other social structures are operating. If the family is taking adequate care of its own needy members, the state may well abstain from action in this field. But when economic security or other human needs—education, for example—are not being taken care of to the extent that the resources of the society would justify, then whether and how effectively the political organization steps in is a measure of the society's political development. Generally speaking, the promotion of economic growth, whether indirectly by supplying the necessary infrastructure, by providing conditions that encourage the immigration of foreign capital and expertise, or more directly by governmental "planning" and enterprise, is today accepted as a proper function of government; and the effective energies spent on it constitute a measure of the society's political development.

Welfare includes much more than physical welfare. Such matters as growth in individual dignity and self-respect and the development of individual capacities (as long as they are not used to the detriment of others) come under this heading. The polity may make a contribution in this area by providing for widespread political participation. Robert Ward includes among the specifications of the modern polity "widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system, though not necessarily in the decision-making aspects thereof."[15] He is making a descriptive statement. I would simply add that, where participation in decision-making contributes to the achievement of consensus, legitimacy, or the achievement of political goals, it counts as a sign of political development; and moreover that, where it contributes to individual capacity and self-respect, it is also a measure of political development, in the absence of offsetting negative effects.

A third political good is justice. Again we are dealing with a concept that covers a large area. Some parts of the area are ill-defined and in dispute, but even without these sections we have a sizable parcel that has been well surveyed, and title to which, as within the political province, is well established. To settle disputes that threaten to lead to violence or to divide the polity and thus expose it to attack or civil war is clearly one of the first functions undertaken by the political system. Equally it is a mark of political development when the number and kinds of disputes among its members over which the judicial machinery of the polity successfully takes jurisdiction grows

[15] "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan," *World Politics*, XV (January 1963), 569-96, 571.

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and approaches a monopoly. Likewise, we recognize that a political system is developing as it acquires standards, machinery, and modes of procedure that facilitate judgments based on full and accurate information, that treat like cases alike, and that protect society with a minimum of degradation and a maximum of rehabilitation for its deviant members.[16]

"Justice according to law," "the rule of law," and related concepts (e.g., "due process") do not of course exhaust the content of "justice." Nor do they exhaust the area in which we can find substantial agreement. Take equality of opportunity. As applied to the bureaucracy, and marked by appointment to office on a merit rather than an ascriptive basis, this principle is generally recognized as a test of political development. I would suggest that a polity that secures the application of this principle throughout the society, and not just in administrative and political circles, has achieved a significant political good. (Of course many people in this country and others would take issue with the universal application of the principle of equality of opportunity; but generally, I believe, it would be on the grounds that under the circumstances in question it would result in so much harm as to warrant the injustice done by limiting its application.)

How much further can one go in elaborating principles of justice to which general agreement could be secured? To answer that ques-

[16] It will be noted that I have here reverted to discussion of the processes and organization of government, but the point is that their value is to be judged by their outputs—or more specifically, by the out*comes* of these outputs.

It might be objected that modern totalitarian dictatorships may not subscribe to the standards of justice according to law outlined above. Are we then to call them less "developed" than modern constitutional regimes? I would suggest three replies to such an argument, any one of which would seem to me adequate. In the first place, we might avoid the issue by saying that whether or not you call these regimes "developed," to the extent that their standards of the administration of justice do not meet the principles outlined above—to that extent, all else apart—they are less productive of "political goods" than are polities that do conform to these principles. Secondly, I would be quite happy to say that to this extent they are in fact less developed, less fitted to fulfill the needs of men and society. Finally, I would doubt that in fact totalitarian regimes have questioned the principles set forth above. Where practices differ it is generally, I suggest, for one of two reasons. It may be claimed that values are in conflict and that "justice" in the legalistic sense has to be sacrificed to some more basic value, perhaps the security of the political system itself. Thus for instance when individuals are punished for the alleged crimes of others it is generally on the theory that the threat of such punishment is, under existing circumstances, a necessary mechanism of social control (cf. the Supreme Court's justification for our wartime treatment of the Japanese Americans). Alternatively, the problem may be one of disagreement as to what are "like" cases. If it is believed, for instance, that a Jew is a human being of an inferior type and that his behavior subverts sound Aryan standards, then even one who accepts the formal standards of justice belonging to the "Western" tradition must come to a differing conclusion because of his factual judgment of what a Jew is or does.

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tion would take me far beyond the bounds of this article. A few hypothetical questions, however, may suggest that what has been said thus far by no means reaches the outer limits of the area of agreement. Is it unjust to punish willful injury to others, where no justification based on standards accepted by the society is offered? Is it unjust to compel an individual to live up to a contract that met the prevailing legal conditions for a contract when it was made? Is it unjust to require an individual to restore the acknowledged property of another person which has somehow come into his possession?

Finally, I would add, as a fourth political good, "liberty." One's first reaction might be that liberty is a peculiarly "Western," parochial value. But this is not the case. Meanings vary, and so does the relative importance attributed to liberty. Even so, as in the case of justice, the area of pure relativity is less extensive than might at first appear. Why is security so generally sought after? Is it because people wish to avoid uncertainty, suffering, and violent death? But this kind of security, as has often been pointed out, they could enjoy in a prison cell or, in a measure, as slaves. It can hardly be doubted that some freedom to move about and to make choices in areas of one's interests is a desideratum for virtually all sane human beings. And most certainly the demands and needs that lead to the formation and development of a political system include this element. Put in these terms, the point hardly seems to call for further justification. Clearly a major purpose of "law and order" is to make it possible for people to enjoy a predictable environment and to be free and feel free to exercise their own choices. For Communists, liberty is one of the highest goals. What we would consider serious abridgments of liberty in Communist countries they justify as necessary to the realization of the ultimate free society, or as restrictions on one kind of liberty (e.g., freedom of speech) for the protection of another ("economic" liberty), or for the preservation of a regime dedicated to the creation of the cooperative commonwealth. Even fascist regimes, while being extremely parsimonious with this particular kind of political good, give at least tacit recognition to its value by the justification they advance for their treatment of it. Liberty, they argue, must be restricted because it is destructive of political unity, or, as we might say, of the political culture. For the political system to allow it in great measure would be to lead, they believe, to the serious injury, perhaps the dissolution, of the body politic itself. The difference here between the fascist and the democratic view is not so much a matter of what is of ultimate value as it is a question of what is possible and what are the likely consequences

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of a given policy. Typically, fascist regimes have risen where the bourgeois liberty of free speech has been charged, not always without reason, with leading to stultifying deadlock destructive of all other political goods.

III. Further Observations

While the very general values discussed above as "political goods" are, I believe, either expressly or tacitly recognized as goods with substantial universality, in many particular situations they are relativistic. Those things necessary for the persistence of the political system, which is essential to all else, must take priority. In a given case this necessity may call for the abrogation or abridgment of interests and values otherwise judged fundamental. Moreover, human interests are subject to certain natural orderings. Just as life is essential to the enjoyment of all human values, so the necessities of life must first be satisfied; the hungry man will set small store by liberty or many elements of welfare. A political system that fails to provide basic security or to provide—or enable the economy to provide—minimum subsistence cannot then be judged highly developed no matter how much liberty it succeeds in guaranteeing.

Moreover, the production of political goods cannot serve as the sole test for the development of the polity in the same way that the production of economic goods serves economists as a measure of economic development. In the most simple society at least some of the goods we have termed "political" may be enjoyed with little or no aid from the political system, or at least from any distinct entity identifiable as a political system. But this is only a limiting case. In large and complicated societies political goods are not forthcoming in satisfactory degree without a considerable development of political culture, institutions, and organization.

Political systems are subject to deterioration as well as to development. They may decline, and they may even be destroyed by internal as well as external forces. Eisenstadt has described this process at length, documented it for many cases, and explained something of its dynamics.[17] For instance, he points out that after a bureaucracy along Weberian lines has become highly developed, its foundations may be undermined by conflict between ruling groups and other major social strata, with the consequence that the political system is gradually transformed in the direction of less differentiation and flexibility. It is sig-

[17] *Political Systems of Empires.*

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nificant to note his finding that "one crucial aspect of such a breakdown . . . was the tendency of the bureaucracy itself to displace its service goals to the rulers and the major strata—emphasizing goals of self-aggrandizement, and thus seriously impairing its own efficiency."[18] In other words the political system retrogresses whether judged by aspects of its structure, such as differentiation, or by its outputs and their effect on the welfare or other "good" of the society as a whole or of important parts of it.

IV. Measurement of Political Goods

I have spoken of the output of political goods as a basis for evaluation and even as a "dimension" of political development. Against this suggested mode of analysis it may be urged that the concepts dealt with are too vague, that they do not submit themselves to measurement. How much security, or welfare, or justice, or liberty is "produced" by a particular polity? How can one tell? To place these questions in proper perspective, one must see how they might apply to the generally recognized dimensions of political development, as discussed at the beginning of this article. What is the "support potential" of a particular polity?[19] Gross comparisons are possible; careful measurement would seem to be beyond our present reach. What is the degree of "legitimacy" enjoyed by a particular political system, or how much consensus characterizes its political culture? Is consensus complemented by enough but not too much cleavage? If political participation is an aspect of political development, does it follow that the greater the degree of participation the greater the development? Or is it a question of proportion? And if the latter, how is it measured? How does one measure secularization or capacity for social mobilization? I am by no means suggesting that these concepts are so vague as to be useless; but I am suggesting that the problems involved in measuring or weighing them are of an order of magnitude similar to that of problems entailed by the consideration of political goods.

Take the case of security. Here, as with the concept of a healthy political culture, one must break it up into smaller bits. One may examine the record of homicides, assaults, thefts, property damage, and the casualties resulting from civil strife. These items can be counted (and in developed polities they are). An overall view of such statistics gives at least an indication of the degree to which the political

[18] *Ibid.*, 363. Cf. Aristotle on perverted forms of government (*Politics*, 1279a).
[19] This concept is developed in Almond, "A Developmental Approach," 204-5.

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system in question is developed in one of its aspects, an indication suitable at least for purposes of comparing the system with other polities of similar size and complexity.

Welfare of course is a large and amorphous collection of specifics. Many of them, individually, submit rather readily to measurement: transportation and communication facilities, sanitation, education, poverty, housing. Sometimes one finds single indicators, such as life expectancy or caloric intake, that give considerable feel for the quality of a large area of a country's welfare map. This kind of test, however, must then be supplemented by study aimed at discovering how far the political system is responsible for the welfare of the society in question. What about such an indeterminate but vital characteristic as human dignity? No one would claim that he could measure it directly; but none of us would have any difficulty in naming measurable items—the existence and extent of slavery, for example—that would constitute important guides to the estate of human dignity in a particular society. The establishment of effective procedures to prevent the conviction and punishment of innocent persons would be another indicator. So would discrimination on the basis of race or color. Do people stand up for their rights, or submit to arbitrary or callous governmental action without resistance?[20]

In the case of justice, too, one could rely on survey techniques (Do people trust the integrity and impartiality of the courts? Are the courts better or worse than they were ten years ago?) and also on the more easily ascertainable facts of judicial procedure (Are the elements of a "fair trial" or their functional equivalents observed? What proportion of reported crimes go unpunished?). To what extent are vocational and other valued opportunities open to all on achievement-oriented rather than ascriptive qualifications? What is the extent of social and occupational mobility and what is the nature of the obstacles to it?

As to liberty, again one need only let his imagination roam. Is movement within the country or across national boundaries restricted, and if so, how much? Is preventive detention relied upon? What about freedom of expression? Are news media relatively free and independent? (Content analysis provides a useful tool for answering this question.) What about freedom of association, in political parties and otherwise? Does freedom of religious belief and exercise prevail? Are

[20] Some of the ways in which survey research techniques could be used to explore this kind of question are suggested by Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963).

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arbitrary arrests, punishments, and expropriations common, and do people live in fear of such infringements on their rights? These are matters that can be ascertained with some degree of precision in most societies. Where they cannot, that fact is itself a significant indication of the scope of liberty.

V. Comparison of Polities in Terms of Political Goods

Although one may be able to measure important elements of security, welfare, and the like, the question remains of how one can compare different political goods, or different aspects of the broad categories of political good that have been discussed above. How much is it worth, in material terms, to enhance the dignity of citizens? Is a particular state buying security at too high a price in terms of butter or freedom? As in the case of measurement, it is doubtful whether questions of this kind are more difficult when applied to political goods than they are in the case of other dimensions of political development; but however that may be, they are worth considering in themselves.

Questions of the kind just posed have to do largely with how society *distributes* its outputs among various political goods rather than with the amount of political goods it produces. We might describe the difficulty as the lack of a market. A man, in certain societies, can trade a cow for a hut or a wife and can thereby (together with many similar transactions) establish their relative economic values. But he cannot similarly exchange some of his protection against violence for more honest courts, or some of his equality of opportunity for more security against poverty in his old age.

Difficult though this problem of commensurability is, it can, I believe, be tackled and minimized in a variety of ways. First, one can apply the principle of the Pareto optimum. One can say of two otherwise similar polities that the one with less violence is higher on the scale of political development. This "other-things-being-equal" approach has severe limitations, especially in a field in which there are so many "other things"; but it is not to be completely ignored. Probably, it has its greatest usefulness in comparing the same polity at two different times. Thus one can say of a state that, in the absence of retrogression in other respects, an increase in equality of opportunity for certain groups, the removal of censorship, or the expansion of free schools, with an attendant rise in the educational level of the populace, are evidences of political development.

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A second point tends to make the Paretian method more useful than it might otherwise appear, and also in itself diminishes the extent of the problem. The political goods we have been discussing may sometimes conflict, but more frequently they do not. Political goods tend to be realized together and even to be mutually self-supporting. An improvement in the quality of justice administered by the courts is likely to improve personal security. Greater educational opportunities have positive repercussions on both liberty and welfare. Within limits, the same can be said of increased political participation (itself an aspect of welfare as well as a means to further political development). More broadly, an increase in security helps all the other political values or objectives—much as an improvement in the political culture helps the processes by which political inputs are converted into outputs—and an increase in justice, welfare, or even liberty more frequently than not contributes, directly or indirectly, to security.

It is no accident that many of the factors we have been discussing tend to develop together, in the same direction if not at the same pace, for many of them are aspects of the general Weberian rationality-legality pattern. Thus the elimination of special privilege and of discrimination throughout society is based upon the same principle of rationality as is the bureaucratic rule of appointments and promotions according to merit. The principle underlying the formal rationality of the rule of law is easily and not unnaturally extended to such "substantive" matters (in Weber's terminology) as assuring equal access to the courts and to legal counsel regardless of economic circumstance. True, the bureaucracy may move in a Weberian direction even while, on the political side, a charismatic leader may behave arbitrarily, resisting the pressure toward both rationalistic standards and public accountability. But even modern dictatorships and modern democracies are likely to show more developments in common with each other than either has in common with a traditional, ascriptive society.[21]

Much of the difficulty that appears when one thinks abstractly about such questions as the relative values of liberty and equality disappears

[21] It may be suggested that political development is characterized by a movement toward, or an increase in, each of the following elements, regardless of whether the polity is democratically or autocratically governed: dynamism; achievement orientation; differentiation of function; such elements of rationality as a bureaucracy organized on rational principles or, more generally, the breakdown of ascriptive bases for selection, access, and opportunities, in favor of rational criteria (perhaps qualified by a "political" component); secularization of politics; development of instrumentalities for political communication and for articulating and aggregating interests; popular political participation (not necessarily in decision-making); the capacity for social mobilization; and the acceptance of broad responsibility for welfare.

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when one not only breaks these abstractions down into more concrete entities but also when one poses the problem of whether, *in a particular situation*, if one has to choose, it is better to increase the one or the other. In other words, an incremental approach often avoids problems that otherwise seem insoluble.[22] *If* it is clear, for instance, that in a given situation a second political party can be permitted only at the price of such governmental instability as will discourage the entrance of much needed foreign capital, *and if* it seems reasonable to suppose that denial of a second party now will probably not foreclose the opportunity a few years hence, then most people would be likely to agree that freedom of association should be to this extent limited. The difficulties about this choice reside in the "if" clauses. But these are matters of calculating probable consequences, not of weighing one value against another.

Finally, it was perhaps an exaggeration to say that politics (at least in democratic regimes) has no substitute for the economic market as a means of commensurating goods and establishing a common unit of value. We have, after all, the political marketplace of elections and related elements of the democratic process itself. The democratic political process gives effect to political demands. Its outputs tend to maximize the satisfaction of political wants, with varying degrees of accuracy.

This last point has brought us back to "process," specifically to democratic processes, in our search for tests and measures of political development. But we must note that process is only *one* index. The political market—like the economic market—is subject to serious shortcomings. In the first place, it is not strictly comparable to the economic market. For instance, it may fail to reflect intensity either of demand or of need. It has, in fact, a certain all-or-nothing quality about it. Minorities and minority rights are *guaranteed* no protection by the electoral process, although they may achieve it.[23]

Also in politics, unlike economics, people do not bid (vote) directly for their objectives, but for men or policies that they believe or hope (perhaps mistakenly) will lead to the realization of those objectives. In short, one cannot assume that what they get is an exact indication of what they want. (Whether they get what they deserve, as is some-

[22] See David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process* (New York 1963).

[23] Such guarantees of course may be written into the constitution and protected by judicial review or other devices, but this is not market action. Guarantees of this nature do not reflect current pressures, but earlier decisions made by the constituent power.

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times argued, is another question.) Furthermore, people may be so divided as to means—as to how they believe liberty or justice or prosperity may best be obtained—that their political activities become completely self-defeating, nugatory, or worse. Also, especially in the short run, they may not know their own good. Their desires may not reflect their real needs. Finally, in most of the emerging nations, anything that could at all fairly be called a political market hardly exists. It certainly malfunctions too seriously to be used as an important test for political development. It is only where democratic institutions are working well that the test of the political marketplace provides an important measure for how well the ends of the state are being attained. And even here one need only consider the extent of political apathy and the lack of adequate information and communication in even the most advanced democracies to realize that at best the market test is subject to severe limitations.

VI. In Conclusion

"Political development" cannot be reduced to a simple formula. Not all facets of a developed polity mutually reinforce each other; some qualify each other. For instance, responsiveness to the wishes of the majority may run contrary to respect for individual rights; and by the same token the latter may limit the former. The quality of the political culture is a basic measure; but it is not all-sufficient and it is itself a composite of many characteristics. A formula like "free circulation of inputs and outputs through the institutional framework" is suggestive, and yet is so vague as to be of relatively little use for measurement or for comparison. A developed polity should not only respond to demands; it should respond to them effectively. Moreover, it should *encourage* them by identifying needs and specifying how they can be met.

Frey's suggestive phrase "the increase in the distribution and reciprocity of power" is both interesting and valuable. It covers a lot of important ground; but it is also rather vague and difficult to pin down in application. Moreover, Frey himself qualifies and complicates it by adding the element of the total amount of power. Surely this is important. But would one wish to say that the development of political power *without limit* was a sign of political development, even if the power were widely distributed?

Parsons' "collective goal attainment" also has its attractiveness—and its shortcomings. The phrase "collective goal" may conceal potential

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conflicts. A collectivity, too, may desire something that is bad for it as judged by outsiders or by the collectivity at a later date. Has American treatment of Negroes, to say nothing of Nazi treatment of Jews, been "collective goal attainment"? If so, does it signify "political development"? In other words, this formula tells us nothing about such things as rights, or security against arbitrary arrest, torture, or other forms of tyranny. Sometimes, too, people do not desire what they need. It is a proper and important function of the polity, and a mark of its development, to make its members conscious of their needs—for instance, for better education or for better sanitary conditions or for birth control.

Although no one formula or test has proved acceptable, it is tempting to think that a polity's record in producing political goods deserves a certain priority. *A priori*, the test of anything in terms of what it produces seems to make sense. Furthermore achievement as the test of development has the intuitive advantage of being an "unlimited value goal," as contrasted with an "optimum value goal." That is to say, such matters as stability or political participation are not necessarily the kind of goods of which the more the better, *ad infinitum*. After a certain point, additional increments may become actually disvalued.[24] Security, justice, liberty, and welfare, on the other hand, may be affirmed to have unlimited value, each in itself. (Of course, if more of one involves a decrease in one of the others, that is another matter.) To put it differently, these political goods are what the polity is *for*, in the sense that they give it whatever value and justification it has. On the other hand, what we have called the environmental and procedural elements are the causes, the conditions, indeed the necessary conditions, of these goods. Unlike the political culture and the structural and procedural elements, the political goods are not *parts* of the polity, although they are attributes of it; they are, in large measure, its fruits.

Primarily, however, the question is not whether outputs should be stressed more than inputs or processes; or, to speak more accurately, whether achievements are more important than the political culture or the structural elaboration and smooth operation of the political machine. They must all be taken into account. In politics, the distinctions between means and ends and between procedure and substance are never final. These elements are forever reacting upon each other and merging into one another. Analysis must not be allowed to ob-

[24] This discussion borrows heavily from Frederick W. Frey, in Pye, 300-301.

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scure organic relations. Yet for scientific purposes the distinctions are important. It is common today to compare or rank states by the degree of party competition,[25] or their adoption and use of the major devices of representative government,[26] or their social mobilization.[27] It is my suggestion that, to see a more nearly complete picture and to make more highly discriminating judgments, anyone who is concerned with political development in any way involving measurement or comparison should take full account of some of the measurable elements of the political goods of security, justice, liberty, and welfare.

[25] See for example the valuable tables in Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), Appendix.

[26] As worked out in detail by Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (April 1963), 253-64.

[27] See Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 493-514.

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INTEREST GROUPS AND COMMUNIST POLITICS

By H. GORDON SKILLING*

THE idea that interest groups may play a significant role in Communist politics has, until recently, not been seriously entertained either by Western political scientists or by Soviet legal specialists. The concept of "totalitarianism" that has dominated the analysis of communism in the West has seemed to preclude the possibility that interest groups could challenge or affect the single ruling party as the fount of all power. The uniqueness of a totalitarian system has been deemed to lie in the very totality of its political power, excluding, as it were by definition, any area of autonomous behavior by groups other than the state or party, and still more, preventing serious influence by them on the process of decision-making. Marxist theorists, starting from different presuppositions, have assumed that the single ruling party, the organization of the working class, best knew the "real" interests of the people as a whole, and have denied the possibility of fundamental conflicts of interest within the working class, or between it and associated friendly classes such as the peasantry. Within the ruling party itself, groups or factions opposing the leadership have not been admitted in theory or permitted in practice.[1]

Although there has been by no means general agreement on the meaning of totalitarianism, and the term has been rejected out of hand by Communist scholars, it has been common in the West to treat it as a phenomenon unique in world history, sharply distinguished not only from Western democratic societies but also from traditional authoritarian regimes.[2] It has usually been accepted that totalitarianism entails the widest possible extension of state power over society, thus tending to annihilate all boundaries between state and society, and destroying any associations or groups intermediate between the individ-

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[1] See, for instance, *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma* [Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism] (Moscow 1959), 79-81, 352-54. Cf. Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Soviet Political Doctrine and the Problem of Opposition," *Bucknell Review*, XII (May 1964), 11ff.

[2] See the symposium *Totalitarianism*, edited by Carl J. Friedrich (New York 1954), for a wide array of views. Note in particular Friedrich's "The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society," 47.

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ual and the state.[3] Zbigniew Brzezinski, having with Carl Friedrich (in their book published in 1956) established a syndrome of indispensable elements, argues also that the system involves an unavoidable compulsion on the part of the ruling movement to absorb or destroy all social groups obstructing its complete control of society.[4] This line of thought assumes a totally organized or totally administered society, a mass community in which the individual is alone and helpless.[5]

Yet even the most vigorous protagonists of the totalitarian model have admitted the existence of "islands of separateness," such as the family or religion,[6] and others have written of the "limits" on totalitarian power set by the ability of the individual to resist the pressures put upon him.[7] Perhaps even more destructive to totalitarian uniqueness is the suggestion, advanced by N. S. Timasheff, of a "democratic-totalitarian" continuum involving an infinite gradation of differing degrees of totalitarianism and democracy.[8] A specialist on Eastern Europe, Andrew Gyorgy, denies that the Communist states of that area were, at the time of writing, fully totalitarian, and suggests they were instead "partialitarian," thus implying the feasibility of a "relative," or nontotal, totalitarianism.[9]

The totalitarian concept has also often implied a certain changelessness in the nature of Communist politics.[10] Even after the death of Stalin, the likelihood of a decline of totalitarianism has been doubted by

[3] See, for instance, in *Totalitarianism*, N. S. Timasheff, 39; Waldemar Gurian, 125-26; Alex Inkeles, 93-95, 99-101. See also Bertram D. Wolfe, "The Durability of Soviet Totalitarianism," a paper given at Oxford in 1957, and reprinted in Inkeles and Kent Geiger, eds., *Soviet Society: A Book of Readings* (Boston 1961), 648-59; and the comment by Daniel Bell, *ibid.*, 49-50.

[4] See *Totalitarianism*, 52-53, and Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 9-10. The five essential features are these: an official ideology, a single mass party, a monopoly of control of all means of armed combat, a monopoly of control of mass communication, and terroristic police control. See also the later article by Brzezinski, "The Nature of the Soviet System," *Slavic Review*, XX (October 1961), 353.

[5] Compare recent articles in the same spirit by Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 558ff.; and by T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," *ibid.*, 539ff.

[6] Friedrich and Brzezinski, 239-89.

[7] See David Riesman, "Some Observations on the Limits of Totalitarian Power," *Antioch Review*, XXII (June 1952), 155-68, reprinted in Riesman's *Individualism Reconsidered* (Glencoe 1954), chap. 25.

[8] *Totalitarianism*, 43. More recently, in openly doubting the usefulness of the term "totalitarianism," Robert C. Tucker has returned to this idea, and has spoken of a sequence of different political systems in Russia since 1917. See his comment on Brzezinski's "Nature of the Soviet System," *Slavic Review*, XX (October 1961), 379-80.

[9] *Totalitarianism*, 381ff., esp. n. 2.

[10] The most extreme version of this view is given by Bertram Wolfe in the paper cited here in n. 3.

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some. If anything, it has been argued by Friedrich and Brzezinski, Communist societies would probably become *more*, not *less*, totalitarian.[11] Some scholars, however, have forecast the possibility that existing totalitarian societies might "mellow," or be "undermined" by their own features, thus opening up the perspective of nontotalitarian Communist systems as theoretically conceivable.[12] Barrington Moore, in his *Terror and Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship*, discusses several future alternatives, including nontotalitarian ones, and calculates the balance of social forces that might produce new political conditions.[13] Writing some years later Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer argue that Soviet society is the product of the interplay of two elements: its distinctive totalitarian character and the pattern of an industrial society which it shares with others.[14] The latter element had modified the former, producing changes similar to those in other industrial societies. Deliberate actions already taken to improve the system have made it "less totalitarian" and have reflected "the mellowing, even to some extent, the 'liberalization' of Soviet society."[15]

Paradoxically, the wide-ranging reevaluation of comparative politics which has been conducted during the past several decades has largely ignored the Soviet system. No doubt the use of the totalitarian concept, reinforced by the pressures of the cold war, has produced a propensity to think in black and white terms about Soviet and Western politics, and has tended to obscure the differences within the so-called totalitarian category as well as the common features of all political systems, the Soviet included.[16] A gulf has opened up between two developing

[11] Friedrich and Brzezinski, 300; Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," *American Political Science Review*, L (September 1956), 761.

[12] See in *Totalitarianism*, George F. Kennan, 31-32, 34, 83; Paul Kecskemeti, 379; Karl W. Deutsch, 317-18, 320, 321, 331ff. Deutsch writes of a "steady drift to a peripheralization and pluralization of the centers of decision" and of a possible split between Russia and China in the 70's or 80's.

[13] (Cambridge, Mass., 1954). Isaac Deutscher also predicted a change in Soviet society as a result of industrialization, which, in his view, had undermined Stalinism and had stimulated democratic aspirations. See his *Russia: What Next?* (London 1953).

[14] See the final chapter of their book *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961): "Trying to read the future of Soviet development solely on the basis of the distinctive characteristics of Soviet totalitarianism without taking account of the changes in the Soviet industrial social structure and in the Soviet people is like trying to understand a story when the pages have been torn in half, lengthwise, and you have only the left halves to read" (pp. 383-84).

[15] See the criticisms of the "totalitarian model" in Siegfried Jenkner, "On the Application of Integration and Conflict Models in Research on Communist Social and Ruling Systems," *Modern World* (Köln and Berlin), III (1963-64), 117-27; and in A. J. Groth, "The 'Isms' in Totalitarianism," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (December 1964), 888-901.

[16] This paraphrases a comment made by Gabriel Almond in an unpublished address

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subdisciplines, comparative politics and Soviet political studies, each pursuing its own course largely unaware of, or at least unaffected by, the other's efforts.[17] Needless to say, the comparative analysis conducted by David Easton, Gabriel Almond, and others is intended to be applicable to all types of state, including the Communist.[18] Nonetheless the search for a new theory of politics has been based largely on materials and concepts derived from the study of American and other Western democratic institutions, enriched by postwar research and theoretical speculation concerning non-Western or developing societies. No serious effort has been made to test empirically concepts derived from these political experiences by applying them to Communist states; still less has any attempt been made to derive from Soviet political life concepts that might be useful in interpreting other systems. In the course of disquisitions on the comparative approach, there have been only random remarks referring to Soviet and Communist politics, and occasional warnings against a polarization of analysis of the totalitarian and democratic extremes.[19]

On the other hand, a generally applicable concept such as that of the "elite" has sometimes been used as an instrument for the study of Soviet politics.[20] Moreover several books, such as those of Sigmund Neumann and Maurice Duverger on political parties, and of Henry W. Ehrmann on interest groups, have embraced the Soviet system in a general comparative treatment.[21] In both Neumann and Duverger,

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at a meeting of the Conference on Soviet and Communist Studies of the American Political Science Association, September 10, 1964.

[17] See my article "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach," *Journal of Politics*, XXII (1960), 300-313.

[18] See, for instance, David Easton, *The Political System* (New York 1953); Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960); and the substantial literature cited in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill., 1961). See also Harry Eckstein's introduction to Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (London 1963), 3-32.

[19] For instance, Almond and Coleman, 49. They themselves use the totalitarian concept, with, however, some suggestive reservations (pp. 40-41). See also Almond's article "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (1956), 391-409.

[20] John Armstrong, in *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York 1959), writes of the conflict and diversity beneath the monolithic surface of Soviet politics (pp. 28, 30). See also Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 36-37, 417-20, on the struggle of elites in Soviet bureaucratic politics. On elites, see also Bauer, Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956); and David Granick, *The Red Executive* (New York 1960).

[21] Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago 1955), esp. the editor's essay, "Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties," 395-421; Duverger, *Les Partis politiques* (Paris 1951), and in English, *Political Parties* (London and New York 1954); Ehrmann, ed., *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (Pittsburgh 1958), esp. the report by Jovan Djordjević, "Interest Groups and the Political System of Yugoslavia," 197-228, and his later comment, 292-94.

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however, the bulk of the analysis is devoted to two-party and multiparty systems, and the one-party system is treated as a thing apart, sharply differentiated from the others and hardly comparable with them in function or organization.[22] On the other hand, Professor Djordjević, in his contribution to the 1958 conference proceedings edited by Ehrmann, recognizes the value of the comparative approach for the study of interest groups in both Communist and non-Communist systems, and applies the group concept to Yugoslavia in an original manner (to be discussed more fully later in this article). His ideas are not, however, seriously incorporated in the general thinking of the conference.[23] In all these cases, then, the traditional dichotomy between the Soviet and other political systems remains largely unbridged, and the general lack of systematic comparative analysis is pointed up still more sharply.

The model of Communist politics implicit in most Western analysis has seemed, strangely enough, to be exclusively concerned with "outputs," i.e. the imposition of binding decisions, and to be entirely lacking in the "inputs" regarded by Easton as an essential element of every political system.[24] Unlike all other systems, the Soviet has been often depicted as one in which struggles over ideas and interests, or conflicts of rival groups, are absent. Issues requiring decisions are raised not by society or social groups but presumably by the party, or better, by its topmost leaders, without regard for the values and interests of other entities. The monolithic party has been regarded as the only interest group, not itself differentiated in its thinking or behavior. Almond and Coleman, however, have offered the suggestive thought that the articulation and aggregation of interests characteristic of all systems take place within a totalitarian party, largely latently, through the interplay of interest groups and factions.[25]

Western scholars were not fully prepared for the extraordinary

[22] Neumann at first describes the one-party system as a contradiction in terms, since one can speak of a party only if more than one exists. He later compares it with other systems, but notes that in spite of apparent similarity of function, there is a fundamental difference in their actual nature, and the contrast between democracy and dictatorship is embodied in the types of party system. Neumann speaks, however, of a hidden multiparty system within the monolithic regime (p. 411). Duverger similarly counterposes sharply the single-party system and democracy, but notes that theoretically a single party might not be totalitarian, and that the real opposition *might* exist within the party (pp. 261, 276ff., 393, 413).

[23] Ehrmann, 198, 227, 292-94. Only two of the participants, Gunnar Heckscher and Gabriel Almond, comment on his view (p. 302). Both urge the need for continued study of interest groups in Communist countries.

[24] "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), 383-400.

[25] Pp. 40-41.

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changes that occurred in the Soviet political system after Stalin's death, and for the increasing diversity among the Communist countries. Many have continued to use the term "totalitarian" while the facts of Communist society are rendering it more and more obsolete and less and less helpful for satisfactory analysis. The evidence has steadily mounted that the Soviet system is far from being "conflictless" and that behind the facade of the monolithic party a genuine struggle has been taking place among rival groups or factions.[26] Carl Linden speaks of a "continuing battle between powerful and entrenched elements in the party's higher echelons," and speaks of these as "constraints built into the Soviet system of power," limiting the complete freedom of the top leaders.[27] The conflict is sometimes interpreted as a mere personal struggle for power, largely divorced from issues of policy or ideology, or from the interests of social groups, and designed to secure control of the main institutions of power, namely the party apparatus, the state bureaucracy, the army, and the police. In other cases, however, the struggle is linked with major issues of public policy, and related to even more narrowly defined groups, such as the central or peripheral party organizations; the *apparatchiki* and state bureaucrats; central and local economic management; conservative, liberal and centrist factions; the intelligentsia and its various sectors; special interests such as heavy industry, agriculture, or arms production; the nationalities; and so on.[28] Robert Conquest lists the "pressures"—in-

[26] There is an interesting confrontation of views in T. H. Rigby and L. G. Churchward, *Policy-Making in the USSR, 1953-1961: Two Views* (Melbourne 1962). On the post-Stalin succession struggle the literature is too extensive to list, but the following may be cited as representative: Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev* (Washington 1958); Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR* (London 1961); Roger Pethybridge, *A Key to Soviet Politics* (London 1962). See also the discussions in successive issues of *Problems of Communism* cited here in nn. 27, 30. Cf. the earlier articles under the common title "The Soviet Leadership: Trends and Portents," by Richard Lowenthal and Robert Conquest, *ibid.*, IX (July-August 1960), 1-7, 7-11, respectively. On the struggle for power before and after Khrushchev's fall, see Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR* (New York 1965); and Conquest, *Russia After Khrushchev* (New York 1965).

[27] "How Strong Is Khrushchev?" *Problems of Communism*, XII (September-October 1963), 27-35; also Linden's comment, *ibid.* (November-December 1963), 56-58. Linden's view is strongly commended by Robert C. Tucker and Wolfgang Leonhard in letters, *ibid.*, 59-61, 61-64. See also Tucker's letter, *ibid.*, XIII (May-June 1964), 88.

[28] Pethybridge in his discussion of the 1957 crisis defines "pressure groups" as "influential bodies of men within and without the Presidium and the Central Committee whose composite power makes them a force to be reckoned with in Soviet politics." He distinguishes two major groups—the party apparatus and the government bureaucracy—and two minor groups—the economic elite and the army—and, under Stalin, a further major group—the police (pp. 17ff.). V. V. Aspaturian, in his analysis of Soviet foreign policy in Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs 1958), writes of the competing interest groups or elites, including the party apparatus; the government bureaucracy; the economic managers and technicians;

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cluding the peasantry, intellectuals, and national minorities—under which the struggle for power occurs, and the "institutional elements" involved, such as the various organs of party and government, and the army, police, and managers. Although he does not assign great influence to these groups, he views the power of Khrushchev as somewhat limited and not necessarily complete and final.[29] T. H. Rigby, while insisting on the supreme power of the top leader, notes the foci of conflict, which he lists under twelve headings, including not only the conflicts obviously related to the struggle for power, but also those between different sections of the bureaucracy; between informal groupings of officials; between areas and occupational groups; between and within the groups purveying values in the arts and sciences, and even in ideology; and between the masses and the regime.[30]

The study of political power in the United States and the USSR published in 1964 by Brzezinski and Huntington was a major breakthrough in comparative analysis.[31] In this work the authors deal extensively with the role of interest groups, including "social forces" (aspirations of workers, peasants, and so on) impinging on Soviet politicians and creating the main issues of politics; "specific interest groups" (intellectuals, scientists, or minorities); and "policy groups" (the military, heavy and light industry managers, agricultural managers, and state bureaucrats) which participate in the formation of policy. Like most of the other specialists cited, however, they continue to regard conflict as taking place mainly at the peak of the Soviet political pyramid, with only the top party echelons making policy, and the other groups not enjoying much autonomy or influence.

It has thus become increasingly evident that a totalitarian concept which excludes group interest and conflict is no longer an appropriate means of analyzing Soviet politics, and that a more systematic study

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the cultural, professional, and scientific intelligentsia; the police; and the armed forces (pp. 169-75).

[29] Conquest, *Power and Policy*, 18ff., 29ff., 48.

[30] Rigby's rejoinder to Linden, *Problems of Communism*, XII (September-October 1963), 36ff. See his "How Strong is the Leader?" *ibid.*, XI (September-October 1962), 1-8. More recently Barghoorn has dealt extensively with the play of social forces in Soviet politics, and has referred to the limited degree of pluralism and group action that is emerging. He minimizes and even explicitly denies the existence of organized interest groups comparable to those in the West. See his chapter on the USSR in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965), 450-511.

[31] *Political Power USA/USSR* (New York 1964), esp. 195-98. See my review article "Soviet and American Politics: The Dialectic of Opposites," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXXI (May 1965), 273-80. Significantly, the word "totalitarianism" is not listed in the index and was deliberately not used in the book.

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of the reality of group politics is overdue.[32] In the Communist states of Eastern Europe there is even clearer indication of the growing importance of groups in the political process.[33] This has even been acknowledged by Communist theorists themselves. Professor Djordjević has expressed the opinion that groups are inevitable features of every system, Communist as well as non-Communist, although they manifest themselves in different ways. The recognition of these groups has been hampered, he says, by absolutist and totalitarian ideologies, idealistic or legalistic theories of the state, and, in Communist countries, by "Stalinist dogmatism." "Modern society is a dynamic body, complicated and diversified in its structure, full of conflicting and even antagonistic interests. Consequently, the political affirmation, the role and influence of different interest groups, are the general tendency of human society."[34]

More recently a Slovak theorist, Michael Lakatoš, writing in the legal journal *Právny obzor*, has argued that socialist society is characterized not merely by differences of class, but also by conflicts "evoked by the intraclass social differentiation of our society, i.e., by interest groups." These he terms "the real basis of the structure of the social and political system." The role of such groups in politics had been neglected in Europe until the late fifties, he says, both by bourgeois political science, with its emphasis on the individual and the state, and by Marxist scholars, with their exclusive concern with social classes. A scientific study of politics requires, he says, an investigation of "the interests of people in the entire complicated structure of socialist society, and especially group interests."[35]

[32] See esp. Tucker on "The Conflict Model" in *Problems of Communism*, XII (November-December 1963), 59-61. Cf. Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia* (Princeton 1965), for a detailed case study concerning agricultural policy from 1953 to 1963. The author draws the conclusion that there is "a genuinely oligarchic procedure for policy-making, and its most outstanding feature is conflict" (p. 283).

[33] See my book *Government and Politics in Communist East Europe* (New York 1966), esp. chap. 11.

[34] Ehrmann, esp. 292-94.

[35] "K niektorým problémom štruktury našej politickej sústavy [On Some Problems of the Structure of Our Political System], *Právny obzor* (Bratislava), No. 1 (1965), 26-36, in Slovak. Cf. his orthodox class analysis in an article published less than two years earlier, "K otázce vývoje sociálně politické základny socialistického státu v ČSSR" [On the Question of the Development of the Social and Political Basis of the Socialist State in the CSSR], *ibid.*, No. 7 (1963), 385-94. In his later article Lakatoš refers to the work of Arthur Bentley on interest groups in the early part of the century, and cites also the study by Stanislaw Ehrlich, *Grupy nacisku w strukturze politycznej kapitalizmu* [Pressure Groups in the Political Structure of Capitalism] (Warsaw 1962), in Polish. See the review of the latter by W. Wesolowski in *Polish Perspectives*, VII (January 1964), 78-80.

A recent important study by the Czech economist O. Šik, *Ekonomika, zájmy, politika*

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There can be no doubt that Communist society, in spite of its monolithic appearance and the claims of homogeneity made by its supporters, is in fact as complex and stratified as any other, and is divided into social classes[36] and into other categories distinguished by factors such as nationality or religion. Each group has its own values and interests, and each its sharp internal differences, and all are inescapably involved in conflict with other groups. The novelty of the views expressed by both Djordjević and Lakatoš lies in their recognition, in the words of the former, that socialist society *is* "complex and heterogeneous." "In the sociological sense, society is a mosaic of larger and smaller, and highly different, interest groups." Djordjević refers also to amorphous groupings—ethnic, local, or regional in character—which might seek precedence over the national interest; the clashing of specialized interests, such as consumers and producers; and other influences such as those of "a backward environment," "bureaucratic and authoritarian groups," and "personal notions of individuals."[37]

Lakatoš writes of the conflict between the interests of society as a whole and of individuals and groups, and recognizes that these are not mere vestiges of capitalism. In a list not meant to be exhaustive he suggests the following criteria of social differentiation: relationship to the means of production (state sector, cooperative sector, or small production); division of labor (industry, agriculture, intellectual or physical work); level of income; participation in the direction of society (Communists, nonparty persons, or organizers of production); ethnic affiliation; territorial divisions (different administrative entities); biological character (men and women); and so on. He refers to "inner conflicts which exist between society as the proprietor and interests of groups and individuals," and which call forth "a whole series of conflicting relations in economics and in the social-political sphere," and cites the especially deep conflicts over the distribution of income.[38]

[Economics, Interests, and Politics] (Prague 1962), in Czech, also published in Russian as *Ekonomika, interesy, politika* (Moscow 1964), devotes a chapter to "Needs and Interests," in which Šik notes the importance of noneconomic as well as economic needs and interests, and refers to national as well as class interests. His later discussion, however, relates almost exclusively to conflicts between classes and ignores other social groups entirely.

[36] See Inkeles, "Myth and Reality of Social Classes," reprinted from an article originally published in *American Sociological Review*, XV (1950), in Inkeles and Geiger, 558-73. See also his fuller study, with Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, esp. chap. 13, "Social Class Cleavage."

[37] Ehrmann, 203, 210, 212-13, 222.

[38] Lakatoš, "On Some Problems," 29-31. Some support for this approach was forthcoming in the Soviet Union in an article by V. Shubkin, "O konkretnykh issledovaniiakh sotsialnykh protsessov" [On Concrete Research on Social Processes], *Kom-*

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More relevant for political analysis than such broad groupings of a sociological character are the organized political groups that claim to express the interests of the broad groupings and to exert pressure on government for their implementation. Djordjević defines three categories of organized political groups in Yugoslavia: (*a*) those participating directly in the process of governing (such as economic organizations and social institutions); (*b*) those holding "strategic positions" in the political system (such as the League of Communists); and (*c*) those representing the special interests of citizens (such as unions or churches). He recognizes that these might have their own selfish interests, and might also seek to impose their views on the social forces they are supposed to represent. There might also be conflicts of interests between the leaders of such groups and their members, or between their central and local organizations. Djordjević sees in the development of a public opinion favorable to "the general interest" the major safeguard of a correct relation between "rightful" and "selfish" group interests. The direct participation of many groups in the governing process (their "institutionalization") is regarded as a unique and valuable feature of the Yugoslav system. In similar vein Lakatoš expresses the opinion that groups might one-sidedly pursue their own interests, at the expense of the general interest, or might, unless closely connected with the social forces they represent, fail to express real group interests and become mere arms of the state. An indispensable part of socialist democracy, in his view, are the "interest groups, the institutional expression of group interests"; to them, "as an integrating element, the guidance of society must be adapted."

In speaking of interest organizations Lakatoš has in mind mainly the societal or mass associations that exist in all Communist countries: the trade unions, youth leagues, women's committees, and a host of other bodies in specialized fields such as the unions of writers and journalists. Known in Stalin's times as "transmission belts," they were regarded as means of transmitting policy *to* the groups rather than as sources originating it, and had in fact no share in the shaping of public policy. Power was, in any case, concentrated in their higher echelons, so that each organization tended to stand not for the special interests of its members, or of a broader social group such as the workers or

munist, No. 3 (February 1965), which refers to the complexity of society and the need to study not only classes but also definite groups within classes, "the differences among which were conditioned not by forms of ownership of the means of production, but by factors such as profession, level of training, education, and extent of income" (pp. 49, 51). It remains to be seen whether Soviet and other Communist scholars will conduct empirical research elucidating the role of interest groups.

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writers, but rather for a general "public" interest as conceived by the party and its spokesmen within the organization. In times of crisis, the mass associations have only occasionally emerged, as in Poland and Hungary in 1955 and 1956, as powerful pressure groups challenging the party itself. While it has rightly been assumed in the West that the mass organizations have not played an influential role in Soviet or Communist politics, we should be alert to the possibility of a shift in their role, and the strengthening of their position as articulators of the interests of specialized groups.[39]

Much more powerful are those groups whose position has been institutionalized as part of the administrative machinery, but whose interests may be distinct and even in conflict with each other. These include the top party organs, the highest state officials (ministers and planners), the managers of industrial enterprises, specialists in agriculture, the military and the police, all of whom by virtue of their official positions are able to influence the formulation of policy and its implementation.[40] To some extent they defend the interests of extensive social groups, such as the "managers" or the "military"; to some extent, the standpoint of a particular department or sector. As noted above, the existence of these policy groups has been adequately recognized in recent writings, but much remains to be done in the way of a systematic analysis of their position.

Under Khrushchev a new element emerged in the form of a greatly expanded participation in decision-making in their respective fields by experts and specialists. In an increasingly vigorous debate on public policy, the specialized elites have been able to express their views and interests and to exert an influence on the ultimate decisions in such spheres as education, military strategy, industrial management, legal reform, science, art, and literature. In some cases initial proposals have been substantially altered as a result of the discussions.[41] The cultural,

[39] Note for instance the changing role of the trade unions. See the symposium "Soviet Workers: The Current Scene," *Problems of Communism*, XIII (January-February 1964), esp. Jay B. Sorenson, "Problems and Prospects," 32. Cf. later article by Lakatoš, "Dvadsat rokov budovania socialistickej demokracie" [Twenty Years of Building Socialist Democracy], *Právny obzor*, No. 5 (1965), 265-74, in which he speaks of the mass associations as exerting pressure, on behalf of interest groups, on the organizations that resolve the conflicts between group and general social interests.

[40] Cf. Brzezinski and Huntington, 196.

[41] The expanded public discussion and the increasing role of experts are noted by Churchward who quotes a Soviet source as stating that between 1953 and 1956 some twenty major conferences, involving some 30,000 persons, took place. See Rigby and Churchward, 30, 39-40, 42, and n. 35. See also the article by Jenkner (cited here in n. 15) and, on the role of the intelligentsia in East Germany, see Ernst Richert, *Macht ohne Mandat* (Köln and Opladen 1963), esp. 281-89.

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professional, and scientific intelligentsia have thus emerged as one of the main pressure groups affecting public policy.[42] Although their participation in policy-making is often linked with power-political considerations within the ruling echelons, the intelligentsia have also been drawn into a process of deliberation designed mainly to influence the shape of policy rather than to secure power. In this marketplace of ideas, competition is highly imperfect, since the bounds of discussion are strictly drawn and the party authority has the last word. Nonetheless, sharp differences have been manifested between and within the groups (and no doubt within the party apparatus itself) on such basic questions as artistic freedom, historical truth, economic analysis, administrative management, the legal rights of the individual, and freedom of scientific research.

It is *not* true to say then, as Conquest does, that Soviet politics is quite unlike Western politics because there is "no mechanism in the USSR for social forces to express themselves."[43] Nor are groups mere "formless clusters of vested interests," to use Aspaturian's term.[44] The various sectors of the intelligentsia, for instance, exert their influence through their institutes and associations, and through newspapers, scholarly journals, and special conferences, and in varying ways express the needs and interests of broader segments of the population. Individual case studies already provide much data for further generalization concerning their role. Among the jurists, for instance, there have been substantial freedom of discussion and sharp cleavages of opinion, which have had considerable impact on legal reforms.[45] On questions of planning and management there have been deep-seated differences among the economists and among managers, officials, and engineers between the extreme centralizers and others less centralist in attitude.[46] Among writers and artists, a vigorous struggle between

[42] This is acknowledged by Aspaturian, in Macridis, 170-71. See also his analysis of Soviet politics in Macridis and Robert E. Ward, *Modern Political Systems: Europe* (Englewood Cliffs 1963), 526-27. Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn have argued that a large proportion of the intelligentsia are not members of the "political elite" and are "apolitical." Somewhat contradictorily the intelligentsia are said to have "a good deal of power," but not to "have much power" in current decisions (pp. 157, 175-76). John Hazard discusses the growing influence of the intellectuals in *The Soviet System of Government* (Chicago 1957), 29-31. See also Barghoorn, in Pye and Verba, 486-90, 508-10.

[43] "After the Fall: Some Lessons," *Problems of Communism*, XIV (January-February 1965), 18.

[44] Macridis, 169.

[45] See Harold J. Berman, "The Struggle of Soviet Jurists Against a Return to Stalinist Terror," *Slavic Review*, XXII (June 1963), 314-20, and his *Justice in the USSR*, rev. ed. (New York 1963), esp. 80.

[46] Leon Smolinski and Peter Wiles, "The Soviet Planning Pendulum," *Problems of*

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liberals and conservatives has occurred, with an embryonic public opinion emerging, and some success registered in resisting the party's policy of restricting freedom of expression.[47] Discussion among educators exercised a definite influence on Khrushchev's educational reforms.[48] National groups, such as Ukrainian leaders, have also not been without influence on party decisions.[49] Scientists, although they are said not to have an influence on major policy, are important as "lobbyists," and the leadership is responsive to their argumentation.[50] The military have been divided among themselves, and have differed with the political leadership on military strategy, and have sought to affect decisions on other matters of public policy affecting them.[51] There is sometimes an interlocking of groups, as for instance between liberal writers and legal specialists on the necessity for a decrease of terror, or between managers and economists seeking a more decentralized system.

In the context of group conflict, the necessity arises of "sublimating" or "integrating" the competing interests and arriving at a decision that ostensibly represents the public or general interest. "The social interest in our society," writes Lakatoš, "can be democratically formed only by the integration of group interests; in the process of this integration, the interest groups protect their own economic and other social interests; this is in no way altered by the fact that everything appears on the surface as a unity of interests." The main burden of responsibility for this task falls to the groups holding "a strategic position," to use Djordjević's term (borrowed from David Truman), which he identifies in Yugoslavia with the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance.[52] Although it is not expressly stated, the function of

Communism, XII (November-December 1963), 21-33; Alec Nove, "The Liberman Proposals," *Survey*, No. 47 (April 1963), 112-18. See also Smolinski, "Khrushchevism Without Khrushchev," *Problems of Communism*, XIV (May-June 1965), 42-44.

[47] See Priscilla Johnson, "The Regime and the Intellectuals: A Window on Party Politics," supplement, *Problems of Communism*, XII (July-August 1963), xxvii, and her book *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). Cf. Vera S. Dunham, "Insights from Soviet Literature," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XVIII (December 1964), 386-410.

[48] Barghoorn, in Pye and Verba, 488.

[49] Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick 1964), esp. chap. 8.

[50] Nicholas De Witt, "The Politics of Soviet Science," unpubl. paper given at the American Political Science Association, September 7, 1962

[51] See the articles by Thomas W. Wolfe and M. P. Gallagher in *Problems of Communism*, XIII (May-June 1964), 44-52, 53-62; also, Wolfe, "Problems of Soviet Defense Policy Under the New Regime," *Slavic Review*, XXIV (June 1965), 175-88, and *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge 1964).

[52] Ehrmann, 205.

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these strategic groups is presumably to cultivate the public interest, and to subordinate to it special and partial interests. Lakatoš develops the same theme at greater length, referring at one point to the state as "an active organ capable of coordinating these interest conflicts, and under the pressure of these group interests, of forming a general social interest." The task, however, is shared, in his opinion, with the societal organizations, and with the Communist Party, all of which bear some of the responsibility for resolving the conflicts of class, group, and individual interests. "The party as the leading and directing political force fulfills its function by resolving intra-class and inter-class interests."[53]

In the words of a Western commentator, the party is "an arena in which the various Soviet elites make known their demands on one another, articulate their special interests, and try to impose their desires as the unified will of society as a whole."[54] It is no longer seen as completely monolithic, but as a "conglomeration of interests."[55] Since it already possesses power, it need not be concerned with what is often the most important function of parties elsewhere, the acquisition of power. Nonetheless, within the party there is a hidden struggle for power, a subterranean rivalry over policy and the public interest, sometimes bursting into the open in purge and counterpurge. In the absence of an effective representative body, and also of independent and competing parties, the single party must fill many roles performed in other systems by various institutions and, above all, must serve as a broker of competing group interests.[56] In the post-

[53] Lakatoš, "On Some Problems," 34-35. Herbert Marcuse, in his *Soviet Marxism* (New York 1958), writes of the competing special interests in Soviet society, even within the party, and of the role of the bureaucracy in representing "the social interest over and above individual interests," and the "real" interest as distinct from the immediate interests of the people (pp. 107-19).

[54] Aspaturian, in Macridis and Ward, 492-94, 526. He does not admit the possibility of an "accommodation" of interests, but speaks only of an "imposition" or of "mutual elimination." Ploss, in his *Soviet Politics Since the Fall of Khrushchev*, Foreign Policy Research Institute Series, mimeographed (Philadelphia 1965), rejects the abstraction of a cohesive Soviet leadership and argues that the leadership "frames its policies with need [sic] to compromise and adjust between diverse groups and their interests in society" (p. 12).

[55] Aspaturian, in Macridis, 170. Cf. Barghoorn on intraparty differences, in Pye and Verba, 468-70, 510.

[56] The computer approach to comparative politics by Arthur A. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), is weak in its analysis of Eastern European Communist states with reference to interests. It is assumed that "interest articulation" by associational groups and nonassociational groups, or by several political parties, is limited or negligible, and is significant only through institutional groups (the single party). "Interest aggregation" by the legislature, it is said, is "negligible," and, for the executive, is "unascertained." The role of the single party in interest articulation and aggregation is also said to be not ascertainable (pp. 89ff.).

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Stalin era, with the circle of decision-making widening and public discussion less restricted, the party chiefs must more and more give attention to forming a consensus among competing policy groups, specialist elites, differing viewpoints within the party, professional and other associations, and broader amorphous social groupings.

A new model of Communist politics is thus slowly emerging as a result of the changes that have occurred since Stalin's death and the shifting perspectives of both Western and Communist analysts. The model of a totalitarian system, in which a single party, itself free of internal conflict, imposes its will on society, and on all social groups, is being replaced by a model that takes account of the conflicting groups that exert an influence on the making of policy by the party. This is not genuine pluralism, nor is it pure totalitarianism; it is rather a kind of imperfect monism in which, of the many elements involved, one—the party—is more powerful than all others but is not omnipotent. It might be called a "pluralism of elites," or to borrow Robert Dahl's expressive term, a "polyarchical" system, but oligarchical rather than democratic in character.[57] As in all systems, the final product—policy—is highly political, reflecting the parallelogram of conflicting forces and interests within the structure of the single party, of the national Communist society, and, to an increasing extent, of the Communist world as a whole.[58]

It was only in 1951 that David Truman directed attention to the role of interest groups in American politics.[59] Since then there have been substantial efforts to adopt a similar approach in studying other political systems. Research is still, however, only at the beginning stage, and some doubts have been expressed as to the usefulness of this approach even for American politics.[60] Nonetheless group theory is rec-

[57] Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago 1963), 63. See Barghoorn's speculations on the growth of elite influence and incipient pluralism, in Pye and Verba, 507-10. Cf. the discussion of the continuance of traditional elites under Nazism and Fascism, in Groth, "The 'Isms.'"

[58] A Czech scholar in a recent article (in Russian) discusses at length the relations of individual and group interests with the general social interest, and the role of the party, the trade unions, the representative bodies, and the technical experts in achieving a reconciliation of these conflicting interests. See Z. Mlynarzh (Mlynář), "Problemy politicheskovo rukovodstva i novaya ekonomicheskaya sistema" [Problems of Political Leadership and the New Economic System], *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, No. 12 (December 1965), 90-99.

[59] *The Governmental Process, Political Interests, and Public Opinion* (New York 1951).

[60] See for instance Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Politics*, XXIII (February 1961), 25-45, and Eckstein and Apter, 389ff. See also the review article by Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 677-715.

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ognized as "a way one can talk about politics,"[61] and one that seems quite applicable to Communist politics.

On the basis of what has been said earlier in this article, it seems difficult to deny that there *are* in the USSR and other Communist states political interest groups in Truman's sense of the term: namely, groups which, "on the basis of one or more shared attitudes," make certain claims upon other groups in the society, and specifically "through or upon any of the institutions of government."[62] These groups seek not so much to "become the government" as to "realize aspirations through governmental decision-making"[63]—in other words, to influence policy rather than to seek power. As Truman notes, the interests "need not be 'selfish,' are not necessarily solidly unified, and may not be represented by organized groups."[64] In Almond's terms, they may be "associational," i.e., "specialized structures of interest articulation," or "non-associational," i.e., groups that articulate interests informally and intermittently, through individuals, cliques, and such.[65] As elsewhere, groups will differ in the scope and intensity of their activity, and in the success with which they influence governmental decisions. It is also quite likely that the nature of the groups and their mode of action will vary according to the issues involved, and the arena of action appropriate for their settlement.[66]

The point has been well made by several analysts that the style of interest groups is always strongly influenced by the entire political culture within which they operate.[67] In a system where decision-making is highly centralized, where several parties do not exist, and where the representative agencies and elections play a minor role, interest groups will take on forms appropriate to this setting. Soviet Russia is not a "pluralist" society with a long tradition of associational activity and wide freedom of public discussion but is, on the contrary, one where Russian tradition as well as Communist theory and practice have been hostile to the idea of powerful interest groups, and where such groups have limited access to the public and restricted freedom of expression. In particular it is a system where there is not, as in the U.S., "a multitude of points of access" for pressure groups to the "points of decision."[68] On the contrary, the main point of access is at the topmost

[61] Eckstein and Apter, 393.
[62] Truman, 33, 37.
[63] Eckstein and Apter, 412.
[64] P. 507.
[65] Almond and Coleman, 33.
[66] Lowi.
[67] See Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," and Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review*, LII (March 1958), 270-82.
[68] Truman, 437, 519.

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level of the party, in its apparatus, secretariat, and presidium. Whether there are other such points (for instance, in the executive) or whether others may develop (for example, even in the legislature) should be the subject of further study.

Much remains to be done to apply the interest-group approach to Communist systems. Some lines of future inquiry have been suggested in this article. The questions for research that Truman set forth also seem relevant to Soviet and Communist politics today. "How do interest groups emerge? Under what circumstances do they make claims upon or through the institutions of government? . . . What are the internal features of existing groups, the degree of cohesion they command under varying conditions, their resources? How are various groups interrelated . . . ? In what fashion do groups operate upon the government and its subdivisions? With what frequency and degrees of intensity? What are the mutations of governmental institutions in response to group activity?"[69] These and many other questions provide an imposing agenda for future research.[70]

[69] *Ibid.*, 65.

[70] The results of a content analysis of newspapers and journals assumed to represent six Soviet and American elites that exert influence on decision-makers were published by Robert C. Angell and J. David Singer as "Social Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VIII (December 1964), 329-491. The six Soviet elites are the military, scientific, cultural, labor, government-Party, and economic. The results of this massive statistical analysis are meager and dubious, and reveal no significant information about differences among Soviet elites. More meaningful results might be achieved by a content analysis of Soviet journals on specific policy issues, or by the more traditional types of analysis of Soviet discussions in individual fields, along the lines of the studies cited here in nn. 45-51. For instance, Vera Dunham, in an article included in the Angell and Singer report and cited in n. 47 above, uses literary sources to identify differences of view within the cultural elite and to detect the influences exerted by them on the political elite.

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SIX VIEWS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

By JAMES H. BILLINGTON

IF a central problem for any nineteenth-century thinker was that of defining his attitude toward the French Revolution, a central one for contemporary man is his appraisal of the Russian Revolution. The latter problem is even more critical, for nearly one billion people explicitly claim to be heirs and defenders of the Russian Revolution. Forces called into being by the upheaval of 1917 are even more forcefully mobilized and tangibly powerful than those called into being by the French Revolution of 1789 and the "age of the democratic revolution." Thus, as we approach the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution of 1917 and the volume of writings threatens to reach avalanche proportions, it might be well to take a critical look at the historical studies and reflections that have been called forth in what might well be called the age of the totalitarian revolution.

The Russian Revolution offers a fascinating kaleidoscope: a genuine "insurgency" from below (the February Revolution that overthrew Tsardom) followed by a coup d'état from above (the October Revolution) and a protracted internal war (the Civil War of 1918-1920). With the Revolution, there vaulted into power a relatively new institution of governmental authority (the Soviets), a new type of political party (the Bolshevik "party of a new type"), and some brilliant new leaders claiming to speak for hitherto forgotten social classes.

However conflicting the varying testimonies and histories, there is little doubt that there was a tangible revolution in the Russia of 1917 that fully satisfies the current dictionary definition of an "overturn and fundamental change in political organization." Some have, to be sure, spoken of the "real" revolution that occurred earlier in the minds of men; of a "second" revolution occurring later under Stalin during the forced collectivization and industrialization of 1929-1932; or of revolutions that are "unknown," "unfinished," "permanent," or possessed of a special "soul."[1] But the center of all this brooding and pre-

[1] See, for instance, the book written by Moissaye Olgin while the events of 1917 were still unfolding, *The Soul of the Russian Revolution* (New York 1917). A now outdated but still useful history by the Western economic historian James Mavor, *The Russian Revolution* (London 1928), suggests that the real revolution in economic and social matters was yet to come, and thus anticipates the concept of the "second Revolution" that many contend began with the launching of the first five-year plan the following year—"the year of the great change" (*god velikogo pereloma*) as Stalin called

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occupation remains the indelibly revolutionary events centered on 1917. None who participated in these events disputes the applicability of the often overused word "Revolution"; no one questions the use of a capital "R"; most could perhaps agree on a skeletal description of the Revolution as the seizure, extension, and defense of state power throughout most of the old Russian Empire, then in a state of near anarchy, by substantial elements of the unpropertied classes under the leadership of a disciplined, new political organization consecrated to a new philosophy of history and social organization.

Providing a chronological frame for this Revolution immediately involves one, however, in controversy. Official Soviet historians recognize that the "Great October Revolution" began earlier than that month (with the destruction of Imperial authority in the precedent February Revolution) and was not even provisionally completed until later (with the promulgation of a formal constitution for the first and largest of the new Socialist republics, the Russian, in July

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it. Still the best of the many attempts to trace the Revolution to prior Russian thought and culture is Nicholas Berdyaev's *The Origin of Russian Communism* (New York 1937). Vsevolod Eichenbaum (Voline), *La Révolution inconnue* (Paris 1947), equates the "unknown revolution" with the genuinely popular uprisings that coincided with the revolution but were crushed by the Bolshevik leadership. Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" was first set forth in an article in his volume *Nasha revoliutsiia* (St. Petersburg 1906), abridged and slightly altered as *Our Revolution* (New York 1918). Trotsky's later and more full-blown three-volume work *The History of the Russian Revolution* (New York 1936) has among other distinctions that of inspiring a gigantic pictorial "History of the Russian Revolution," 33 by 14 feet in size, by the fashionable "pop" artist Larry Rivers (see the reproduction in *Time*, December 17, 1965, 70-71). Adam Ulam's *The Unfinished Revolution* (New York 1960) is a ranging inquiry on the Marxist and Communist influence in the modern world; his *The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia* (New York 1965) comes closer to being a history of the Revolution.

The term "revolution" has been used in a variety of often contradictory ways since its introduction in early modern times. Basically derived from astronomy, it was frequently used to describe an essentially conservative restoration: the "revolving" of a political or social body toward traditional normality after an aberrant period of violent change. See Vernon Snow, "The Concept of Revolution in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Historical Journal*, II, No. 2 (1957), 162-74. Already in the mid-eighteenth century, before the great Pugachev rebellion among the peasantry or the formation of the modern revolutionary tradition among the "Pugachevs from the universities," a visiting Frenchman said of Russia: "Il n'y a point d'états qui n'aient eu leurs Révolutions; mais aucun n'en présente d'aussi extraordinaires, d'aussi rapides, et d'aussi multipliées que la Russie" (Jacques Lacombe, *Histoire des révolutions de l'empire de Russie* [Paris 1760], iii). Russians themselves still tend to use *sui generis* terms like *perevorot* (cataclysmic overturn) or *perelom* (sudden change, in the sense of a breaking point in a fever or a divide in stairs) in their discussion of revolutions.

The Age of the Democratic Revolution is, of course, the general title of the two-volume comprehensive history of the French Revolutionary era by Robert R. Palmer (Princeton 1959, 1964), which has as yet no single parallel dealing with the Russian case.

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1918).[2] Non-Soviet historians generally attach more significance to the February Revolution and to precedent agitation for reform in the late Imperial period, but do not for the most part challenge some such chronological frame. Some view events in early 1918 (the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly or the attainment of peace at Brest-Litovsk)[3] as the logical cutoff point; others extend the date to the adoption of the final constitution for the entire USSR in 1923.[4]

My proposed general definition of this revolution suggests a chronological frame somewhere between the two extremes, in which, however, Revolution and Civil War are not separated. Mine would be a four-year frame from March 1917 to March 1921: from the month in which the old order collapsed to the time at which the last mass-based internal opposition within the major centers of power (the Kronstadt sailors and the Workers' Opposition) were forcibly silenced (during the historic Tenth Party Congress). Only by the latter date was it completely clear (*a*) that the Leninist oligarchy's hold on state power was not to be modified by the Soviets or by the party rank and file within any more than by sworn enemies without, and (*b*) that concessions in internal and foreign relations necessary to consolidate power did not imply any basic renunciation of the ideological convictions that made this a "universal" and not merely a "parochial" revolution.[5] This

[2] See the first part of section 1 of Michael P. Kim, ed., *Istoriia SSSR: Epokha sotsializma 1917-1957* [History of the USSR: The Epoch of Socialism 1917-1957] (Moscow 1958). His chronological frame will apparently also be that of the popular history being prepared by the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Science, *Istoriia velikoi oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii* [History of the Great October Socialist Revolution], as announced and described in *Novye Knigi*, No. 42 (1962), 48-49. The new six-volume documentary collection *Velikaia oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia. Dokumenty i materialy* [The Great October Socialist Revolution: Documents and Materials], prepared by the Academy (Moscow 1957-1962), begins with the overthrow of Imperial power in February 1917 and ends with the coup in October.

[3] Raphael Abramovitch sees the dissolution of the Assembly as the "point of no return" in his *The Soviet Revolution 1917-1939* (New York 1962); it is also the terminal point of the high Stalinist collection, Lenin and Stalin, *The Russian Revolution* (New York 1938). John S. Curtiss and François Coquin see Brest-Litovsk as the cutoff point in their respective studies, *The Russian Revolutions of 1917* (Princeton 1957) and *La Révolution russe* (Paris 1962).

[4] This is the terminal point of Edward Hallett Carr's magisterial three-volume *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923* (London 1950-1953).

[5] This distinction is basic to the neglected analysis of revolutions made by A. M. Onu, "Sotsiologicheskaia priroda revoliutsii" [The Sociological Nature of Revolution], in *Sbornik statei posviashchennykh Pavlu Nikolaevichu Miliukovu 1859-1929* [Collection of Articles Dedicated to Paul Nikolaevich Miliukov] (Prague 1929). According to this view, the Revolution of 1848, for instance, although physically widespread was only a series of parochial revolutions, judged by both regional focus and class interest, whereas the English Revolution of the seventeenth century was, for all its confinement to a small region, universal in both its aspirations for reform and its social inclusiveness.

Onu's work considers both the generalizations of Western sociologists and the special histories and controversies written (up to 1929) by specialists of the Russian Revolu-

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four-year period was one in which both of the ingredients that Wladimir Weidlé considers necessary for a true revolution—the "shock element" and the "system element"—had come into full play. Russia had yet to survive the terrifying famine of 1921-22 and the debilitating lassitude of the NEP period. The prospects for the regime might still have been in doubt; but the process of revolutionary change had been essentially completed.[6]

The efforts to describe this Revolution—whether set in a larger or smaller chronological frame than is here suggested—are now legion. Almost every partisan point of view has found an articulate spokesman;[7] new controversy and questioning among the legatees of the Revolution have brought to light ever more material from the archives;[8] and a number of relatively detached observers have produced more complex and comprehensive histories in recent years. The much-needed task of providing a comprehensive historiography of the Revolution awaits a specialist far more deeply read in these events than I—someone who might give the layman at least a provisional

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tion. For other attempts to compare major revolutions see Crane Brinton's *Anatomy of Revolution* (New York 1938) and Karsavin's work (cited here in n.32).

Among many stimulating comparisons of the French Revolution with the Russian, see that of the French historian of socialism, Alexandre B. Zévaès, written in July 1917 in the midst of the upheaval, *La révolution russe* (Paris 1917), 156-69; Henry Rollin, *La révolution russe*, 2 vols. (Paris 1931); and Isaac Deutscher in *Russia in Transition*, rev. ed., paper (New York 1960), 163-77. A distinction between "local" and "universal" significance is also made by Iliodor A. Doroshev who, however, applies the latter term only to the October Revolution as the most important event of human history; see his introduction to the symposium which he edited under the title *Vsemirno-istoricheskoe znachenie velikoi oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii* [The World-Historical Significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution] (Moscow 1957), 3.

[6] Weidlé, *Russia Absent and Present* (New York 1952). The 1917-1921 framework is used by William Henry Chamberlin in his two-volume *History of the Russian Revolution* (New York 1935), which is still in many ways the best comprehensive narrative of events during the period. Deutscher also uses 1921 as the cutoff point in his *The Prophet Armed* (London 1954), the second half of which remains one of the most successful and vivid attempts to tell the story of the Bolshevik accession to power through the career of one of its leaders.

[7] Particularly valuable in this genre is the three-part first volume of the unfinished history by the liberal leader Paul Miliukov, *Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii* [History of the Second Russian Revolution] (Sofia 1921-1924), the text of which was largely completed by August 1918. Also useful are the last two chapters of Miliukov's *Russia Today and Tomorrow* (New York 1922), which stimulated other reformists and radicals to write their own accounts, and General Anton Denikin's excellent five-volume *Ocherki russkoi smuty* [Sketches of the Russian Tumult] (Paris and Berlin, 1921-1926), which provided much information and notably lifted the level of apologetics among the more conservative White émigrés.

[8] The tradition that interpretations of the Revolution become involved in political power struggles began with the furor over Trotsky's "Lessons of October," published in the fall of 1924 as a preface to a collected volume of his speeches and writings of 1917. See the discussion in Deutscher's *The Prophet Unarmed* (London 1959), 151ff.

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appraisal of methodology, assessment of accuracy, and comparison of insights of the many gifted figures who have written about the Revolution.[9] In the meantime, however, it might be useful to winnow out for the general reader the basic attitudes or frameworks of interpretation that historians have mixed, often unconsciously, with their empirical investigations, and by this to discover what philosophical attitudes twentieth-century man has taken toward perhaps the most important single event of this century.[10]

1. The first basic attitude toward the Revolution may be characterized as the *accidental-pathetic* view. This outlook is common to all those who see in the Revolution no deep meaning, but view its outcome with the same sense of bewilderment and helpless outrage one feels at the interjection of a senseless natural calamity into human affairs. Use of terms like "catastrophe" and "disaster," or metaphors like "flood" and "storm" are characteristic trademarks of pathetic-accidentalists. Bewilderment is resolved into a feeling of pathetic regret and intellectual inquiry focused on random detail and occasionally animated by the belief or suggestion that what happened might somehow have been avoided.

[9] A valuable account and itemization of the early histories of the Revolution has been provided by Michael Karpovich in "The Russian Revolution of 1917," *Journal of Modern History*, II (June 1930), 258-80; more recent studies of Soviet work are Robert H. McNeal, "Soviet Historiography on the October Revolution: A Review of Forty Years," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XVII (October 1958), 269-92; and Serge Utechin, "The Year 1917: New Publications in Party History," *Survey*, No. 21-22 (1957), 5-11.

Attempts to collate various testimonial and historical accounts to provide paperback historiographical readers on the Revolution include Arthur Adams, *The Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory* (Boston 1960); McNeal, *The Russian Revolution: Why Did the Bolsheviks Win?* (New York 1959); and Gilbert Comte, *La Révolution russe par ses témoins* (Paris 1963).

Among many interesting Soviet collections, see that of contemporary Western diplomatic dispatches interpreting to their governments the events leading up to the October Revolution, in *Krasny Arkhiv*, XXIV (1927), 108-63; for an overall bibliographical guide to documentary publications, see E. N. Gorodetsky, ed., *Velikaia oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia: Bibliograficheskiy ukazatel' dokumental'nykh publikatsii* [The Great October Socialist Revolution: A Bibliographical Index of Documentary Publications] (Moscow 1961); for a critical Soviet survey of German work, see V. Salov, "Germanskaia istoriografiia velikoi oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii" [German Historiography of the Great October Socialist Revolution], *Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia*, IV (1957), 239-49.

[10] Some study has been made of Western attitudes toward the Russian Revolution, though these studies are generally focused on a relatively small group of writers and deal more with polemic literature than with serious historical writing. See Paul H. Anderson, *The Attitude of the American Leftist Leaders Toward the Russian Revolution 1917-1923* (Notre Dame 1942); Christopher Lasch, *The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution* (New York 1962); Leonid Strakhovsky, *American Opinion About Russia 1917-1920* (Toronto 1961); and David Caute, *Communism and the French Intellectuals* (New York 1964).

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Such a view is implicit in two important groups of writing: (*a*) the retrospective appraisals of many high-principled but perplexed figures who served in (or identified with) the original February Revolution, but were engulfed by the subsequent torrent of events; and (*b*) the monographs of most Anglo-American scholars and commentators, whose skeptical empiricism inclines them to reject deeper patterns or forms of explanation, and whose native political traditions subtly incline them to regard sudden and convulsive change as a distasteful aberration from the norm in human events.

The major preoccupation of pathetic-accidentalists tends to be a continual replaying of the hand, dwelling on turning points at which events might have gone the other way. The anguished former leaders of the provisional government (group *a*) tend toward intramural recrimination, which was, of course, one of their principal problems when they stood briefly at the helm between February and October. They can be petulantly self-justificatory like Kerensky, who sees 1917 as a capricious unfolding of calamities abetted by the "inertia of human intellect" in the fourth Duma, Miliukov's "lack of political intuition," Kornilov's "insanity," the stupidity of the Allied Military Mission, and the Germans' support of Lenin.[11] The desire to replay the hand may be more scholarly and imaginative—as with Miliukov, for whom the demons are often less obvious: the second-rate political advisers around Kornilov or the compulsive revolutionary dogmatism of the Russian intellectuals. Nevertheless, Miliukov's pioneering history trails off sharply from a penetrating and ranging introduction and first section into a verbose chronicle of events within the provisional government in which "the pathetic" Kerensky emerges repeatedly as the villain.[12]

Anglo-American academic empiricists (group *b*) have of course been encouraged to adopt the pathetic-accidentalist viewpoint by the many liberal and reformist émigrés who took refuge in the democratic

[11] Alexander Kerensky, *The Catastrophe* (New York 1927), and also his recent *Russia and History's Turning Point* (New York 1965).

[12] Miliukov, *Istoriia,* I, *Part* 1, 48, gives an acerbic characterization of the kind of "pathetic order" that Kerensky issued, with "the pathos" of his political ineptitude "harmonizing badly with the prose of the Revolution." This characterization is generally echoed in the eclectic but basically accidental-pathetic reading of the Revolution in Alan Moorehead, *The Russian Revolution* (New York 1958), 9: "In the end the revolution slips by him almost accidentally. . . . He leaves the tragedy in much the way he entered it in the beginning, terror and violence all around him, handsomely and honorably knowing nothing." A better accidental-pathetic account, which seeks "not to explain but to concretize" events that it collectively calls a "flood" is Sergei P. Mel'gunov, *Kak Bolsheviki zakhvatili vlast'* [How the Bolsheviks Seized Power], written in 1937 (Paris 1953).

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West and helped organize and conceptualize the study of Russian history there. This view, however, harmonizes well with an academic ethos that tends subtly to encourage suspended judgments—the keeping of one's credentials intact, as it were, for the eventual mediation of controversy. Historians no less than politicians in the Anglo-American world seem to seek to become purveyors of a *consensus* of other monographic investigations (an attitude that can be more readily defended as "objective"—and will surely be so by the graduate students who are often bonded to it by assigned Ph.D. subjects) rather than of an *interpretation*, which is a more lonely labor that others cannot help perform, and which the historian will have none but purely intellectual reasons for defending from the inevitable charge of subjective bias.

Being human, even academic pathetic-accidentalists end by making judgments. The refusal to make broader judgments merely canalizes this instinct into the same detailed bickering over incidents and personalities in which the ex-participants mire themselves. Oliver Radkey, for instance, one of the most learned American scholars of the entire events and literature of the revolutionary period, mars his impressively detailed history of the Socialist Revolutionary party during the Revolution with diffuse, carping criticisms of these bewildered also-rans, proving perhaps that the maintenance of a critical attitude towards one's subject matter does not guarantee any newer perspective or fuller understanding than does an uncritical apologetic tone.[13] Anglo-American scholarship has produced more urbane and epigrammatic writing, more balanced judgments on minor questions than those of Radkey. What is perhaps surprising and disappointing is that this well-subsidized and well-populated area of scholarship has produced so few works of comparable scholarly thoroughness and detail. In view of the profession's apparent dedication to an approach that resolves all larger questions into a large number of smaller and more prosaic ones, one might hope for more of the kind of genuinely definitive investigation that Radkey has conducted. Suspended judgment does not, however, seem to guarantee that scholars are working in the meantime on those major studies of minor problems that might prepare the way for eventual consideration of higher questions. Flourishing materially in societies largely unaffected by wars and revolutions, the skeptically empirical Anglo-American historian tends

[13] Radkey, *The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism* (New York 1958), covers the Socialist Revolutionaries from March to October 1917, and *The Sickle Under the Hammer* (New York 1963) continues and rounds off the Socialist Revolutionaries' story.

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to feel no compelling need to account for such phenomena even when he finds it interesting to continue writing and talking about them.

2. A second and opposite view is the *heroic-inevitable* view of the Revolution. This is, of course, the official Soviet view: The Revolution represents the predestined vindication of all that is good and that could not have happened otherwise. The prototype for this view is the ecstatic report *in medias res* by a former Harvard cheerleader John Reed, *Ten Days that Shook the World*, in which the falling of pure white snow, the "great throbbing cities rushing faster and faster," and the "unrolling pageant of the Russian masses" all interact in a chronicle of cosmic liberation.[14] The USSR rejected this overemotional picture in its official chronicling, but accepted its basic image of history reaching a kind of compressed climax in "Great October." The mythic image of a new epiphany was transposed and dramatized most effectively in pageants and movies, particularly after the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the Revolution in 1927.

The official myth requires the image of inevitability as well as that of heroism in order to secure the authority and support the policies of the epigones in power. The myth can be changed in detail but not in kind; and it has come to contain certain constant falsifications and dramatic distortions: a deification of the personal role of Lenin (particularly at the expense of the still almost unmentionable role of Trotsky) and of the clairvoyance of the Communist Party, of the form the October coup actually took, and of the nature and extent of foreign intervention during the Civil War. The Revolution emerges as a work of transcendent heroism in which each development was necessary for the good of the besieged fortress of human aspirations, and was wisely ordained by the custodian of these aspirations within the magic citadel of the Communist Party leadership.

The heroic-inevitable and accidental-pathetic views are direct opposites of one another. Yet, in a curious sense, each justifies itself largely as a necessary corrective to the other. Just as the pathetic-accidentalists see themselves as the only constant foe of bogus generalization and myth-making, so the heroic-inevitabilists view themselves as the guardians of the only true alternative to a world view of meaningless chance and despair.

If the pathetic school sees the Revolution as the chance intrusion of a natural calamity subject to some small measure of *ex post facto*

[14] (New York 1919), 41, 16. Reed's career and his disillusionment prior to his death in 1921 are discussed by Bertram Wolfe, "The Harvard Man in the Kremlin Wall," *American Heritage* (February 1960), 6-9, 94-103.

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geological analysis, the heroic school sees it as a culmination of supranatural necessity suitable for unlimited choral celebration. The hypotheses of the geologists change as frequently as the verses of the choristers (and the Communist chorus is now sung in many different tongues and keys) but the need to remake and celebrate this one pure event grows even more compelling as the reputations of individual leaders and the wisdom of individual policies become increasingly subject to divisive debate.

In the more critical post-Stalinist atmosphere, the need grows to find in the origins of the new regime a kind of heroic purity: a popular—or, more accurately, a populist—sanction for a regime that dispensed alike with hereditary and parliamentary authority. Since the USSR is now described as an "all people's state" rather than a "dictatorship of the proletariat," it has become psychologically important to emphasize those chapters of history (the Revolution–Civil War period and the Second World War) in which all the people did participate with some degree of spontaneity rather than those chapters in which the ruling oligarchy was the main driving force. The Revolution and the War are the two events consistently referred to as "the great" in Soviet historical terminology; and it seems appropriate that historical-heroical writing on these two events markedly accelerated precisely at a time in 1955-56 when many shibboleths of Soviet ideology and many figures of Soviet history were being suddenly subjected to criticism that was tending to degrade the entire quarreling leadership of the Soviet state.

Mikoyan in the very speech that launched the public denigration of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 took the lead in calling for a short and comprehensive text on the October Revolution. He was not only bewailing the absence of one, but, in effect, was also seeking some new form of holy writ to replace the discredited "short course" of the Stalin era.[15] Nor were the posthumous venerators

[15] Mikoyan's speech is referenced and discussed in McNeal, "Historiography," which also provides an account of official Communist efforts to write histories of the Revolution up to that time (1958).

Just as the production of Sergei Eisenstein's famous film *Potemkin* in 1925 for the twentieth anniversary of the Revolution of 1905 provided a kind of anticipatory model for the cinematic tributes that accompanied the celebration in 1927 of the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, so the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution of 1905 in 1955 helped precipitate a dramatic increase in historical and documentary collections. Both the two volumes edited by a committee under the late Anna M. Pankratova, *Pervaia russkaia revoliutsiia i mezhdunarodnoe revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie* [The First Russian Revolution and the International Revolutionary Movement] (Moscow 1955, 1956), which trace the impact of the Russian uprising on such places as Mexico and Ireland, and the vast collection *Revoliutsiia 1905-*

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of Stalin, the Chinese, to surrender their claim to the legacy of October. Mao himself came to Moscow in 1957 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Revolution, and hailed the Revolution as the most important in all world history, while Liu Shao Chi affirmed at the concurrent festivities in Peking that "the Chinese revolution is a continuation of the Great October Revolution."[16]

There is, of course, an inherent tension between emphasis on the heroic and on the inevitable. Some histories that must be included in

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1907 gg. v Rossii. Dokumenty i materialy [The Revolution of 1905-1907: Documents and Materials] (Moscow 1955-), twelve volumes at this writing, have provided the physical model for (and exceeded the length of) comparable volumes begun slightly later in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (referenced in n.2). Another new collection of relevant documentary material from a quite different perspective is the three-volume work *The Russian Provisional Government, 1917; Documents*, edited by Robert P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky (Stanford 1961).

[16] Cited from official English translations of texts in *Current Background*, American Consulate General (Hong Kong), No. 480 (November 13, 1957), 1, 6. Lavish praise and festivities in honor of the October Revolution have continued in China unaffected by the acute Sino-Soviet conflict of recent times, or by Chinese denigration of Russian historical experience generally. The Chinese emphasis remains however on the need "to carry forward and develop the glorious traditions of the October Revolution and carry the world revolution through to the end" (*People's Daily* editorial of November 7, 1963, in *Peking Review* (November 13, 1963), 15. The Chinese also periodically cite (particularly on their own anniversaries) the formulation apparently first made on July 1, 1951, at the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, that "the prototype of the revolution in capitalist countries is the October Revolution; the prototype of the revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries is the Chinese Revolution" (cited in David Gilula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare* [New York 1964], 139). Lin Piao, in his famous statement of September 3, 1965, on "People's War" appears to have found a synthesis with his contention that "the October Revolution opened up a new era in the revolution of the oppressed nations," but principally by building "a bridge between the Socialist revolution of the proletariat of the West and the national-democratic revolution of the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East." The Chinese revolution alone has solved the decisive problem of the age: "how to link up the national democratic with the Socialist revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries" (*New York Times*, September 4, 1965, 2). The closest approach to a detailed Chinese discussion of the October Revolution appears to be *Chung-kuo jen-min ch'ing-chu shih-yüeh-ko-ming ssu-shih-chou-nien chi-nien wen-chi* [A Collection of Commemorative Articles by Chinese People in Celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution] (Peking 1958), discussed with other material in T. A. Hsia, "Demons in Paradise: The Chinese Images of Russia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 349 (September 1963), esp. 33-34.

For a series of Soviet statements on the impact and significance of the October Revolution in the Orient, made in connection with celebrations of the thirtieth anniversary of the Revolution in 1947 (just before the final success of the Chinese Revolution became apparent), see Ivar and Marion Spector, *Readings in Russian History and Culture* (Boston 1965), 291-300. For a recent Soviet analysis which includes an apparent riposte to the Chinese position (characteristically offered as a position which "no one doubts any more"), see Yu. Frantsev, "The Human Race Took Heart," cited from *Izvestiia*, November 6, 1965, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, December 1, 1965, 3-4: "Now, no one any longer denies that it was the October Revolution that provided the experience in combining the proletarian revolution with the colonial revolution within countries. This experience was later demonstrated beyond its boundaries as well."

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this heroic-inevitable category stress the voluntaristic and personal element; others, the more deterministic workings of inescapable and basically impersonal forces. Lenin's voluntaristic modifications of Marxism and the long rule of the "cult of personality" (that of Lenin having preceded and, in many ways, succeeded that of Stalin) in the USSR have all led to an exaggerated emphasis on the heroic element at the expense of the deterministic in Soviet historiography. Isaac Mints, who has been a court historian of the Revolution both during and since the Stalin era has obligingly followed all modifications of the party line in his innumerable writings on the subject. He links the revolutionary victory with Lenin and Stalin, then increasingly with Lenin and the toiling masses of Russia, and summons up the un-Marxian term *podvig* (heroic deed), a term traditionally applied to Old Russian warrior-saints and much favored by Stalin, to characterize the Revolution as the "world-historical *podvig* of the working class of Russia."[17]

Much more interesting are two outstanding histories which stress—in part through their cool professionalism and mastery of detail—inexorable and deterministic forces. The first of these is Michael Pokrovsky's two-volume *Ocherki po istorii oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii* (Essays on the History of the October Revolution), still the best attempt to apply Marxist forms of analysis to the events of 1917. Particularly brilliant is the third and last section, which analyzes the events between the February and October Revolutions not in terms of rival programs and personalities, but in terms of two basic objective factors (the internal economic situation and the international political position of Russia) which "stripped the Wilsonian mask from the Provisional Government" and led to the Bolshevik victory.[18] This was inevitable not so much because of the "electric charges of will power" attributed by other historians to the heroic leadership of Lenin and Trotsky or because of any popular "will" or "collective wisdom of the people,"[19] but because Bolshevik leadership was, objectively speaking, the only

[17] *Velikaia oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i ee mezhdunarodnoe znachenie* [The Great October Socialist Revolution and Its International Meaning] (Moscow 1955), 5. The phrase quoted is the heading for an entire section in this work, which is distributed in a typically enormous printing of 170,000 copies.

[18] (Moscow and Leningrad 1927), II, 447.

[19] The first phrase was used by the Socialist Revolutionary leader Victor Chernov in *The Great Russian Revolution* (New Haven 1936), 445; the second, by the Cadet leader Miliukov in his *Istoriia*, I, Part 1, 6. Both illustrate how the concept of irresistible forces of wills played on the minds of rival claimants for the allegiance of revolutionary passions in the year 1917.

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way to avoid "the colonization of Russia by Anglo-American capital,"[20] which presumably would have occurred under any of the rival forms of modernizing, reformist leadership.

The second of these outstanding heroic-inevitable histories of revolution to stress the impersonal and inexorable forces behind it is E. H. Carr's monumental *Bolshevik Revolution*. Here the emphasis follows not from a rigid Marxist commitment, but from Carr's professed intention "to write the history not of the events of the revolution, but of the political, social, and economic order that emerged from it."[21] Less rigidly deterministic than Pokrovsky and more willing to recognize the role of individual leaders, Carr nevertheless tends to identify virtue with success, to neglect non-Bolshevik sources and subjective accounts and factors generally, and to bring negative value judgments in unilaterally against the "unholy alliances" and suspect motivations of the Bolsheviks' opponents. The work is scrupulously honest and thorough in detail, but the perspective of the whole remains that of a restrained but admiring recording secretary of the Leninist Central Committee. Carr chronicles the building of the new order from the point of view of one reasonably persuaded "that Lenin's policy was the only conceivable one in the empirical terms of current Russian politics."[22] It is not too much to expect that a more rational and demythologized successor regime in the USSR will some day adopt a text very much like that of Carr for general use, just as Carr's work is even now very much respected and consulted by specialists within the Soviet Union.

Hard as the acknowledgment is for the Anglo-American mind, which is so heavily opposed to deterministic interpretations, it is difficult to resist the judgment that these works by Pokrovsky and Carr remain the most powerful scholarly accomplishments in the entire glutted field.

In addition to these two views of the Revolution—the accidental-pathetic and heroic-inevitable—there is another pair of interpretations that differ in subtle but important ways from the first pair, but are also directly opposite to each other. These may be characterized—for want of better terminology—as the *nostalgic-traditionalist* and the *visionary-futurist* views. These two views differ from the first pair in that these both view the revolutionary period with genuine ideological passion

[20] Pokrovsky, II, 448. [21] I, v.

[22] *Ibid.*, 100. This view is offered somewhat tentatively at the end of Part I as a conclusion that "may well have been true"; but the author's analysis here and subsequently suggests that this is his general view of almost all major Bolshevik policies.

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and weigh its significance by relating it to an imagined order of society that has greater meaning for the interpreter than do the actual societies the October Revolution brought into being.

3. The nostalgic-traditionalist view is held by all those who view the Revolution as a sustained disaster because of its rejection of existing loyalties and of an ultimately preferable preexisting order of things. Proponents of this view—whether priests, soldiers, peasants, or even neo-Victorian moralists—differ from the pathetic-accidentalist opponents of the Revolution in that they condemn the Revolution *en bloc* and yet see in it the inevitable, logical outcome of the general moral decay of European society. The traditionalists also tend to view the ideological pretensions and compulsions of the revolutionaries with greater seriousness than do the perennially skeptical accidentalists.

Since traditionalists generally incline toward an organic view of society, their image of the Revolution tends to be one of a spreading disease or malignancy that the organism cannot afford to let go unchecked. It was the Revolution's rejection of all tradition that made the more articulate Whites such as Wrangel fight on "always with honor" after all possibility of success was gone;[23] it was the chain reaction of repudiation that made a very few Western observers such as Churchill immediate, unequivocal (and, in Churchill's case, most eloquent) in urging the immediate destruction of the Bolshevik "plague bacillus."[24] The retrospective writings of such men as Wrangel and Churchill—along with those of other traditionalists, particularly Central European Roman Catholic thinkers—are unified both in their sense of all-European involvement in the Bolshevik Revolution and in their rejection of the Revolution for its very act of cutting loose the moorings of established social and political life.

4. The visionary-futurist view is, of course, the opposite of the traditionalist. Like its opposite, it is a passionate reaction, based on faith in something beyond the immediate events and alternatives of the revolutionary period. In the futurist case, however, it is faith in the coming millennium and a concomitant joy in liberation from past loyalties.

This was the prophetic, poetic view represented in Alexander Blok's famous poem of January 1918, "The Twelve," in which Christ appears at the head of a revolutionary band entering Petersburg, or in Bely's book of the same year, *Christ Is Risen*.[25] In less rapturous form, the visionary-

[23] The phrase was a favorite of Baron Peter N. Wrangel; see his *Memoirs* (London 1929).

[24] See Winston Churchill, *The Aftermath* (New York 1929), 63-66, for his famous rhetorical characterization of Lenin as "the Great Repudiator."

[25] Andrei Bely, *Khristos voskres* (Moscow 1918). For Blok's ecstatic essays of 1918

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futurist view attracted many of the intellectual supporters of the Revolution: the former "God-builders," the romantic "Scythians" and Left Socialist Revolutionaries, and the all-important *mezhraiontsy* (interregion) group whose adherence to the Bolshevik cause in the preparatory months of 1917 provided a critical increment of intellectual talent to Lenin's party. The most nearly perfect spokesman in historical prose for this visionary-futurist view was the leading *mezhraionets* convert to Bolshevism in 1917, Leon Trotsky. Like the brooding traditionalists, the exultant Trotsky saw the Russian Revolution as only the first stage of a continuing process of social transformation that would grow ever deeper within and ever more extensive without—in his terminology, "permanent revolution." This coming new order was for Trotsky as unequivocally good as it was evil for the counterrevolutionary. But both Trotsky and Churchill saw violence, duplicity, and repudiation as logical and inescapable parts of the coming new order. Indeed, such developments perplex only the accidentalists, and require dissimulation and varnishing over only for the heroic mythologists.[26] Rituals, pretense, organization—all are irrelevant; revolutionaries are justified by faith alone, faith in the absolute reality of the coming utopia.

Traditionalists and futurists both tend to use the metaphor of new birth for the Revolution; but whereas traditionalists follow Churchill in viewing it as a potential monster to be smothered in the cradle, futurists follow rather the path of agonizing rapture pointed out by Romain Rolland:

> This order is all bloody and soiled like a human baby just wrested from his mother's womb. In spite of disgust, in spite of the horror of ferocious crimes, I go up to the child, I embrace the newly-born: he is hope, the miserable hope of the human future. He is yours in spite of you![27]

The traditionalist and the futurist views draw strength from the

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that provided prose accompaniment to "The Twelve" see his *The Spirit of Music* (London 1946).

[26] Visionary futurists were free to speak much more honestly and openly about their actions. Karl Radek, for instance, who was close to Trotsky in both intellect and temperament, felt no need for qualms or even prudence in declaring that "Marxism was never really practically brought face to face with the question of force. . . . Dictatorship without terror is the last refuge of the bourgeoisie" (*Proletarian Dictatorship and Terrorism* [Detroit n.d.], 36, 56).

[27] Rolland is writing in response to the appeals addressed to him early in 1928 by the Russian émigré writers Constantine Balmont and Ivan Bunin, as cited in Wladimir Drabovitch, *Les Intellectuels français et le bolchévisme* (Paris 1937), 151-52.

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existence of one another, just as the contrasting pathetic and heroic views do. These are the views of the loyal knight and the armed prophet prepared to enter combat wherever they may meet. But, accordingly, these views have become increasingly remote and unfashionable as the events recede; as visions fade, the battle subsides and the captains and kings depart.

There remain two positions that are less shallow than the first two views, less monolithic than the last pair. These views are also properly bracketed with one another, but for the different reason that they are similar to (though subtly different from) one another. These are the tragic and the ironic interpretations.

5. The *tragic* view is held by those who in some sense accept with Lenin the necessity for a radical new start and who yet believe that path to have been foredoomed by some higher and more irresistible force. The most genuinely tragic perspective on the Revolution is that of those who followed Lenin because they nobly viewed his path as the only one possible for bringing into being in Russia the freedoms and rights that had been developed in the bourgeois West. This is the view, often poorly expressed, of many driven at the time by suffering and compassion to the sincere belief that Leninist means and democratic ends were somehow related. This is the view common to all those who at some point in the struggle for power lent aid to the cause of Lenin and Trotsky, and yet, at another, rebelled at the rationalizations for interim tyranny or pretense of party infallibility. Its most searching formulation probably lies in the last writings in prison of Rosa Luxembourg, reflecting on the course of the Russian Revolution.[28]

This tragic view of the revolution was shared by many of the Mensheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries who collaborated initially in the belief that a true start toward freedom and democracy might be made through a government of the Soviets; and perhaps also by many inarticulate grass-roots supporters of the original coup who later supported the Democratic Centralist or Workers' Opposition programs

[28] *The Russian Revolution, and Leninism or Marxism*, paper (Ann Arbor 1961). A similar tragic view of the Revolution (in which the tragic flaw of the Bolsheviks is found in their sponsoring an elitist break with the democratic traditions on which Marxian socialism was to build) was taken even earlier by the founding figure of Russian Marxism, George Plekhanov, shortly before his death in May 1918. See his *God na rodinu* [A Year in the Fatherland] (Paris 1921), II, 257-68. For another early tragic interpretation that blames the Russians' very lack of philistinism for their confusion and suffering, see Alfons Paquet, "Die russische Revolution als tragisches Ereignis," in *Der Geist der russischen Revolution* (Leipzig 1919), 69-109.

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within the Bolshevik Party and saw them both ruthlessly rejected by 1921. Above all, this tragic view must have been held by the Kronstadt garrison as it was massacred by the Bolsheviks in March 1921 for advocating substantially the same program that had been presented to them by the Bolshevik agitators at the onset of the Revolution.

One of the more stimulating tragic interpretations is that of Isaac Steinberg, a Left Socialist Revolutionary who collaborated briefly with the Bolsheviks as People's Commissar of Justice and then later in 1918 wrote an account of the origins of the Revolution, which he finished in prison early in 1919. He stresses the justice and inevitability of the Soviet form of government, and ingeniously defends the closing of the Constituent Assembly; but he views the Revolution as "a great tragedy in which both the hero and the victim often appear to be the people," who "have to contend not only with their visible enemies," but also with their own "naive, childlike faith" in their leaders. Although speaking of the pre-October period, he seems also to be referring to the Bolsheviks in his statement that "the tragedy lies not in that the people have blind leaders in the Revolution, but in that the people themselves produce these leaders and in their image clumsily struggle for their own happiness."[29]

Just below the level of high tragedy of those whose noble intentions were linked to the tragic flaw of supporting dictatorship in order to realize democracy stands a less majestic, but no less tragic, view that might be called "the school of historical destiny." This variant of the tragic view sees the Revolution as an event filled with high aspiration but frustrated by foreordained forces in the Russian nature or historical development.

At the most melodramatic level, this view finds expression in the "curse of the Romanovs" school, which finds omens of all kinds in the violent origins and disintegration of the dynastic family, and in figures like Rasputin.[30] Some of the most brilliant and sophisticated students of these years, such as George Kennan, often tend to see events unfolding against a backdrop of inexorable fate, with the Revolution prefigured in such events as the confusion and casualties incidental to Nicholas II's coronation, and in the history, geography, and even the unnatural illumination of Petersburg itself—a city in which

[29] *Ot fevralia po oktiabr' 1917 g.* [From February to October 1917] (Berlin-Milan n.d.), 128-29.

[30] The memoir of the Revolution by the leader of the Duma, Michael Rodzianko, *The Reign of Rasputin* (New York 1927), is almost obsessively focused on this figure, not just as a symptom but as a kind of root cause of the entire crisis.

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> human relationships attain . . . a touch of premonition [and] . . . fingers of fate seem to reach in from a great distance, like the beams of the sun, to find and shape the lives and affairs of individuals; events have a tendency to move with dramatic precision to denouements which no one devised but which everyone recognizes after the fact as inevitable and somehow faintly familiar.[31]

The fact that the 300th anniversary of the dynasty was celebrated by a host of publications and ceremonies in 1913, just as the nation was plunged into war and revolution, helped make Russians during that period uniquely conscious of that period's similarity with the chaos and interregnum out of which the Romanov dynasty had emerged in 1613. Among the most historically reflective of those defeated by the Revolution there was, therefore, a natural tendency to compare the revolutionary era to the famed "Time of Troubles" (*Smutnoe vremia*), and to look for some kind of deep national meaning—even if a tragic one—in events of such magnitude. Thus, many defeated and rejected émigré historians subtly drifted from the recriminating pathetic-accidental view to invocations of tragic grandeur. The Revolution was still seen as a kind of impersonal natural catastrophe; but it was no longer so much a completely senseless flood as what Miliukov came to call a "powerful geological upheaval" that covered over the thin layer of recently acquired European culture with the lava of the submerged masses and with fiery fragments from the forgotten thought-world of the peasant rebellions.[32]

The tragic forces were geographic rather than geological for the Eurasians, who saw Russia's submerged, autocratic Asian self reclaiming the prize that an effete Europe had tried to take away through the purgative medium of the Revolution—which in some of the more apocalyptically minded Eurasian thinkers seems to have been seen only as a kind of Antichrist heralding the imminent arrival of some more

[31] See *Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton 1956), 4, for this citation amidst a magnificent word picture of Petersburg. The foreboding arising from the coronation of Nicholas was stressed in Mr. Kennan's opening lecture in a course on the age of Nicholas II given at Princeton University in the spring of 1964. It was also emphasized in Catherine Radziwill, "The Great Revolution," in her *Rasputin and the Russian Revolution* (New York 1918), 193ff.

[32] Miliukov, *Istoriia,* I, Part I, 11ff. Denikin, Peter Struve, Mel'gunov, and many others also likened the revolutionary upheaval to those of the seventeenth century. For a less-known work, see Timofei V. Lokot', *Smutnoe vremia i revoliutsiia. Politicheskiia paralleli 1613-1917 gg.* [The Time of Troubles and the Revolution: Political Parallels 1613-1917] (Berlin 1923). The Eurasian theorist L. P. Karsavin refers to the *smuta* and the Revolution as "the two Russian revolutions" in his interesting and undeservedly neglected "Fenomenologiia revoliutsii" [The Phenomenology of Revolution], *Evraziiskii Vremennik,* V (1927), 28-74, esp. 72-73.

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far-reaching and spiritual millennium. More penetrating Eurasians like Karsavin predicted accurately that any post-Leninist leadership would have to incorporate many traditional exclusivist, anti-European ideas into its ideology in order to maintain a hold on the people. In Chernov's history the word "tragedy" is repeatedly invoked, and the elements themselves made to seem ultimately responsible: "Across the plains, blizzards and storms are free to move and rage. The storm of revolution revealed the genuine 'color and aroma' of the people's soil . . . with all the best features of the national character and all the savage passions and vices implanted by its history."[33]

6. If Soviet historians are necessarily committed to the heroic view, Western observers tend toward the pathetic, with occasional flashes of traditionalist empathy and futurist ardor and a constant penchant for the evocative rhetoric of tragedy. There may, however, be available to the Western historian another view more probing than the pathetic, less Manichaean than the traditionalist and futurist, yet more honest than the tragic—one that properly requires a larger measure of identification with the hopes of the Revolution and the destiny of Russia than most contemporary Western observers can honestly hold. This view may be called the *ironic*.

In his penetrating *The Irony of American History*, Reinhold Niebuhr distinguishes the ironic in history from the purely pathetic "for which no reason can be given, or guilt ascribed," and from the tragic, which involves "conscious choices of evil for the sake of good." Irony, in Niebuhr's view "consists of apparently fortuitous incongruities . . . which are discovered upon closer examination to be not merely fortuitous."[34]

The record of the Russian Revolution is filled with such perplexing, yet revealing, incongruities. There is irony in the fact that the Revolution which Marx predicted and which was to take place in his name occurred not, as Marx had expected, in the urbanized bourgeois democracies but in the autocratic and peasant East (and in a country he particularly feared and disliked). It is ironic that a profound upheaval made in the name of a philosophy of history that attached no real significance to the individual was perhaps more dependent than almost any other revolution on one individual, Lenin.

Irony was evidenced at every turn as Russia emerged from the revolutionary turmoil early in 1921. The revolutionary principle of a so-

[33] Chernov, 444. See also Moorehead, 29: "It is a climate and topography that call for extremes and idealism, not for liberalism and compromise."

[34] (London 1952), ix-x.

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cialized economy was giving way to the practice of a mixed, incentive economy; the "revolutionary alliance of workers with poor peasants" was conceding to the demands of the rich peasants, the kulaks; the interim dictatorship of the proletariat was blossoming into a giant bureaucracy rather than withering away; the dream of international revolution was belied by normalized state relations with the very countries—Germany and Turkey—where revolutionary hopes had once been highest; the revolutionary promise of new rights for long-suppressed nationality groups in the Russian Empire was shattered by armed aggression against Poland and Georgia.

To draw again on Niebuhr's terminology, these incongruities reach the level of irony since they were not purely fortuitous, but arose from the overriding Leninist principle of making tactical concessions in the interest of the redemptive revolutionary cause. These ironies were made to seem temporary and transitory at the time by the sheer force of Lenin's personality and the compelling sincerity of his convictions. Here, too, Niebuhr's distinction seems applicable—the distinction that "the ironic situation is distinguished from a pathetic one by the fact that the person involved in it bears some responsibility for it. It is differentiated from tragedy by the fact that the responsibility is related to an unconscious weakness rather than to a conscious resolution."[35]

A final argument for an ironic view of the Revolution is that in this view decisions made after the end of the Revolution assume a continuing moral significance that they tend to lose in most other interpretations. For "while a pathetic or a tragic situation is not dissolved when a person becomes conscious of his involvement in it, an ironic situation must dissolve, if men or nations are made aware of their complicity in it. Such awareness involves some realization of the hidden vanity or pretension by which comedy is turned into irony. This realization either must lead to an abatement of the pretension which means contrition; or it leads to a desperate accentuation of the vanities to the point where irony turns into pure evil."[36] The ironic view permits one to take seriously the hopes and fears that are so deeply felt in the revolutionary period, but which accidentalists and inevitabilists both tend to treat unfeelingly if not patronizingly.[37] At the same time, this view enjoins the historian to brood in detail over the historical

[35] Niebuhr, x. [36] *Ibid.*

[37] See Deutscher's rebuke of Carr for the insufficient consideration paid by Carr to "Lenin the revolutionary dreamer" in his historiographical review article of 1954 reprinted in *Russia in Transition*, 201-20.

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record, which is not as ultimately irrelevant for him as for the *a priori* traditionalist or futurist. Finally, the ironic view enables the historian to recognize the existence of "incongruities which are more than mere chance," without invoking supernatural forces of tragic predestination.

The ironic perspective is that of the historian who views himself neither as seer and judge, nor as a mere news commentator, but rather as another mortal surrounded by mystery, yet driven on by curiosity, and tantalized by hidden and unforeseen quirks that seem to be more than accidents yet less than fate. Scrutinizing himself as well as the historical record, the historian of ironic perspective is skeptical both of the total explanations so widely accepted in the nineteenth century and of the total absurdity so fashionable in our own.

This strong sense of irony—which is able sympathetically to penetrate unfamiliar human situations without suspending moral concern—was already present in two histories published in 1921, the last year of the revolutionary upheaval. Miliukov, in the first chapter of his *Ocherki* (suitably entitled "Contradictions of the Revolution"), rises above the antagonism of battle to acknowledge that the Revolution did arise in response to the wishes of the masses; but he goes on to make the ironic point that events did not in any important way serve their interests. For all of its Western ideological trappings and talk of the future, the Russian Revolution, in Miliukov's ironic view, had led Russia back to its primitive, insular past.[38] Osip Lourié, a long-time French student of Russian life and thought, agreed in a history written in 1921 that the Revolution had not and would not change Russia as much as revolutionaries assumed. However, he foresaw more clearly than Miliukov did then (and than many still do today) that "the Russian Revolution does not continue the revolutions of Europe, it surpasses them; its significance is not simply social and positive [but] universal and mystical," representing the climax of the sectarian longing for some new universal faith. By establishing on earth "a system that is universal, scientific and mystical all at the same time," the Revolution in Russia—however precarious its victory may have appeared in 1921—heralded the end of European civilization as decisively as Einstein's revolution heralded the end of belief in a Newtonian universe. Thus, ironically, "the fate of Lenin is less to reform Russia than to revolutionize humanity."[39]

[38] Miliukov, I, Part 1, 6, 11.

[39] Lourié, *La Révolution russe* (Paris 1921), 105-6, 110-11, 109. A similar conclusion is reached in the rambling but frequently stimulating and bibliographically useful discussion by Baron Alexander Meyendorff, *The Background of the Russian Revolution* (New York 1929), esp. 141-42.

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Boris Pil'niak, one of the best of the many unorthodox writers of the early Soviet era, in his portrayal of Russia at the end of the Revolution, *The Naked Year*, suggests the ironic fact that the militantly Westernizing Bolsheviks were in fact the unwitting agents of a "sectarian, Orthodox, spiritual Russia" seeking revenge against "mechanical Europe" which had destroyed it by means of the First World War.[40] Such an ironic perspective may someday enable us to reappraise the ostensibly anti-Western and Muscovite figure of Stalin as the agent (through forced social and technological changes) of the profound and perhaps irreversible processes of Westernization and modernization.

A sense of irony has underlain many of the most important subsequent studies of the revolutionary era: Bertram Wolfe's analysis of the leaders who prepared the Revolution, Sukhanov's valuable if diffuse memoir of the year 1917, and R. V. Daniels' study of the sad fate, after Lenin's death, of most of those who had stood at his side during the Revolution.[41] There is an ironic frame to Leonard Schapiro's account of how Lenin's ostensibly Marxist party triumphed by, in effect, standing Marx on his head and proving that "political power controlled the economic form of society."[42] There is irony as well in the quiet assertion in Louis Fischer's impressive biography of Lenin that "what commenced to wither was the idea of withering away,"[43] and in both Park's and Pipes's accounts of the frustration of the federal aspirations of minority peoples by the Bolsheviks who had promised most to (and benefitted much from) these groups.[44] Among symbolic interpretations, Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* contains a deeply ironic (certainly not, as many in both East and West have contended, a counterrevolutionary—or, in our terminology, "nostalgic-traditionalist") reading of this great event.[45] Developed with uncommon sensitivity and contrapuntal

[40] *Goly God* [The Naked Year], first published in 1920, cited here from *Sobranie sochinenii* [Collected Works] (Moscow and Leningrad 1929), I, esp. pp. 97-103.

[41] Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution*, paper (Boston 1955); Nicholas Sukhanov, *The Russian Revolution 1917* (London 1955), an abridged version of his seven-volume *Zapiski o revoliutsii* [Notes on Revolution] (Berlin 1922-23); and Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

[42] *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy* (London 1955).

[43] *The Life of Lenin* (New York 1965).

[44] Alexander Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927* (New York 1957); Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).

[45] (New York 1958), esp. 461, 518-19. Pasternak's view of the Revolution and the more general applicability of the concept of irony to modern Russian history are discussed in my *The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Modern Russian Culture* (New York 1966).

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skill, the picture is one of repeated frustration of high purpose through failings that are more than accidental but less than tragic.

Sometimes the sense of irony is confidently polemic, as in the iconoclastic historiographical article by the former Communist and biographer of Stalin, Boris Souvarine, who systematically compares Bolshevik promises with their performance and concludes that "in order to keep themselves in power, they gradually lost all reason for existence, if their own doctrines are to serve as any standard."[46] Sometimes the sense of irony is perplexed and almost detached as in one who had initially seemed to be a beneficiary of the Bolshevik takeover, Hindenburg's chief-of-staff, General Ludendorff: "I often dreamed of this revolution which would so lighten the burden of our war . . . but today the dream is suddenly realized in an unanticipated way. . . . Our moral collapse began with the beginning of the Russian revolution."[47]

It may be that new understanding can come in the study of this critical episode in modern history through a deepened sense of irony. The ironic view sees in the Revolution only a particularly dramatic example of a universal conflict between two ever-present human feelings whose constant struggle makes all history ultimately unpredictable: the desire to discard pretense and the drive toward what Niebuhr calls the "desperate accentuation of hidden vanities, which turns irony into evil." To say that the latter has so far been the main path of postrevolutionary Soviet writing is not to say that it will always remain so in the increasingly self-scrutinizing USSR, nor is it to deny that there may often be an "accentuation of hidden vanities" in much of Western writing about the Revolution. The truth of the ironic perspective is rather that which Montesquieu offered as a general maxim (long before his own conservative writings became ironically influential in the American Revolution): "Toute révolution prévue n'arrivera jamais."[48]

[46] " 'October': Myths and Realities," *New Leader* (November 4, 1957), 22—an excellent article. See also in the same issue Karpovich's "Russia's Revolution in Focus," 14-17, which adds to the author's vigorously anti-inevitabilist argument an ironic perspective with a strong suggestion that the losers of 1917 will ultimately prove vindicated.

[47] Cited in Denikin, I, 48-49.

[48] Cited before the introduction to John Plamenatz, *German Marxism and Russian Communism* (London 1954), ix; compare this with the almost identical statement of Engels in 1885 (appropriately cited in the introduction to Daniels, p. 4) about the impossibility of revolutionaries' predicting or controlling the course of the revolutions they themselves initiate. The same citation from Engels is featured in the ironic conclusion of Deutscher's short history, "The Russian Revolution," which appears as Chapter 14 in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, XII (Cambridge 1960); see esp. 412-15.

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A COMPARISON OF HOSTILE BEHAVIOR OF DECISION-MAKERS IN SIMULATE AND HISTORICAL DATA

By DINA A. ZINNES*

THE origin of wars is to be found . . . in the minds . . . of men," said Frederick S. Dunn in the course of his argument that the United Nations should improve educational opportunities and raise living standards throughout the world.[1] Such reforms, he believed, would alleviate ignorance and mass dissatisfaction, two of the principal causes of war. But Dunn's statement, in the light of recent research, also lends itself to a totally different interpretation.

War could be said to originate in the minds of certain key men, namely, the world's top-level decision-makers, as a consequence of the way in which they see the world. A world perceived as hostile and threatening could urge a decision-maker to opt for an aggressive move in the face of an international crisis; he might be led by his perception to believe that his state must strike before being struck. Hence, an important, perhaps critical, area for research on the behavior of nations must be the perceptual framework of each nation's decision-makers. It becomes important to ask "To what extent do decision-makers misperceive their environment? What conditions affect their perceptions? What are the consequences of different ways of perceiving the world?"

These questions are studied here by testing a series of hypotheses about some determinants and consequences of a decision-maker's perceptual framework. How does the international alliance configuration affect a decision-maker's perception of his own and the opposing alliance? Do hostile expressions coincide with the perception of a hostile environment? How accurate are the perceptions of decision-makers? Do they perceive hostility only when it in fact exists?

Specifically, thirteen hypotheses are here tested using two different sources of data. One set of data was derived from Inter-Nation Simu-

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[1] *War and the Minds of Men* (New York 1950), 1.

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lation runs conducted by Brody and Driver[2] and is based on Brody's analysis of a loose bipolar system (defined later in this article).[3] These data represent the communications, decisions, and evaluations of high school students who played the role of decision-makers for seven fictitious nations. The second set of data was acquired from a historical situation, the six-week crisis in Europe that preceded the outbreak of World War I.[4] Here the source of data was the set of documents, or communications, exchanged between the six major-state participants.[5] Hence a comparison can be made between a situation attempting to replicate the international world and a historical situation in which decision-makers faced immediate and pressing international problems.

The purpose of this study is threefold. First, it provides two separate tests of each hypothesis. Second, it makes it possible to compare the perceptual frameworks of two different types of decision-makers: Does a high school student confronted with artificial problems whose alternative solutions produce only minimal consequences perceive and behave like a president or prime minister facing a decision that could have catastrophic consequences?

The third purpose of the study is a corollary of the second: to test the comparability, or isomorphism, between the international system and its laboratory simulate. If it can be demonstrated that certain significant aspects of the international system can be replicated in a laboratory setting, then many of the theoretical questions of concern

[2] Harold S. Guetzkow, Richard A. Brody, Michael Driver, and P. Beach, *An Experiment on the N-County Problem through Simulation*, Social Science Institute, Washington University (St. Louis 1960).

[3] Brody, "Some Systemic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology: A Study through Simulation of a Multi-Nuclear Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII (December 1963), 663-753.

[4] Zinnes, "The Expression and Perception of Hostility in Pre-War Crisis: 1914," in J. David Singer, ed., *International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research* (New York, forthcoming 1966).

[5] The collections from which data was acquired were these: Germany: Max Montegelas and Walter Schuecking, eds., *Outbreak of the War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky*, trans. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (New York 1924); Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: Ministerium des K. und K. Hauses und des Aeusseren, *Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914: Diplomatische Aktenstuecke des oesterreich-ungarischen Ministeriums des Aeusseren*, ed. Ludwig Bittner and Alfred Pribram (Vienna and Leipzig 1930); Russia: Komissiia po izdaniiu dokumentov epokhi imperializma [Commission for the Publication of Documents of the Era of Imperialism], *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma* [International Relations in the Era of Imperialism], dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravital'stv 1878-1915 gg., seria 3, IV, V (Moscow and Leningrad 1934); France: Commission for the Publication of Documents Relative to the War of 1914, *Documents diplomatique français* (1871-1914), 3rd Series, X, XI (Paris 1936); Great Britain: Foreign Office, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, XI, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London 1926).

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to the international-relations specialist become amenable to research. One such demonstration, suggested by Hermann, is to compare results obtained for a set of hypotheses in both situations.[6] If decision-makers perceive and behave similarly in both settings, then we can be reasonably confident that at least in certain respects (those described in the hypotheses) the simulate and the international system are comparable.

I. The Hypotheses

The hypotheses to be tested in this study postulate relationships between these four principal variables:

1. *A perception of threat*: state x's perception that y threatens x, denoted by xTy.
2. *A perception of unfriendliness*: state x's perception that y is hostile to x, denoted by xUy.
3. *An expression of hostility* by state x to state y, denoted by xEy.
4. *The frequency of interaction* between two states as measured by the number of messages sent by x to y, denoted by xIy.

The following thirteen hypotheses explore the effects of alliance systems (or blocs) on perceptions; the relationship between perception on the one hand and expression of hostility and amount of interaction on the other; and, in turn, the consequences of expressions of hostility on subsequent perceptions, expressions, and interactions.

Hypothesis 1. Nations outside the bloc will be seen as more threatening (xTy) than nations within the bloc.[7]

Hypothesis 2. Nations outside the bloc will be seen as more unfriendly (xUy) than nations within the bloc.

Hypothesis 3. There will be more hostility transmitted (xEy) between blocs than within blocs.

Hypothesis 4. There is a positive relationship between perceptions of threat (xTy) and perceptions of unfriendliness (xUy).

Hypothesis 5. There is a positive relationship between x's expression of hostility to y (xEy) and y's perception of threat (yTx).

[6] Charles F. Hermann, "A Validity Problem: Crises in Simulated Foreign Policy Organizations," unpubl. paper delivered at Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, September 1964.

[7] Hypotheses 1-5, 10, and 11 were originally postulated and tested by Brody (pp. 713-46). The terms "alliance" and "bloc" will be used interchangeably to mean mutual ties of friendship and support between members.

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Hypothesis 6. There is a positive relationship between x's expression of hostility to y (xEy) and y's perception of unfriendliness (yUx).

Hypothesis 7. There is a positive relationship between the perception of threat (xTy) and the expression of hostility (xEy).

Hypothesis 8. There is a positive relationship between the perception of unfriendliness (xUy) and the expression of hostility (xEy).

Hypothesis 9. There is a positive relationship between x's expression of hostility to y (xEy) and y's expression of hostility back to x (yEx).

Hypothesis 10. Frequency of interaction (xIy) within the bloc will be greater than frequency of interaction between blocs.

Hypothesis 11. There is a negative relationship between the perception of threat (xTy) and the frequency of interaction (xIy), i.e., the greater the perceived threat the less the interaction.

Hypothesis 12. There is a negative relationship between the perception of unfriendliness (xUy) and the frequency of interaction (xIy).

Hypothesis 13. There is a negative relationship between x's hostility to y (xEy) and y's frequency of interaction with x (yIx).

Since both the loose bipolar study and the 1914 study were originally designed to answer quite different questions, the choice of hypotheses was dictated by the availability of comparable data in both studies.

II. The Data

The use of two totally different sources of data, and, furthermore, the use of data that was originally collected for other research purposes, posed a series of difficult problems. The first such problem, as indicated, concerned the selection of hypotheses for which data existed in both studies. The second problem required a decision as to what parts of the data to use from both studies. Brody's bipolar study was designed to explore the effects of the dispersion of nuclear weapons in a loose bipolar world, a world in which two alliances existed, within each of which only one dominant nation possessed nuclear weapons. Two sets of data were generated: (1) data obtained during what was termed

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the *prenuclear spread* situation, in which only the two dominant powers possessed nuclear capabilities, and (2) data obtained in the *postnuclear spread* situation, when all nations were given nuclear weapons. Which set of data should be used, i.e., which of these two situations most closely approximated the 1914 setting? As in the prenuclear situation, two alliances had been formed prior to the 1914 crisis. On the other hand, it would be difficult to argue that either alliance in the 1914 situation contained a single extremely strong ("nuclear") nation. In terms of the distribution of power, then, the better comparison might be made between the postnuclear spread simulate and the 1914 crisis. Yet in the postnuclear simulate, the alliance structures begin to dissolve. In other words, the prenuclear spread simulate and the 1914 crisis have comparable alliance patterns but do not have comparable power structures, while the postnuclear spread simulate and 1914 have comparable power structures but not alliance systems.

Since there were no obvious *a priori* reasons for choosing between prenuclear and postnuclear data, the decision was made on the basis of ease of analysis and availability of data. Seven of the hypotheses given above had already been tested in the prenuclear situation (see footnote 7). Brody was originally concerned with the characteristics of both periods and with certain changes from prenuclear to postnuclear situations; he did not in all cases test the same hypotheses in both sets of data. Of the seven hypotheses tested in the prenuclear situation, only two were tested in the postnuclear simulate. Hence if the prenuclear data were chosen, seven of the analyses would already be completed. A second consideration was also relevant: Brody did not report for the postnuclear situation all the data necessary to test all thirteen hypotheses. The use of the prenuclear spread data would therefore permit the testing of more hypotheses. Finally, there is some indication in Brody's analysis that, although changes occur from the prenuclear to postnuclear situations, the same type of behavior occurs in both. Thus there may have been a *reduction* in the perception of threat from nonalliance members from prenuclear to postnuclear runs, but it is still the case that in both situations alliance members perceived outsiders as more threatening than members of their own alliance.[8]

The choice between two sets of data also existed in the 1914 study, though to a lesser extent. The original 1914 study contained data covering the period in 1914 from June 28, the date of the Archduke's assassination, through August 4, when war had broken out between the

[8] Brody, 732.

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principal contenders. In the early weeks of the crisis one could argue that only the German-Austrian alliance was sufficiently cohesive to be comparable to the alliance in the prenuclear simulate. It was only after Austria delivered the ultimatum to Serbia, on July 24, that the second alliance between Russia, France, Great Britain, and Serbia took shape. Should data from the entire period be used or only that generated subsequent to the publication of the ultimatum? Again, no clear solution suggested itself, and a decision was made on the basis of several considerations. First, although the second alliance was not initially as cohesive as the German-Austrian alliance, its existence was nonetheless implicit in many of the negotiations and discussions that took place among the key decision-makers of the various capitals. Second, the restriction of the time period to the last eleven days of the crisis would seriously diminish the amount of data available for testing the hypotheses. For these two reasons, then, it was decided to use data from the entire crisis period.

The third major difficulty posed by the use of two different data sources was the problem of acquiring from both the 1914 and the simulate data comparable measures for the four variables. For example, what measure of *xTy* (a perception of threat) in simulate data would correspond to a measure of *xTy* in the 1914 data? Since both studies had already been completed, the task actually became one of choosing among available indices in each study. Since there were several possible indices for each variable in the 1914 data, the decision was made to use the original measures given in the simulation study. Comparable measures were then selected from the 1914 study.

A description of the measures used in the 1914 and simulate data for each of the four variables would probably be made more meaningful by a brief discussion of the principal characteristics of both sets of data.[9] Data obtained from the simulation study were of two types, system endogenous and system exogenous. *System endogenous* data were acquired as a direct consequence of the simulation runs. In particular, system endogenous data consisted of (1) the number of messages exchanged and (2) a content analysis of the text of these messages. The messages were content-analyzed using "Leary Content Processes."[10] According to this technique a given text is content-analyzed by counting the frequency of occurrence of eight different types of themes: domination, rejection or manipulation, hostile-aggressive,

[9] For a complete description of the simulate data see Brody. A complete description of the 1914 data can be found in Zinnes.

[10] Timothy F. Leary, *Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality* (New York 1957).

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suspicious, anxious-submissive, dependent, friendly-cooperative, and supportive. Examples of those themes relevant to the present study are given in Table I. The frequencies for each type of theme are weighted and combined in various ways to provide indices for such variables as expression of hostility. One of these indices will be explored in greater detail subsequently.

System exogenous data were acquired from rating scales administered to the participants at different intervals during the simulation runs. These were scales on which a nation would rate the friendliness, trustworthiness, helpfulness, and so on, of other nations. Only two of these

TABLE I.

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION DATA USING LEARY CONTENT PROCESSES*

Hostility Statements	*Friendship Statements*
I. Rejection or Manipulation	I. Dependent
Self-praise in a manner derogatory or disparaging of others.	Provoking some kind of help or guidance.
Withholding, e.g., "I won't give in until you do," with a challenging quality.	Asking for "aid" as opposed to "trade" among equals.
Aggressive confidence theme, e.g., "I don't need you to go ahead."	Grateful, appreciative.
Power struggle.	Demonstrates trust in someone stronger.
Selfish motivation—self-centered.	Eager to please.
"Don't call us . . . we'll call you."	Apple-polishing.
	"You set the terms of our interaction."
	Asks for a favor.
	Asks for a loan.
II. Hostile-Aggressive	II. Friendly-Cooperative
Readiness to use power in aggressive manner—"either . . . or."	Proposes a trade among equals without the dominance implied in setting specific terms.
Themes of punishment, threat, coercion, anger.	Proposes nonaggression pact for mutual benefit.
Sarcasm.	Going out of way to be nice, agreeable.
Ultimatum.	Anticipates happy ending.
Brutally frank.	Sharing, sharing information or confidence, e.g., about a third party.
Impatient, in a hostile sense.	
Criticize.	
III. Suspicious	III. Supportive
To be hurt, e.g., "You are doing bad things to me."	Support someone weaker.
Feelings of distrust, jealousy, skepticism, disappointment.	Be very kind and gentle.
Being rejected.	Think of other's welfare primarily.
Complaining.	Sympathy, understanding, soft-hearted.
Resentful.	Giving assurances.
	Protect.
	Give loans (even with interest).

* Brody, 709-11.

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scales will be of interest here: the scales indicating (1) the degree of friendliness or unfriendliness and (2) the probability of war between the rating country and all other countries in the system.

In contrast, the 1914 data were entirely endogenous; obviously the decision-makers could not be asked to rate other nations along various scales. However, this difference is more apparent than real since the 1914 decision-makers left behind a wealth of notes, memoranda, letters, and reports that reflect their perceptions of the friendliness or hostility of other nations in the system.[11] These documents—which constitute the entire set of available communications exchanged within and between the six major participants during the pre-World War I crisis—were subjected to a thematic content analysis that extracted two types of mutually exclusive themes: (1) x's *expressions* of hostility to y (xEy) and (2) x's *perceptions* of y's hostility to x (xPy).[12] The two resulting sets of themes—expressions and perceptions—were then scaled along two dimensions. The first scaling procedure assigned each theme a weight, from one to twelve, indicating the intensity of hostility evident in its statement. The second procedure classified the themes into two mutually exclusive categories: *threats* (hostility statements made in the future tense) and *actions* (reports of hostile activity made in the present or past tense).[13] Table II gives examples of these two types of hostility statements. It should be noted that the two scaling procedures generate six possible measures of xEy and xPy: Both frequency and intensity measures can be determined for all available statements, or only threat statements, or only action statements.

[11] In contrast to most historical periods, there exists for the 1914 crisis a reasonably complete set of documents. This was due in part to the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the First World War in which three of the governments of major-state participants (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia) were overthrown. The new governments, in their rush to discredit the old, published all documents related to the war, particularly those that might incriminate the previous governments. The existence of these documents, and the absence of comparable documents for England and France, seemed to suggest that these latter two countries had something to hide. Revisionist historians subsequently charged England and France with direct responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Before long, England and France also felt compelled to publish most of their documents for the six-week crisis period. Consequently, we have a reasonably complete set of documents for this period. Only two omissions are significant: (1) Because of the British law requiring a fifty-year waiting period before the release of some official documents, not all British documents were available for research when the study began, and (2) we have almost no Serbian documents. Attempts were made to compensate for the latter, more serious, difficulty, but it did remain a problem throughout the study.

[12] A more detailed account of the content-analysis procedures utilized in this study can be found in Zinnes; and in Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, M. George Zaninovich, and Dina A. Zinnes, *Content Analysis* (Evanston 1963).

[13] For a complete description of the scaling procedure used see Zinnes; and North and others, 79-90.

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TABLE II.

HOSTILITY STATEMENTS FROM THE 1914 DATA

Threat Hostility Statements	*Action Hostility Statements*
1. Germany would probably not wait for a pretext for attacking us.	1. The Austrian note reproaches the Serbian government.
2. The Russian military districts against Austria will be mobilized.	2. The Serbian government tolerated anti-Austrian propaganda.
3. I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me and forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war.	3. England has maintained a reserved attitude to the Triple Entente ever since the Balkan crisis.
4. I am prepared to start war at once against Russia.	4. Military action against Serbia has been decided.
5. This, however, only can be possible when Serbia is eliminated as a factor of political power.	5. An order for mobilization against Austria was given in Serbia.
6. Serbia can, however, by no means permit the Austro-Hungarian press to mislead the public opinion of Europe.	6. Austria declared war on Serbia.
7. The Serbs must be disposed of and that right soon.	7. The object of that action was to crush Serbia and make her a vassal of Austria.
8. I was disturbed by what the Ambassador had told me about the form that anti-Serbian feeling might take in Serbia.	8. In the Italian question Vienna seems to disregard our advice.
9. I spoke to M. Cambon of the great apprehension felt as to what Austria was going to demand of Serbia.	9. The English fleet protects France's northern coast by tying up our fleet.
10. For the sake of our prestige and security, serious and energetic steps have to be taken in Belgrade.	10. The whole war is plainly arranged between England, France, and Russia for the annihilation of Germany.

To return to the original four variables set forth at the beginning of Section I: The first variable, a *perception of threat* (*xTy*), was measured in simulation data on a nine-point rating scale on which each nation was asked to indicate "the likelihood of each of the other six nations' becoming involved in a war with your nation." Note that this is an *intensity* measure of a *perception*, and that the perception concerns *future* events, and is a judgment about the prospects for war. Hence, the comparable 1914 measure of *xTy* would also indicate the intensities of perceptions of threat (perceptions of hostility statements made in the future tense).

Similarly, the second variable, a *perception of unfriendliness* (*xUy*), was measured in simulation data by using a nine-point rating scale on which each nation was asked to indicate "the friendliness to your nation of the other six nations." This is also an *intensity* measure and

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the rating scale involves a *perception of present and past events*, i.e., rather than to anticipate future relationships, the nation is asked to evaluate the present and past relationships between it and all other countries. A comparable measure of *xUy* in the 1914 data would therefore also involve the intensity measure and would utilize report or action perceptions of hostility (perceptions of hostility statements made in the present or past tense). The first two variables, then, were measured in simulate data by using exogenous data sources—namely, rating scales—and in 1914 data by using the intensity measure and the twofold breakdown of the original perception of hostility variable (*xPy*).

Expressions of hostility (*xEy*) were obtained in simulation data from endogenous sources, namely, from Leary content-analysis procedures. It will be recalled that this technique provides indices for variables as a consequence of weighting and summing frequencies for eight different types of themes. The index for expression of hostility (*xEy*) uses six of the eight original themes. Examples of these six themes are given in Table I. The Leary hostility index is computed on the basis of the following formula:

$$xEy = H - F - .7(S - R - P + D)$$

where H = frequency of hostile or aggressive themes,
F = frequency of friendly or cooperative themes,
S = frequency of supportive themes,
R = frequency of rejection or manipulation themes,
P = frequency of suspicious themes,
D = frequency of dependent themes.

Note that this index is a weighted sum of the frequencies of hostility themes (rejection or manipulation, hostile or aggressive, suspicious) minus the weighted sum of frequencies for the friendship themes (dependent, friendly or cooperative, supportive).

A comparable choice for a measure of *xEy* in the 1914 data caused some difficulty. First, it was not clear whether the Leary hostility index should be considered a frequency or an intensity measure. On the one hand, the index was based on the *frequencies* of certain themes; on the other hand, it *weighted* those frequencies and, furthermore, *combined* frequencies for several different types of themes. The second difficulty concerned the choice between using all expressions of hostility in the 1914 data or using only threats or only report statements. The solutions adopted for these two problems were (1) to consider the Leary index as an index of intensity, since it was a weighted composite

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of several types of themes, and (2) to use *all* expressions of hostility in the 1914 data (i.e., not to distinguish between threats and reports) since the Leary index consisted of both types of statements (past and present as well as future tense).[14]

The remaining variable, *frequency of interaction* (*xIy*), was measured in both simulation and 1914 data by determining the *number* of messages that *x* sent to *y*. In addition, the 1914 study had also measured *xIy* by the volume, or number of words, sent by *x* to *y*, and for comparison purposes this measure is also given. Table III compares the measures used for each variable in the simulation and historical data.

III. Results

The thirteen hypotheses presented earlier can be effectively grouped on the basis of content and of the statistical test used to determine their validity. The results for six different sets of hypotheses, which are presented and discussed here, are shown in Tables IV through IX. The first set, consisting of three hypotheses, postulates the perceptual and behavioral consequences of certain structural features of the international system. In particular, Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 suggest, respectively, that the alliance system (the existence of two cohesive blocs) will directly influence a nation's perception of threat and unfriendliness and its subsequent expression of hostility. That is to say, these three hypotheses propose that perceptions of threat and un-

[14] Several additional tests were made in an attempt to solve this general question of comparability between the simulate and 1914 measure of *xEy*. Unfortunately, none of the tests was conclusive. Ideally, we would have liked simply to compute the Leary hostility index for the 1914 data, but the 1914 documents had not been coded for all the necessary themes. This deficiency led to a second approach which consisted of determining the relationship in the simulate data between the Leary hostility index and the three hostility themes on which it was based. If high positive correlations had been obtained it could have been argued that the Leary index was equivalent to the simple frequency counts of the hostility themes, and it would then have been reasonable to use the frequency of expressions of hostility in the 1914 data. The results, shown in the Appendix, did not support this contention: Surprisingly, the correlations between the frequency of each hostility theme separately and the sum of the frequencies for all three hostility themes against the Leary hostility index were all small and negative. This paradoxical result could not be explained and bears further study.

An additional attempt was made to solve the comparability problem. This consisted of recomputing those analyses made by Brody in which the *xEy* variable appeared, using the original raw data from the simulation, i.e., using the frequencies for each of the three themes and their sum. With only two exceptions, these results were also perplexing. In almost every case, when the Leary hostility index provided data that supported the hypotheses, the 1914 data also supported the hypotheses. In contrast, for these same tests, the use of any of the three hostility themes or their sum failed to produce adequate support for the hypotheses. These results also demand further investigation. For comparison purposes we have reported, in addition to the results obtained for the Leary hostility index, the results for the sum of the three hostility themes, for each relevant hypothesis tested.

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TABLE III.

COMPARISON OF DATA USED FROM SIMULATION AND 1914 STUDIES

VARIABLE	1914 DATA	SIMULATION DATA
xTy (perception of threat)	Used *threat xPy* hostility statements and their *intensities.*	*Rating scale* indicating *likelihood of war* with any other nation.
xUy (perception of unfriendliness)	Used *action xPy* hostility statements and their *intensities.*	*Rating scale* indicating *friendliness-unfriendliness* of other nations.
xEy (expression of hostility)	Used all *xEy* (*threat plus action*) hostility statements and their *intensities.*	xEy=H−F−.7(S−R−P+D) Where H = frequency of hostile or aggressive themes F = frequency of friendly or cooperative themes S = frequency of supportive themes R = frequency of rejection or manipulation themes P = frequency of suspicious themes D = frequency of dependent themes
xIy (frequency of interaction)	*Number of messages* sent by the decision-makers of *x* to their ambassador stationed in *y*. For additional comparison, *volume of words* exchanged.	*Number of messages* sent by the decision-makers of *x* to the decision-makers of *y*.

friendliness and expressions of hostility will be greater between two nations belonging to two different alliances than between two nations within the same bloc. One feels less threatened by or hostile toward members of one's own group (bloc) than toward members of another group.

These hypotheses were tested in both simulate and historical data by determining all possible *ordered* pairs of nations in the system—e.g., *Austria-Germany* and *Germany-Austria* are two different pairs. An ordered pair indicates the direction of the perception or expression: for example, a value for the variable expression of hostility (*xEy*) for the pair *Austria-Germany* would mean that Austria expressed hostility to Germany. Similarly the pair *Germany-Austria* would be used to indicate the amount of hostility expressed by Germany to Austria.

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TABLE IV. THE EFFECTS OF ALLIANCE SYSTEMS ON PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR

HYPOTHESES	MANN WHITNEY U TEST				
	U*	z*	n_1**	n_2**	*significance*
1. Nations outside the bloc will be seen as more threatening (xTy) than nations within the bloc.					
1914 Data	22.5		16	15	.001
Simulation Data		5.20	24	18	.001
2. Nations outside the bloc will be seen as more unfriendly (xUy) than nations within the bloc.					
1914 Data	18.0		16	15	.001
Simulation Data		5.40	24	18	.001
3. There will be more hostility transmitted (xEy) between blocs than within blocs.					
1914 Data	40.0		16	15	.001
Simulation Data					
Leary Scores		3.81	24	18	.001
Sum of Three Hostility Themes		2.50	24	18	.01

* For comparison it should be noted that for a given n_1 and n_2, the smaller the U (the measure of unlikeness between two groups) the greater its significance; on the other hand, the larger the z (a measure comparable to U but used for larger samples) the greater its significance.

** n_1 = number of interalliance pairs; n_2 = number of intra-alliance pairs.

After all possible ordered pairs of countries were determined, the pairs were divided into interbloc and intrabloc pairs (an interbloc pair consisting of one nation from each alliance and an intrabloc pair consisting of nations within the same alliance). The Mann-Whitney U test, which essentially tests whether two groups are alike or different, was then used to determine whether there was a significant difference between interbloc and intrabloc perceptions and expressions of hostility.[15] As Table IV demonstrates, the three hypotheses are supported by both simulate and historical data: Perceptions of threat (xTy), perceptions of unfriendliness (xUy), and expressions of hostility (xEy) are greater between interbloc pairs of nations than between intrabloc pairs.[16] Since Hypothesis 3 involves the xEy variable, the results for the simulation data are given for both the Leary hostility index and the sum of the three hostility themes (see footnote 14).

[15] Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics* (New York 1956).

[16] The .05 level of significance is used throughout the study as the criterion for rejecting or accepting a hypothesis. U's are reported for the 1914 data since the n's in this case did not exceed 20 and U tables were applicable ($n_1 = 15$, $n_2 = 16$); the simulation data, containing seven rather than six nations, produced n's greater than 20 ($n_1 = 18$, $n_2 = 24$) which made U tables inapplicable and necessitated the use of z scores.

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TABLE V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF HOSTILITY AND HOSTILE BEHAVIOR

Hypotheses	r_s*	*n***	*significance*
4. There is a positive relationship between perceptions of threat (*xTy*) and perceptions of unfriendliness (*xUy*).			
1914 Data	.91	31	.001
Simulation Data	.88	42	.001
5. There is a positive relationship between *x*'s expression of hostility to *y* (*xEy*) and *y*'s perception of threat (*yTx*).			
1914 Data	.70	31	.001
Simulation Data			
Leary Scores	.43	42	.01
Sum of Three Hostility Themes	—.15	42	—
6. There is a positive relationship between *x*'s expression of hostility to *y* (*xEy*) and *y*'s perception of unfriendliness (*yUx*).			
1914 Data	.73	31	.001
Simulation Data			
Leary Scores	.49	42	.01
Sum of Three Hostility Themes	—.31	42	.05
7. There is a positive relationship between the perception of threat (*xTy*) and the expression of hostility (*xEy*).			
1914 Data	.74	31	.001
Simulation Data			
Leary Scores	.34	42	.01
Sum of Three Hostility Themes	—.09	42	—
8. There is a positive relationship between the perception of unfriendliness (*xUy*) and the expression of hostility (*xEy*).			
1914 Data	.73	31	.001
Simulation Data			
Leary Scores	.49	42	.01
Sum of Three Hostility Themes	—.28	42	—

* Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient.

** *n* for all correlations indicates all possible pairs of nations. The odd number for 1914 data is the result of a data quirk in which, because of coding procedures, the pair Serbia-Serbia appeared.

The second set of hypotheses, 4 through 8, is concerned with the relationship between perceptions of threat and unfriendliness on the one hand and expressions of hostility on the other. Hypothesis 4 postulates an obvious direct correlation between perception of threat and perception of unfriendliness: If state *x* perceives *y* as threatening, then it undoubtedly also sees *y* as unfriendly. Hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that there is a positive relation between *x*'s expression of hostility to *y* and *y*'s subsequent perception that *x* is threatening (Hypothesis 5) and unfriendly (Hypothesis 6). These two hypotheses, then, imply that a state's perception of hostility is a function of the hostility being directed

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TABLE VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECEIPT OF EXPRESSED HOSTILITY AND THE EXPRESSION OF HOSTILITY

	r_s or r*	n**	*significance*
Hypothesis 9. There is a positive relationship between x's expression of hostility to y (xEy) and y's expression of hostility back to x (yEx).			
1914 Data			
"Random" Spearman Rank Order	.44	15	—
"Biased" Spearman Rank Order	.58	15	.05
Pearson Product Moment	.51	30	.01
Simulation Data			
Leary Scores			
"Random" Spearman Rank Order	.64	21	.01
"Biased" Spearman Rank Order	.81	21	.001
Pearson Product Moment	.73	42	.001
Sum of Three Hostility Themes			
"Random" Spearman Rank Order	.76	21	.001
"Biased" Spearman Rank Order	.88	21	.001
Pearson Product Moment	.71	42	.001

* rs = Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient.
r = Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient.

** n for all correlations indicates all possible pairs of nations. The odd number for 1914 data is the result of a data quirk in which, because of coding procedures, Serbia-Serbia appeared.

at it. Although these two hypotheses appear obvious, note that they are not necessarily supported by the data. For example, it is conceivable that the decision-makers of state y are totally oblivious to the hostility directed at them by state x, or, in contrast, that while x is attempting to be friendly to y, y perceives x as hostile. Hypotheses 7 and 8 indicate the importance of perception for subsequent behavior. In these latter instances, it is postulated that x's perception of threat or unfriendliness will influence its expression of hostility.

The relationship between perceptions and expressions of hostility postulated in Hypotheses 4 through 8 can be seen in Table V.[17] These hypotheses were tested using the Spearman rank order correlation.[18] If the significance test is used as the criterion for accepting the (experimental) hypothesis, then for both sets of data, simulate and historical, the correlations are significant at the .01 level. Hence it is possible to conclude that both sets of data support the hypotheses.[19]

[17] Since Hypotheses 5 through 8 involve the xEy variable, results have been given for both the Leary hostility index and the sum of the three themes. Note the generally poor performance of the sum of the three themes, and the perplexing negative trend of these correlations.

[18] The use of a nonparametric statistic rather than the Pearson product moment correlation was dictated by the desire to use comparable statistics in both sets of data; the hypotheses tested by Brody used the Spearman formula.

[19] It might be emphasized that these conclusions are based on the use of significance

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TABLE VII. COMPUTATION OF A "BIASED" SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATION FOR HYPOTHESIS 9 USING 1914 AND SIMULATE DATA

1914 DATA

Dyad	*xEy Score*	*xEy Rank*	*yEx Score*	*yEx Rank*
England-France	0	2.5	0	6
England-Russia	0	2.5	0	6
England-Germany	50.3	15	0	6
England-Austria	5	7	0	6
England-Serbia	9	9	0	6
France-Russia	8	8	0	6
France-Germany	43.2	12	30.8	15
France-Austria	11	10	0	6
France-Serbia	0	2.5	0	6
Russia-Germany	44.7	13	22	13
Russia-Austria	50.2	14	35.5	16
Russia-Serbia	0	2.5	0	6
Germany-Austria	2.5	5	0	6
Germany-Serbia	27.5	11	0	6
Austria-Serbia	130	16	29.8	14
Serbia-Serbia*	3.7	6	3.7	12

SIMULATION DATA

Dyad	*xEy Score*	*xEy Rank*	*yEx Score*	*yEx Rank*
AE	—8.34	16	10.3	18
AO	—19	9	—23.4	13
AY	—6.3	17	—8.3	20
EI	—10.3	14	—17.1	17
EU	.4	21	—8.6	19
EZ	—5.3	18	—17.8	16
IO	—8.5	15	—26.5	12
IY	—20.9	8	—21.9	14
OU	—27.7	5	—57.2	3
OZ	—1.7	19	—28.3	9
UY	—17.1	12	—32.5	7
YZ	—.4	20	—7.3	21
AI	—22.8	7	—26.8	11
AU	—17.2	11	—27.5	10
AZ	—15.8	13	—21.5	15
EO	—63.2	1	—65.4	2
EY	—43.4	2	—44.3	5
IU	—40.3	4	—46.3	4
IZ	—23.1	6	—31.9	8
OY	—18.9	10	—38.7	6
UZ	—43.2	3	—67.5	1

* This pair is a consequence of a data collection quirk. Actually the statements analyzed reflected internal disorder, i.e., fears on the part of the Serbian government of internal dissatisfaction or revolution.

tests. That is to say, when both sets of data produce significant correlations, regardless of the actual magnitude of the correlations, this fact is here interpreted to mean that the relationship postulated in the hypothesis exists in both sets of data. Hence it is concluded that the two sets of data are comparable with respect to the hypothesized relationships. Other tests, of course, could have been used. One that has been suggested is to determine the difference between correlations obtained in simulate and historical data. This test was also made and a discussion and presentation of the results can be found in the Appendix.

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TABLE VIII. EFFECTS OF ALLIANCE STRUCTURE ON COMMUNICATION INTERACTION

	*U**	*z**	n_1**	n_2**	*significance*
Hypothesis 10. Frequency of interaction (*xIy*) within the bloc will be greater than frequency of interaction between blocs.					
1914 Data					
Total Number of Messages	93.5		16	15	—
Crisis Number of Messages	87		16	15	—
Total Word Message Volume	109		16	15	—
Crisis Word Message Volume	108		16	15	—
Simulation Data					
Prenuclear		4.17	24	18	.001
Postnuclear		.79	24	18	—

* For comparison it should be noted that for a given n_1 and n_2, the smaller the *U* (the measure of unlikeness between two groups) the greater its significance; on the other hand, the larger the *z* (a measure comparable to *U* but used for larger samples) the greater its significance.

** n_1 = number of interalliance pairs; n_2 = number of intra-alliance pairs.

Hypothesis 9 postulates that one state's expression of hostility to another will occasion the second to reply in kind. This hypothesis was difficult to test. Using the Spearman rank order correlation formula the hypothesis required that for the variable *xEy* (expression of hostility) ordered pairs be correlated with their converses, e.g., *xEy* with *yEx*, or Germany's expression of hostility to Austria against Austria's expression of hostility to Germany. However, the rank order correlation is based on rank, not on the original numerical value of the variable, and rank is determined by the values found in a column, i.e., by the values found in the *xEy* column (or similarly by the values found in the *yEx* column). Hence it becomes significant whether the pair *Germany-Austria* is placed in the *xEy* column or the *yEx* column; if the pair has a high value for the variable and is placed in a column containing many low values it will receive a high rank order, but if it is placed in a column containing many other higher values it will receive a low rank order. Obviously, there is no *a priori* reason why it should be placed in one column rather than another. Table VI demonstrates this problem by providing the original raw and rank order scores for both 1914 and simulation data.

Since no simple answer could be found for this difficulty, two different solutions were adopted. First, an attempt was made to find both a "lower" and an "upper" bound to the rank order correlation. This proved to be more difficult than had first been assumed. The operational solution arrived at consisted of computing what is termed

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TABLE IX. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNICATION INTERACTION AND THE PERCEPTION AND EXPRESSION OF HOSTILITY

Hypotheses	r_s*	n**	*significance*
11. There is a negative relationship between the perception of threat (*xTy*) and the frequency of interaction (*xIy*), i.e., the greater the perceived threat the less the interaction.			
1914 Data			
Total Number of Messages	—.04	30	—
Crisis Number of Messages	—.03	30	—
Total Word Message Volume	.04	30	—
Crisis Word Message Volume	.01	30	—
Simulation Data			
Prenuclear	—.36	42	.05
Postnuclear	—.20	42	—
12. There is a negative relationship between the perception of unfriendliness (*xUy*) and the frequency of interaction (*xIy*).			
1914 Data			
Total Number of Messages	—.02	30	—
Crisis Number of Messages	—.03	30	—
Total Word Message Volume	.04	30	—
Crisis Word Message Volume	.11	30	—
Simulation Data			
Prenuclear	—.56	42	.001
Postnuclear	—.41	42	.01
13. There is a negative relationship between *x*'s hostility to *y* (*xEy*) and *y*'s frequency of interaction with *x* (*yIx*).			
1914 Data			
Total Number of Messages	.00	30	—
Crisis Number of Messages	—.11	30	—
Total Word Message Volume	.03	30	—
Crisis Word Message Volume	—.04	30	—
Simulation Data			
Leary scores			.001
Prenuclear	—.71	42	.001
Postnuclear	—.77	42	.001
Sum of Three Hostility Themes	.07	42	—

* Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient.

** n for all correlations indicates all possible pairs of nations. The odd number for 1914 data is the result of a data quirk in which, because of coding procedures, the pair Serbia-Serbia appeared.

(perhaps inappropriately) a "random" and a "biased" Spearman rank order correlation. The "random" correlation was computed by assigning pairs at random to either column; it provides an approximation to a "lower" bound. The "biased" correlation was computed by consistently placing the higher score in a particular column, and it gives the "upper" bound. While these do not necessarily give the actual "upper" and "lower" bounds of the true rank order correlation, they do provide reasonable estimates.

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The second solution consisted of computing the Pearson product moment correlation. Since the difficulty discussed above occurs only as a consequence of using ranked data, one solution is to abandon the nonparametric statistic for this test. Hence, the Pearson product moment correlation is given for both simulate and historical data.

On the basis of the results reported in Table VII we find that the random, or lower bound, estimate of the Spearman rank order correlation does not provide statistically significant results in both simulate and historical data. While the simulate data, using the significance test criterion, does appear to support Hypothesis 9, the correlation for the historical data is not statistically significant. The biased, or upper bound, Spearman rank order correlation, on the other hand, does produce statistically significant correlations in both sets of data. However, since it would be difficult to choose between the lower and upper bounds in order to draw final conclusions concerning the comparability of the two sets of data and since it appears that the Pearson correlation falls roughly between the two estimates, in this instance final conclusions will be based on the Pearson correlation. When this statistic is used, correlations for both sets of data are statistically significant. Hence both sets of data can be said to support the hypotheses.[20] Note also that Hypothesis 9 is supported in the simulation data by both the Leary index and the sum of the three hostility themes.

The last four hypotheses are principally concerned with the interaction consequences of perceptions and expressions of hostility.[21] Do perceptions of threat and unfriendliness and expressions of hostility decrease the frequency of communication interaction between nations? If x perceives y to be unfriendly will x cease communicating with y?

[20] The same considerations discussed in n.19 are also relevant here. See Appendix.

[21] In correspondence with the author, Dr. Dean Pruitt has suggested that Hypotheses 4-8 are not independent of Hypotheses 1-3, and that Hypotheses 11-13 are implied by Hypotheses 1-3 and 10. He argues, for example, that Hypotheses 2 and 3 would seem to imply Hypothesis 5. If there is a significant difference between interbloc perceptions of threat and intrabloc perceptions of threat (Hypothesis 2), it implies that there are a number of pairs of nations that are ranked high on perceptions of threat (the interbloc pairs), and a number of pairs that are ranked low on perceptions of threat (the intrabloc pairs). This is similarly the case for Hypothesis 3. Furthermore, the same pairs will be high (interbloc) or low (intrabloc) for both Hypotheses 2 and 3, thus implying that Hypothesis 5, which postulates a relationship between expression and perception of hostility, would have to be supported. However, while it can be argued that Hypotheses 2 and 3 imply Hypothesis 5, the reverse is not true, i.e., Hypothesis 5 does not imply Hypotheses 2 and 3. Hence these hypotheses are not equivalent and therefore tests of each hypothesis are still in order. In other words, it is possible that Hypotheses 2 and 3 may not be supported by the data, while Hypothesis 5 is supported; perhaps there exists a *different* alliance system than that being used here.

However, it is possible, as Pruitt has suggested, to perform tests of the hypotheses that would render them independent. These analyses are discussed in the Appendix.

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Hypothesis 10, like Hypothesis 1, considers the effects of the alliance structure on the exchange of communications. It suggests that there will be a tendency for alliance members to communicate more frequently among themselves than with members of the other alliance. As can be seen from Table VIII the prenuclear spread simulation data supports this hypothesis while the 1914 data does not. If we restrict the 1914 data and consider only the data generated after the Austrian ultimatum was delivered to Serbia (when the two alliances consequently became more cohesive and perhaps more like the prenuclear simulate data), slightly better results are found. However, even in this instance the 1914 data fail to provide support for the hypothesis. For comparison purposes, the results for the number of words transmitted (rather than number of messages) are also given. Note that they are also not significant and in fact are not as satisfactory as those obtained for the number of messages. One further comparison is of interest. The postnuclear spread simulation data also do not support Hypothesis 10: The spread of nuclear weapons cut down on the preference for interaction with one's own alliance. Hence it appears that both the 1914 and the postnuclear simulation data fail to support the hypothesis.[22]

Hypotheses 11, 12, and 13 propose relationships among perceptions of threat, unfriendliness, and expression of hostility, on the one hand, and frequency of interaction on the other; all three variables are expected to decrease communication interaction. Again, as can be seen in Table IX, testing all three hypotheses provides results similar to those obtained for Hypothesis 10—that is, the prenuclear spread simulation data support the hypotheses but the 1914 data do not. Furthermore, there is little difference between using all the 1914 data or only that data obtained after the dispatch of the ultimatum, and there does not seem to be any difference between using numbers of messages as opposed to numbers of words exchanged. An additional observation is also of interest: Again like the 1914 data, the postnuclear spread data do not support Hypothesis 11. In this instance neither historical nor postnuclear simulate data support the contention that a relationship exists between perception of threat and frequency of interaction. However, as Table IX shows, the postnuclear spread data *do* support Hypotheses 12 and 13, thus not permitting any general conclusions concerning the comparability of the 1914 world and the postnuclear spread setting. Note finally that for Hypothesis 13, which in-

[22] The same considerations discussed in n.19 are relevant here. See Appendix.

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volves the *xEy* variable, the sum of the three themes provides no confirmation for the hypothesis.

IV. Summary and Conclusions

This discussion began by considering a series of questions. The tests and analyses should now provide some answers to the initial queries. Four questions were raised earlier: (1) What factors affect a decision-maker's perception of his environment? (2) What are some of the consequences of these perceptions? (3) Are there differences in both perception and overt behavior between high school decision-makers and national decision-makers? And finally, (4) on the basis of a comparison between historical and simulate data, what are the prospects for simulating international behavior in the laboratory?

1. *What factors affect a decision-maker's perception of his environment?* The five relevant hypotheses (Hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6) have shown in both simulate and historical data that a decision-maker's perception of a hostile environment is a function of two presumably independent factors: the international alliance structure and the extent to which the decision-maker has received hostile communications. "Outsiders" are almost by definition seen as more hostile and threatening than members of one's own group. Yet while the alliance structure might cause some distortion in the perception of the environment, it was found, significantly, that there is a relationship between a decision-maker's perception of a hostile world and his actual receipt of hostile messages. Decision-makers are not necessarily paranoid or even particularly jaundiced in their observation of international hostility: They perceive hostility when in fact it exists. While clearly the results of this study can be advanced only tentatively until further studies are performed using other sources of data, both simulate and historical, the existence of comparable results from two disparate sets of data does increase confidence in the findings.[23]

2. *What are some of the consequences of these perceptions of hostility?* Hypotheses 7 and 8 propose that one consequence is the expression of hostility. When state *x* feels that *y* is threatening or unfriendly,

[23] The 1914 data, for example, represent only one historical case, and possibly an atypical case since it was a crisis that ended in war. Perhaps decision-makers behave differently in noncrisis periods or in crises resolved short of war; or perhaps decision-makers operating in a totally different international epoch behave according to different rules. For these reasons, then, the results here are only suggestive and must await further investigation before they can be considered conclusive. The simulation data, though acquired from a series of "runs" (i.e., plays of the game), also require further replication.

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x reacts by expressing hostility to *y*. However, according to Hypotheses 3 and 9, there are two additional factors that contribute to a state's expression of hostility: the alliance system and the receipt of hostile communications. Thus, on the basis of Hypothesis 3 we find that a state is more likely to express hostility to another state that is a member of a different alliance than he is to a member of his own alliance, while Hypothesis 9 indicates that when state *x* sends state *y* a hostile message, *y* reciprocates in kind. Hence both simulate and historical data confirm the contention that there are at least three variables that can account for a state's hostile behavior: its perception of a hostile environment, its receipt of hostile messages (which could account for the first factor), and the international alliance system.

The interactive consequences of perceptions of hostility, in contrast to the previous findings, were not supported by both sets of data. Hypotheses 10, 11, 12, and 13, which postulated that frequency of interaction would be a consequence, respectively, of the alliance structure, perceptions of threat and unfriendliness, and expressions of hostility, were all supported in prenuclear simulation data but not supported by the historical 1914 data. In contrast, it was observed that Hypotheses 10 and 11 were also not supported in the postnuclear simulation data, suggesting that at least with respect to these hypotheses the 1914 data might be more comparable to the postnuclear setting (when power among the nations was equalized, but the alliance system became decentralized). These differences demand further exploration in considering the question of the validity of simulating international phenomena in a laboratory setting.

3. *Are there differences in perception and overt behavior between high school decision-makers and national decision-makers?* Looking at the data from a different point of view, it is of considerable interest to note the similarity in behavior between two groups of individuals that one might have supposed to be quite different. The high school student and the prime minister appear to share common human characteristics, despite the latter's greater field of experience and the former's innocence. Both sets of decision-makers behave similarly under the conditions proposed in Hypotheses 1 through 9: Simulate and international alliance systems affect their perceptions of threat and unfriendliness and their expressions of hostility—they perceive and express more hostility between alliances than within, and both types of decision-makers express hostility as a consequence of perceiving hostility and receiving hostile messages. While the last four hypotheses might suggest that the two types of decision-makers are not compara-

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ble, at least with respect to interaction (since here noncomparable results were obtained), it can still be shown that this is probably a consequence not of differences in decision-makers, but rather of differences between the international world and its simulate model.

4. *Finally, then, what does a comparison of this historical and simulate data suggest about the prospects for further simulating international behavior in the laboratory?* On the basis of the first nine hypotheses, the prospects look most promising. It would appear that with respect to the three variables discussed in these hypotheses, the simulate and historical worlds are comparable, or isomorphic. Hence, it is the discrepancy found between simulate and historical data in the last four hypotheses that must be analyzed. Here it is discovered that decision-makers in the (prenuclear) simulate behave in a manner comparable to findings in small group studies, namely, that hostility between two individuals results in lessened contact between them, and that there is a preference for interaction with one's own alliance or in-group.[24] But these relationships do not hold in the 1914 data. The differences in this instance between simulate and historical data imply that there are relevant variables that have not been held constant in both studies, and that, with respect to certain variables, the historical and simulate worlds are not isomorphic.

There are at least two variables that clearly are not being held constant in both studies and which, on intuitive grounds, could cause the results found in the last four hypotheses. First, the distribution of power, as discussed earlier, is probably not comparable in the prenuclear simulate and the 1914 situation. It will be recalled that the prenuclear simulate contained two core nations, one in each alliance, which were the only ones in the system to possess nuclear capability. In comparison, the historical 1914 situation did not have two nations, one in each alliance, which were extremely powerful. The importance of this difference is possibly indicated by the results obtained for two of the hypotheses in the postnuclear spread simulate. In the postnuclear spread situation all nations acquired nuclear power, thus equalizing the distribution of power among the nations, as was perhaps the case in 1914. And under these conditions we find that Hypotheses 10 and 11 are not supported by simulate data. These results suggest that additional simulation studies should be conducted using power-distribution as an independent variable: What happens in a system of seven nations, con-

[24] T. M. Newcomb, "Autistic Hostility and Social Reality," *Human Relations*, 1, 69-86.

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taining two alliances, when there are three nuclear powers? four powers? or more?

The second variable that is not comparable in the two studies is the communication structure. The communication structure of the 1914 situation can be diagrammed as shown in Figure 1. This diagram demonstrates two factors of immediate relevance. First, the major decision-makers of two different states seldom communicate directly with one another. If the central decision-maker in state *A* wishes to communicate to the principal decision-maker in state *B*, he does so by way of his own ambassador *a* stationed in *B* or by way of *b*, *B*'s ambassador stationed in *A*. The second point of interest is that the only messages



FIGURE 1. DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE OF THE 1914 DATA

that exist for analysis are those between *A* and his ambassador *a*, and between *B* and his ambassador *b*, as indicated by the heavy lines in Figure 1. Communications between *A* and *b* or between *B* and *a* are principally oral (in the present era they would be transmitted at cocktail parties, receptions, luncheons, and so on) and not recorded (as indicated in Figure 1 by dotted lines).

The question thus becomes one of obtaining a measure in the 1914 data of exchanged messages (*xIy*) comparable to the measure used in the simulation. In the simulation study, *xIy* was measured by simply noting the number of messages *x* sent to *y*, since it was obvious that *y*'s decision-makers would automatically receive these messages. However, since in the 1914 study *A* sent messages to *B* by way of ambassadors, we have two potential sources for the measurement of *xIy*, neither of which is adequate. Clearly, *A*'s messages to *b* cannot be used since they are almost nonexistent. On the other hand, *A*'s messages to *a* are not always intended for *B*; hence this measure will be inflated. Furthermore, either measure taken separately is inadequate since *A* may have used both channels: his ambassador and *B*'s ambassador. There is no obvious solution to this dilemma so the choice is made

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in favor of the lesser of two evils: *A*'s messages to *a* are assumed to be an adequate measure of the exchange of communication.

The impact of this second variable could be investigated in both the historical data and the simulation data. Using the 1914 data, an analysis of *A*'s messages to *a* could be made to uncover the percentage of these intended for *B*. Similarly, an analysis of *b*'s messages to *B* could be made to determine the percentage of these that reflect directives from *A*. This analysis, however, would be difficult on two grounds. First, it would require extensive additional content analyses of the ambassadors' reports. Second, it might be difficult to obtain a measure of *xIy* comparable to the simulation data. Suppose *A*'s message to *a* contains three directives for *a* to communicate to *B*'s decision-makers. Are these three directives comparable to three messages or to one in the simulation data? For these reasons then it would appear that the effects of the communication structure variable could more profitably be investigated in the simulate.

Hence we come to the second possible modification: to restructure the simulate by the addition of ambassadors. It has been argued that the EDM, or *External Decision-Maker*, in the simulate functions in part as an ambassador. While this may be true it must be admitted that the EDM also performs functions an ambassador does not normally perform. Thus while the EDM represents his nation in international politics, as does the ambassador, the EDM also "works closely with the CDM [Central Decision-Maker] to accomplish his nation's goals. . . . Both decision-makers [EDM and CDM] work to provide . . . consumer goods and security [for their populace]. . . ."[25] The EDM then performs also as a policy originator and implementor, a man capable of directing the international politics of his nation. While the ambassador can sometimes, depending on circumstances, influence foreign policy, his role in this regard is clearly secondary to his representative function. In contrast, the EDM's principal role is probably that of formulator rather than representative. Another possibly significant difference is that the ambassador is concerned with only a single country; he need represent and be concerned with only his country's policy with respect to his host country. The EDM, on the other hand, is concerned with all nations and therefore with the general foreign policy of his country.

For these reasons it is suggested that simulation studies might prof-

[25] International Relations Program, Northwestern University, *Inter-Nation Simulation Participant's Manual*, 4.

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itably be conducted using ambassadors. Then a measure of communication interaction could be determined comparable to the measure of *xIy* used in the 1914 data. It would then be possible to investigate whether this alteration produced results similar to those found in the 1914 data. Perhaps the ambassador serves as an intermediary or buffer and therefore lessens the effects of perceptions or expressions of hostility on communication interaction. If the communication structure of the 1914 situation is examined, on purely intuitive grounds it would seem unlikely that *A* would cease communicating with his own ambassador *a* stationed in *B* simply because he is angry at *B* or frightened. On the contrary, though the present data do not bear this out, it seems likely that under this condition there would be *more* reason for *A* to communicate with *a*, in order to verify his perceptions and suppositions and to determine what moves *B* might be expected to make.

The overall results of the study can be summarized as follows: Two separate sets of data show that the alliance structure and the receipt of hostile messages play a critical role in determining a decision-maker's perception of his environment and that these perceptions in turn influence his decision to react aggressively toward the perceived offending state. Furthermore, national decision-makers in the 1914 European crisis and high school decision-makers in a laboratory simulation were found to behave similarly. This similarity increases confidence in the continued use of simulation to study international phenomena. Although the lack of support for four of the hypotheses probably indicates an important difference between the international world and its simulate model, minor modifications of the simulate would alleviate this problem. As usual, the present results point toward the need for more research. However, by showing some of the correlates of a decision-maker's perceptual framework, the results also point in the direction of optimism.

Appendix: Additional Analyses

I

As is indicated in footnote 14, one attempt to solve the comparability between the simulate and historical measure of the *xEy* variable consisted of computing rank correlations between the original three themes used in the Leary index and the Leary hostility index itself. The perplexing, inconclusive results are shown below.

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TABLE X. SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATION FOR SIMULATION DATA BETWEEN LEARY HOSTILITY INDEX AND THE THREE HOSTILITY THEMES

Hostility Themes	*Leary Hostility Index*
Rejection or manipulation	−.494
Hostile-aggressive	−.400
Suspicious	−.372
Sum of the three themes	−.362

II

Footnote 19 suggests a different criterion for comparing the results from simulate and historical data. In particular, it proposes that the null hypothesis of no difference between a simulate and historical correlation for a given hypothesis be tested. Note that in this instance the null hypothesis of no difference would be accepted. Several different tests are available for this purpose. The choice was made to compare the slopes of the linear regression lines of the two sets of data rather than to compare the correlations. However, to do this one assumption had to be met, namely, that the population standard errors of estimate for the two relations are equal. This assumption can be tested by determining the F ratio of the two values and comparing it with the critical value for $n_1 - 2$ (size of first sample) and $n_2 - 2$ (size of second sample) degrees of freedom in a "Critical Values for the F Distribution" Table.[26]

Unfortunately, however, those pairs of correlations that met this assumption were also found to *be* statistically different from one another, i.e., it was not possible to accept the null hypothesis that there was no difference between the simulate and historical correlations. For comparison purposes Table XI gives the slopes for the simulation and 1914 correlations. Hence it must be concluded that, using this criterion, the simulate and historical correlations are not comparable. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that these are strong tests to apply to

TABLE XI. A COMPARISON OF SLOPES FOR 1914 AND SIMULATE DATA

	*xTy**		*xUy*		*xEy*		*yEx*		*xIy*	
	1914	*simulate*	*1914*	*simulate*	*1914*	*simulate*	*1914*	*simulate*	*1914*	*simulate*
xTy	—	—	.89	.88	.70	.33	.66	.43	.07	−.36
xUy	.93	.88	—	—	.71	.49	.71	.49	−.03	−.56
xEy	.78	.33	.75	.49	—	—	.36	.62	−.02	−.79
yEx	.73	.43	.75	.49	.36	.62	—	—	−.08	−.71
xIy	.09	−.36	−.04	−.56	−.02	−.79	−.09	−.71	—	—

* For definitions of these variables see Section I.

[26] Edwin L. Crow, Frances A. Davis, Margaret W. Maxfield, *Statistics Manual* (New York 1960), 161.

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rather imprecise data. It thus seems justifiable to use the significance criterion as a weaker but, it is hoped, indicative comparison test until further research proves otherwise.

III

Dr. Pruitt has suggested that the hypotheses discussed in footnote 21 could be tested independently if the correlations were calculated separately for (1) interalliance pairs of countries and (2) intra-alliance pairs of countries. These calculations were done and the results can be seen in Table XII. This table attempts to show the contrast between the original ("total") correlation which used both interalliance and intra-alliance pairs and the two separate correlations. It would seem that no general conclusion can be drawn from these comparisons. While in most instances the size of the correlations decreases it should also be noted that the amount of data for each correlation has been significantly reduced.

TABLE XII. A COMPARISON OF CORRELATIONS FOR SIMULATION DATA AND 1914 DATA

	SIMULATION			1914		
Hypotheses	r_s*	*n***	*significance*	r_s*	*n***	*significance*
4. There is a positive relationship between perceptions of threat (*xTy*) and perceptions of unfriendliness (*xUy*).						
Total correlation	.88	42	.001	.91	31	.001
Interalliance	.71	24	.001	.85	16	.001
Intra-alliance	.37	18	—	not possible to compute		
5. There is a positive relationship between *x*'s expression of hostility to *y* (*xEy*) and *y*'s perception of threat (*yTx*).						
Total correlation	.43	42	.01	.70	31	.001
Interalliance	—.33	24	—	.55	16	.05
Intra-alliance	.41	18	—	not possible to compute		
6. There is a positive relationship between *x*'s expression of hostility to *y* (*xEy*) and *y*'s perception of unfriendliness (*yUx*).						
Total correlation	.49	42	.01	.73	31	.001
Interalliance	—.23	24	—	.60	16	.02
Intra-alliance	.51	18	.05	.20	15	—

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TABLE XII. A COMPARISON OF CORRELATIONS FOR SIMULATION DATA AND 1914 DATA

(*Continued*)

Hypotheses	SIMULATION r_s*	SIMULATION n**	SIMULATION *significance*	1914 r_s*	1914 n**	1914 *significance*
7. There is a positive relationship between the perception of threat (*xTy*) and the expression of hostility (*xEy*).						
Total correlation	.34	42	.01	.74	31	.001
Interalliance	—.59	24	.01	.67	16	.01
Intra-alliance	.25	18	—	not possible to compute		
8. There is a positive relationship between the perception of unfriendliness (*xUy*) and the expression of hostility (*xEy*).						
Total correlation	.49	42	.01	.73	31	.001
Interalliance	—.25	24	—	.60	16	.02
Intra-alliance	.52	18	.05	.53	15	.05
11. There is a negative relationship between the perception of threat (*xTy*) and the frequency of interaction (*xIy*), i.e., the greater the perceived threat the less the interaction.						
Total correlation	—.36	42	.05	—.04	30	—
Interalliance	.60	24	.01	.36	16	—
Intra-alliance	—.09	18	—	not possible to compute		
12. There is a negative relationship between the perception of unfriendliness (*xUy*) and the frequency of interaction (*xIy*).						
Total correlation	—.56	42	.001	—.02	30	—
Interalliance	.21	24	—	—.05	16	—
Intra-alliance	—.57	18	.02	—.04	15	—
13. There is a negative relationship between *x*'s hostility to *y* (*xEy*) and *y*'s frequency of interaction with *x* (*yIx*).						
Total correlation	—.71	42	.001	.00	30	—
Interalliance	—.53	24	.01	.06	16	—
Intra-alliance	—.46	18	—	—.20	15	—

* Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient.

** *n* for all correlations indicates all possible pairs of nations. The odd number for 1914 data is the result of a data quirk in which, because of coding procedures, the pair Serbia-Serbia appeared.

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Review Articles

THE STUDY OF CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE

By JOHN W. LEWIS*

A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China: The Early Years 1949-55*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, 336 pp. $6.95.
Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, 419 pp. $7.50.
Arthur A. Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964, 210 pp. $5.00.
Robert S. Elegant, *The Center of the World: Communism and the Mind of China*, New York, Doubleday, 1964, 396 pp. $5.95.
Stewart Fraser, editor, *Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade*, Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1965, 542 pp. $10.00.
Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, 319 pp. $7.00.
Frederick T. C. Yu, *Mass Persuasion in Communist China*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, 186 pp. $5.00.

THESE seven recent works typify a cross section of scholarly publication on the Chinese People's Republic, its history, present operation, and prospects. Taken together, they provide the basis for some remarks on the study of Chinese "political culture."[1] Rather than attempt a full review of the individual works, this brief article will examine some of their assumptions and indirectly comment on the literature they represent. Each book reflects a prodigious scholarly effort and has received in various other journals a complete appraisal of its intellectual value. In general it may be fairly said that these volumes do not constitute significant breakthroughs of knowledge. They do, however, bring together and analyze important bodies of data on Communist China.

* I wish to acknowledge with gratitude grants from the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council and from the Cornell Committee of the London-Cornell Project which supported some of the research included in this review article. I am indebted to Professors Douglas E. Ashford, Steven Muller, G. William Skinner, and Arthur P. Wolf for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.

[1] In general I have followed the definitions of this concept provided in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton 1963), chap. 1; and Robert E. Ward, "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan," *World Politics*, XV (July 1963), 569-96.

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I

Let me begin by highlighting a subject on which the seven authors disagree: the actual or expected future political orientation of the Chinese peasant. Dominating their writing—and typical of the literature of the field—are diametrically opposed assumptions concerning the peasant's personality. In the past, the "average" peasant was either a passive, indifferent observer of the calamities and pressures surrounding his life or he was an impatient activist, always a potential rebel but more lately ready grist for the Communist revolutionary mill. Since 1949, it has been unclear whether Mao seeks to mobilize the complacent or subjugate the militant. The reader will have encountered other permutations of this theme; these merely reflect the writings at hand.

Speaking historically, Dr. Jerome Ch'en holds that Mao Tse-tung, "this learned, resolute, experienced, ruthless, and sensitive man" (pp. 212-13), achieved his success by marrying Marxism to the "traditional pattern of peasant revolt" (p. 8). He shares Mao's conviction that the peasantry can "rise like a tornado or tempest—a force so extraordinarily swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to suppress it" (quoted in Schram, p. 180). It is Mao's set of beliefs about this force that Mr. Schram labels "revolutionary nationalism" (pp. 75-77), and Mao, Schram declares, "marched through the door to a Communist-led revolution based on nationalism and agrarian discontent because China's conditions required this" (p. 37). In a limited way, Arthur A. Cohen concurs with the Ch'en-Schram judgment on the peasantry, particularly when he concludes that Mao's thesis concerning rural guerrilla revolution is his "most fully articulated and most important idea" (p. 191). Since Mr. Cohen deals principally with the realm of abstractions, he does not challenge the implication of these statements with respect to the actual revolutionary disposition of the Chinese peasant.

Contrasted to the shared assumption of these three authors is the one found in the writings of Frederick T. C. Yu, which is also implicit in the introductory essay by Stewart Fraser. These writers assume that the peasantry of China constitutes a basically conservative population. Under Communist guidance, however, this conservatism has been transformed. Professor Yu, for example, asserts that the Communists have confronted a "formidable task of persuasion to re-indoctrinate and re-educate the peasants" (p. 21). Their persuasiveness, he concludes, has "turned millions of unconcerned, conciliatory, and easy-

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going peasants and workers into aggressive, agitated, and vicious fighters and revolutionaries" (pp. 158-59).[2]

Finally, several of the authors take the position that the once-militant peasant has lost his fire. While some hold that this was Mao's aim, others believe that it has become his unwanted fate. Superficially similar to Schram's conclusion concerning Mao's "revolutionary nationalism," Robert S. Elegant's interpretation of Maoist thought stresses "the persistent seeking after Utopia which characterized the traditional Chinese state ideology" (p. 20). In that ideology as outlined by Elegant (in Chapter 9 of his book), the peasant emerges as a submissive and malleable soul. The Confucianist (and Communist) aspired to fashion a society where men do not "scheme or plot," nor "contend against each other" (p. 154). Recent events contradict this idealized aspiration, he states. "Millions of farms . . . gave [Mao] the tools to make his revolution" (p. 187), but "the peasants have today failed their champion" (p. 189).[3] Like Professor A. Doak Barnett, Stuart Schram, and other writers, Mr. Elegant holds that the peasantry since 1949 has proved to be less revolutionary in its outlook and less easily mobilized than Mao had predicted (Barnett, pp. 24, 326; Schram, pp. 81-84).

As stated, part of the discrepancy demonstrated above might appear to turn on the false comparison of different historical periods or to be merely verbal. Difficulties with such terms as "revolutionary" and "mobilization" might account for the persistence of the two apparently contradictory views. And it could be convincingly argued that the revolutionary peasantry of the civil war years quite predictably reverted to a more "natural" state of passiveness and conservatism after the achievement of its initial aims in Communist victory. The semantic aspects of the problem, however, would not explain the existence of the same discrepancy in the empirical data. The "historical" explanation similarly would not show why the Communists themselves were troubled in the early years of their struggle as well as more recently

[2] Chalmers A. Johnson argues an alternative thesis that the revolutionary mobilization of the Chinese peasantry resulted from the shock of the Japanese invasion and subsequent terror. He writes, "The war totally destroyed the traditional rural social order and sensitized the Chinese peasantry to a new spectrum of possible associations, identities, and purposes." See his *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945* (Stanford 1962), 5; and Donald G. Gillin, "'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Communism," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIII (February 1964), 269-89.

[3] This theme has been argued in many forms. See, for example, Benjamin Schwartz, "Modernisation and the Maoist Vision: Some Reflections on Chinese Communist Goals," *China Quarterly*, No. 21 (January-March 1965), 3-19; and Lewis, "Revolutionary Struggle and the Second Generation in Communist China," *ibid.*, 126-47.

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by the apparent paradox of a rebellious but passive peasantry. It was Mao Tse-tung's rival in the Chinese Communist Party, Chang Kuo-t'ao, who said that "the peasants take no interest in politics. . . . All they care about is having a true Son of Heaven to rule them and a peaceful, bumper year" (quoted in Ch'en, p. 193). Furthermore, other authors, including Hsiao Kung-ch'üan, the leading analyst of nineteenth-century rural China, have called our attention to the existence of this polarized and contradictory view of the peasantry, but Professor Hsiao's only explanation is a vague reference to the lack of uniformity in the "economic texture" of the Chinese countryside over time and at various places.[4]

II

Many explanations could be offered to show why China specialists, including those represented here, have so long tolerated this apparently paradoxical view of the Chinese peasantry. The most persuasive argument would probably emphasize the lack of data sufficient to come to terms with the real patterns of the society. Happily this state of affairs has begun to change dramatically with the acquisition of the secret military papers in 1963[5] and the Lien-chiang (Fukien) documents in 1964.[6] Both sets of materials, when placed alongside major collections of local newspapers and other additions to our holdings in this country, provide the basis for a totally new level of analysis of Mainland China. Unfortunately, all the studies under review here were written before these new archival materials became widely available.

[4] Kung-chuan Hsiao, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle 1960), 371-73. Communist authors, particularly in their analyses of land tenancy and land rent, have also noted the unevenness of China's economic texture, but their preoccupation has been the ubiquitous existence of exploitation in pre-Communist China and the resultant need for a national Party victory. See, for example, Ch'en Po-ta, *A Study of Land Rent in Pre-Liberation China*, first pub. August 1947 (Peking 1958); Mao Tse-tung, *Nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a* [Village Investigations] (Shanghai 1949), and *Nung-min yün-tung yü nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a* [The Peasant Movement and Village Investigations] (Hong Kong 1949).

[5] See Lewis, "China's Secret Military Papers: 'Continuities' and 'Revelations,'" *China Quarterly*, No. 18 (April-June 1964), 68-78. The military papers are a set of twenty-nine issues of a secret military journal (*Kung-tso t'ung-hsün* [Bulletin of Activities]) which cover the period January 1-August 26, 1961, and were released by the Department of State on August 5, 1963. They were published by the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army.

[6] See Chung-hua min-kuo, Kuo-fang-pu, Ch'ing-pao chü [Republic of China, Ministry of National Defense, Bureau of Investigation], comp., *Fan-kung yu-chi tui t'u-chi Fu-chien Lien-chiang ao-hu fei-fang wen-chien hui-pien* [Collected Documents on Bandit Activities Seized in Anti-Communist Guerrilla Raid on Lien-chiang, Fukien, hereafter cited as *Lien-chiang Documents*] (Taipei 1964). The Hoover Institution at Stanford University holds the microfilms of the original documents.

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When read with the discrepancy concerning the peasantry in mind, the documents from Lien-chiang *hsien* (county), Fukien Province, help us relate idealized Communist statements on the Chinese peasantry to living villages and towns. For this one *hsien*, the documents reveal most of the essential statistics on the populace, political structure, and production. Of particular interest here are the cases of both rewards and deviations in the *hsien*, which can be taken as indices of the success or failure of peasant mobilization.[7] When the deviations were plotted on the map, they clustered in the *hsien* town and the more developed commercial areas along the highways and rivers, and also in the very remote and backward areas. Rewards were concentrated in the more highly developed areas outside the *hsien* town. In brief, the deviations in the most advanced areas were those associated with activities of peasants wanting to leave the commune to engage in private business or other entrepreneurial activity. In the really primitive areas, on the other hand, deviations were typically those of the peasant who could not understand the value of the collective and who desired to operate his farm individually on a traditional basis. Not surprisingly, the reappearance of Taoists, marriage brokers, adopted daughters, and other "feudal" practices was almost wholly limited to the least modern areas in the *hsien*.[8] With this finding of an apparent correlation between patterns of behavior and location, the next obvious question concerned the relevance of modernization to peasant attitudes on a broader scale. In particular, I wondered whether Professor G. William Skinner's study of marketing and social structure[9] would be useful in view of the fact that he had earlier discovered a correspondence between my work on localism[10] and his own conclusions concerning marketing.[11]

In his important study, Professor Skinner highlights the facts that the "typical" small village has gradually over centuries become linked with fifteen or twenty other villages and that a core village of this network has acquired the role of a common marketplace. He calls

[7] It is possible, of course, that a more effective rate of mobilization would correlate with a higher rate of deviation (rather than the reverse assumed here) because of the greater bureaucratic efficiency in reporting deviations in more advanced areas. For complete accuracy in assessing rates of deviation, it would also be necessary to control for differences in population distribution. Because of the suggestive character of this article, I have not considered it necessary to deal with these problems here.

[8] See *Lien-chiang Documents*, 31, 37, 53, 54, 140-41, 146, 175-76.

[9] "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China: Parts I, II, III," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIV (November 1964, February 1965, May 1965), 3-43, 195-228, 363-99.

[10] Lewis, "The Leadership Doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party: The Lesson of the People's Commune," *Asian Survey*, III (October 1963), 457-64.

[11] Skinner, 385-86, 395-96.

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the trading area covered by this market village the *standard marketing area* and the market village itself the *standard market*. This standard market in turn was tied into a higher commercial system involving *hsien* towns and, at the highest commercial levels, the major central cities. Because of its broad functions and contacts, the standard market village grew more rapidly than did the purely agricultural villages. Its population was usually between five hundred and fifteen hundred, and instead of a wholly peasant population, traders, handicraft workers, teachers, and service personnel could also be found.[12] It was in the standard market that commercial urbanization appeared historically in the hitherto purely agricultural economy.

At the same time, the standard marketing area defined the outer limits of the traditional peasant world. Within that area, lineages formed their liaisons and worked out their mechanisms of control, giving content to the Chinese belief that power results from influence in face-to-face relationships rather than from higher official position. (In the Chinese view, for example, the provincial governor had higher status but less power than did the head of the marketing community.) Also within the standard marketing area, people exchanged gossip, set common prices and measures, sought prospective brides, and developed distinctive dialects.[13] There were between fifty and sixty thousand of these standard marketing areas at the time of the Communist takeover in 1949.[14]

These more than fifty thousand markets can be analyzed most appropriately as a part of a hierarchy of developing (or modernizing)[15] communities. Change within this hierarchy was occurring at strikingly different rates as the result of local variations in agricultural surplus and external capital essential to trade and commercial investment. Equally significant, differential rates of change characterized the vari-

[12] In addition to Skinner, see Hsiao-tung Fei, *Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley* (London 1939), chap. 14; Hsiao, 12-24; and C. K. Yang, *A North China Local Market Economy* (New York 1944).

[13] See Skinner, 32-43.

[14] *Ibid.*, 228.

[15] The terms "modernization" and "development" are used interchangeably in this article and are defined as a process of interconnected social changes leading to "economic diversification within an advanced industrial technology; heightened social mobility and the movement toward impersonal and rationalized social relationships; a concentration of the population in cities and in more comprehensive social units generally; and the mobilization of persons en masse through popular education, organization, and communications" (Robert A. Scalapino, "Environmental and Foreign Contributions: Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* [Princeton 1964], 65). "Industrialization" and "commercialization" are thus only two interconnected parts of the modernization process. See Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, II (October 1953), 161-97.

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ous components of each regional marketing system, with transformation occurring most rapidly within the cities, less so in the *hsien* towns and standard markets. As a general rule, such transformation took place at the most modest rate—if at all—within the purely agricultural villages.

Another way of viewing the hierarchy of markets is to note that a relationship existed between increasing commercialization and urbanization, on the one hand, and sociopolitical stability, on the other. Below the range of the great coastal cities of China, the standard and higher markets were less autonomous and self-sufficient than were the tiny agricultural villages. As various students of Chinese society have pointed out, "A rural market was in reality a village that had acquired a specialized economic function,"[16] and this specialization increased the dependency of the inhabitants on outside foodstuffs. At the same time, village traders were frequently less bound to family and village ties and were, moreover, the object of social scorn in the prevailing ideology. As a unit then, the standard market—essential though it was to the operation of Chinese commerce—was more vulnerable and less integrated, more developed and less orthodox politically, than the basic village.[17]

Before 1949, two critical things thus characterized the modernizing market communities: first, their instability and vulnerability, especially in the face of regional economic crises and social upheaval; and second, their exchange function, including the exchange of ideas. It is these market communities in which China's revolutionary forces matured, and, regionally speaking, it was, as we shall see, the more modern—but not the largest—marketing areas that gave scope to the emergent Communist elements in this century. The agricultural villages typically resisted modern ideas and this was particularly true in the mountainous regions, which held people remarkably close to the Stone Age—or, at least, to an age of wood (Ch'en, p. 138). The largest marketing centers—the huge metropolitan areas of east China—also proved unsuitable for sustaining revolutionary movements but usually for the reason that their advanced communications and concentrated economic power could be used to assemble and dispatch formidable

[16] Hsiao, 11.

[17] The emphasis here is deliberately on the lack of *political* orthodoxy in the market towns. The official gods were located in these towns, which made the towns appear, from the religious point of view, more orthodox than the agricultural villages. Also the family structure in the towns more often approached the ideal form. As is suggested in the conclusion of this article, the problem of the congruence between different structures must be confronted before we can adequately understand the political culture of China.

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security forces. In these very modern urban areas the existing elites in the 1920's mobilized their resources more rapidly and more effectively than could their Communist adversaries.

But what about the lack of revolutionary zeal within the apparently well-developed markets in some parts of China, particularly the southeast? In areas such as these, marketing communities witnessed all the signs of peasant unrest and even important peasant rebellions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Part of the explanation for the later failure of revolutionary elements in the southeast relates, of course, to the amount of military force that was brought to bear to crush them (Ch'en, pp. 160-84). Also significant, however, is the fact noted in the work of Professor Maurice Freedman that modernization had simultaneously wrought changes within the localized lineages, which became larger and more powerful.[18] It may be hypothesized, he states, that these lineages in the southeast had undergone a major mutation, in part to offset the increasing instability of the rural environment and the greater individual vulnerability of the local peasants. In every period of great social transformation, it would appear, a race occurs between the traditional institutions adapting and taking advantage of rapid change and the new modern movements or nation-state institutions attempting to construct viable solidarities at a higher level. Because of the earlier capital inputs from abroad and the tendencies of the rice culture of the southeast to produce a surplus, the lineages in that area apparently gained the advantage in that race at an early stage. The forces of change continued to work within the lineage institutions, however, and there emerged as a consequence in southeast China the uniquely bitter clan feuds. As Professor Freedman has pointed out, the common peasants in this area in turn probably formed powerful secret societies outside the lineage apparatus in order to protect themselves against the lineage-directed warfare. Thus these larger lineages could delay both modernization and conflict, but by their so doing, the eventual conflict turned out to be more savage and disruptive. The resultant chaos helped disable revolutionary organization in the southeast.

We have then what might be called a scale of potential revolution and mobilization. This scale, which I shall for convenience call the *modern-revolutionary scale*, ranks the potential for revolution and mobilization according to the level of modernization of the locality.[19] In the early twentieth century, at the top of the scale are the large

[18] *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China* (London 1958), chap. 15.

[19] There are several studies of the relationship between revolutionary impulses in a society and modernization. Chalmers Johnson, drawing on Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism*

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modern cities with important, but tightly contained, revolutionary forces. After the takeover, Communist leaders successfully managed the controlled mobilization of these urban populations. Next come the regional market cities, which might serve as a revolutionary springboard and whose surrounding *hsien* towns and standard markets would most often be alive with revolutionary ferment. It was in areas of this type in Hunan Province and elsewhere that Mao Tse-tung and virtually every other leading Communist in China today originated. Jerome Ch'en states that in the market town near which Mao lived "most of the townsmen made their living from trade, with the Hsiang River as the artery through which not only merchandise but also new ideas flowed" (p. 17).[20] In some of these areas the revolutionary movement was more susceptible than in others to competition from traditional lineage-controlled forces as described above, and the regional market cities, notably Wuhan and Changsha, proved as difficult to control in the "postliberation" era as they had for the Nationalists. Third on the scale would be the standard markets far removed from regional cities and central arteries of communication. Areas such as this—exemplified by the regions later occupied by Mao's Kiangsi Soviet in the early 1930's and the Yenan base area after the Long March—could become revolutionary centers only through skillful leadership or through severe destabilizing shocks.[21] After 1949 able party cadres attracted popular support in some of these areas, while in others leadership deficiencies produced a hostile reaction. Finally, there were the truly backward areas of China—particularly in the mountainous regions—where the development of modern commerce had hardly begun. The revolution almost never took root in areas such as these, and rapid mobilization efforts usually reinforced traditional antagonism and even produced violence after the takeover.

A demonstration of the possible application of the modern-revolutionary scale may be gained from a comparison of the work on

and Social Communication (New York 1953), and E. J. Hobsbawm, *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Glencoe 1959), also defines revolutionary nationalism in terms of "social mobilization." He states that social mobilization is "the dynamic process whereby pre-national peoples enter into political community with their fellows" (pp. 21-22). Since Professor Johnson examines peasant mobilization in only one area of China, he overlooks the problem of differentials in levels of modernization.

[20] On Mao's home area, Hsiao notes (p. 407) that Hsiang-t'an "has been for a long time the great market of foreign goods," and that as early as 1870 people in eastern Hunan were, "on an average, better dressed than the inhabitants [elsewhere]."

[21] This corresponds in part to Johnson's thesis, but also takes into account the problems that thesis offers when applied in detail to different Japanese-controlled areas. Cf. Gillin.

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marketing communities by G. William Skinner, noted above, and the writings of Mao Tse-tung. Skinner, in his analysis of commercial modernization (including the growth of cities and modern transport), divided Mao's native province of Hunan into five zones of modernization, ranking the zones from A (most modern) to E (least modern).[22] What he did not do was to compare his analysis with Mao's famous "Hunan Report" written in 1927.[23] In that report Mao comments at length on the spontaneous growth of revolutionary peasant associations. (In passing it should be noted that Mao actually visited only the modern or "A" areas of Hunan for data included in this Report.) Here, with Skinner's rankings inserted, is what Mao said: "In counties like Hsiangtan [A], Hsianghsiang [A] and Hengshan [B], nearly all the peasants are organized and there is hardly a remote corner where they are not on the move; these are the best places. In some counties, like Yiyang [B] and Huajung [C], the bulk of the peasants are organized, with only a small section remaining unorganized; these places are in the second grade. In other counties, like Chengpu [D] and Liling [B], while a small section is organized, the bulk of the peasants remain unorganized; these places are in the third grade. Western Hunan [E] . . . has not yet been reached by the associations' propaganda, and in many of its counties the peasants are completely unorganized; these form a fourth grade."[24] As is plain, when Mao's four grades of counties ranked according to degree of peasant organization are compared to Skinner's counties ranked according to modernization indices there is a close correspondence.

This analysis of modern-revolutionary combinations could be extended, moreover, to the so-called revolutionary bases in which Mao Tse-tung developed his principles of partisan warfare. In the first areas to which Mao's forces retreated in 1927, the peasants were tucked away in the inhospitable mountain bastions of western Kiangsi[25] and were hardly aware of the modern world (Ch'en, pp. 138-39). Advanced markets in this region were almost nonexistent and the peasants had little, if any, contact with the world beyond their small natural

[22] Pp. 368-71.

[23] See Schram, 28-33, 179-88. The official translation of this Report is in Mao, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," *Selected Works* (Peking 1964), I, 23-59.

[24] *Ibid.*, 34-35. In the quotation above I have corrected one or two errors in the translation.

[25] On the state of development in Kiangsi, see Hsiao, 419, 421, 432, 445-46, 458; and Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China 1368-1953* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 245-46, 284. For recent commentary on the difficulties of mobilization in such districts, see *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking), December 17, 1965.

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villages. Here, according to Mao, "the feudal family system prevails in every county and as all the families in a village or group of villages belong to a single clan, it will be quite a long time before people become conscious of their class and clan sentiment is overcome in the villages."[26] It was in this region, Mao said, that the attitude of the masses was "cold and reserved" and that clan localism threatened the revolutionary quality of the Communist Party.[27] In other, less traditional but still not highly advanced, areas of China, Mao later established the Yenan base areas that succeeded.[28] As we have suggested, leadership guidance and the shock of Japanese terrorism became crucial substitutes for the destabilizing forces of modern change evident in relatively more advanced areas.

The leadership policies developed by the Maoist leaders first in the Kiangsi Soviet and thereafter in Yenan were indelibly stamped by the peculiar characteristics of these regions. It is these characteristics that stand out so prominently in the studies of education and propaganda by Stewart Fraser and Frederick T. C. Yu. By virtue of the lack of development in the base areas, the Party was inevitably led to place an unusual importance on leadership techniques of a certain type—the face-to-face or mass-line type—for the mobilization and guided participation of the peasantry.[29] These Party leadership techniques had a special relevance therefore to the kind of rural society typical of the base areas, a fact lost sight of in the calamitous events of the Japanese War and the subsequent military campaigns against the armies of the Republic. But later, after the takeover, this important fact was to reemerge as the main Communist policies came to bear the Yenan stamp once again.

III

Here then were the techniques by which the Chinese Communist Party attempted to construct what it called a "new society and a new state." Among its other major programs, the Party set out in 1949 to smash the power structure at the local level in the countryside and thereafter to shape new organizations that could support a modern

[26] "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *Selected Works*, 88.

[27] This discussion modifies my earlier thesis concerning the development of Chinese Communist Party leadership techniques. See my *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca 1963), 14-22.

[28] On the state of development in and around Yenan, see Hsiao, 404, 405-6, 411.

[29] The variation in types of participation in China places severe limits on Frederick C. Barghoorn's concept of participant subject. For discussion, see Almond and Verba, 4. For a full discussion of Maoist leadership techniques, see Lewis, *Leadership*, esp. chap. 3.

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agricultural establishment. This struggle, to repeat, was conceptualized within the relatively narrow terms set by the Yenan experience. Thus restricted, the Party struck at the landlords as *the* major step in the elimination of former local elites (Barnett, pp. 172ff). That step as the single move to erase the "impediments" to controlled modernization made some sense in the Yenan-type rural context but not in those areas already modernizing and highly commercialized. Although the Party quickly realized the need for caution in the selection of its class foes in the various sections of China, it exhibited at the outset a singularity of outlook in its actual approach to diverse local conditions.[30] That outlook underlay the forced march from the land reform to small units for pooling labor and tools ("mutual-aid teams") in 1951 and thence in 1953-54 to the so-called lower-level agricultural producers' cooperatives. These cooperatives (sometimes called collectives) were also small—comprising, on the average, twenty to thirty households. Geared to the Yenan model, the most successful collectives of this type sprang up in areas similar in development to Yenan, while in the more advanced parts of China, especially the northeastern[31] and eastern provinces, the move to cooperatives constituted a retreat from modern organization. Indeed I would argue that, in contrast to a single "compliance cycle" as set forth by one author, compliance with Party leadership has in fact ranged all along the modern-revolutionary scale.[32] Only the coexistence of different degrees of compliance can explain the emergence of mixed styles of leadership in the later years of the People's Republic.

It is no wonder then that the successful model cooperatives appeared in some places but not in others. In the early period of the Chinese People's Republic, Mao Tse-tung gave priority to the development of the areas ranked high on the modern-revolutionary scale, while the publicized models typically came from those areas ranked low on that scale. The reason why Professor Yu's discussion of the "sources" of the Chinese Communist approach to ideological reform remains superficial is that it assumes that the "accumulated political and cultural experiences of the Chinese" are uniform throughout China and

[30] See Chao Kuo-chun, *Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1959* (Bombay 1960), esp. chaps. 3, 4.

[31] The different level of development and compliance in China's northeast would help explain the famous deviation of Kao Kang, who argued that leadership should be changed to account for modernization. See Lewis, "Revolutionary Struggle," 129-33.

[32] See Skinner, "Compliance and Leadership in Rural Communist China: A Cyclical Theory," unpubl. paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1965.

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somehow fit well to "the actual experience" of the Chinese Communists in the war years (pp. 37-39). Such has not been the case. In the relatively modern areas of China, for example, the effort to establish lower-level cooperatives ran into immediate difficulties. In these areas collectivization constituted a step backward from modernization. As reported by Mao, the cadres in the relatively modern province of Chekiang, for example, adopted in 1953 a policy of "drastic compression" whereby "out of 53,000 cooperatives in the province, 15,000, comprising 400,000 peasant households, were dissolved at one fell swoop."[33] As in the situation from which arose the Lien-chiang deviations discussed at the beginning of Section II, the lower-level cooperatives (similar to the present production teams) proved too progressive for the backward areas on the modern-revolutionary scale and too restrictive for those that had advanced beyond the Yenan level.

The stress on increasing production throughout China in these years, moreover, prevented Party leaders from attacking directly the essential structure of the standard markets. This reluctance may, of course, be attributed in part to the relative unimportance of the standard market in the Yenan base areas because of the Japanese occupation of the larger market towns and because of the relatively backward state of the commercial economy there.[34] Mao's cadres did attempt to control the markets after 1949 as part of their highly publicized effort to end "the days when the town exploited the countryside and when the two were in great disharmony."[35] To effect this control, supply and marketing cooperatives were established, and severe limitations fell on the free exchange and pricing of goods and services.[36] As had the Kuomintang before them, the Communists carefully avoided a coincidence of the "natural" marketing and village systems with their emerging political apparatus (including the cooperatives) so that at each level only the Party cadre could make the final decision to adjust policy to local conditions and adapt the political power structure to the economic realm. This in turn brought about a duplication of effort and numerous frustrations in the implementation of policies. Moreover, this duplication of effort undermined the principle that Mao had established as fundamental to the preservation of his elite's revolutionary integrity: Mao in principle wished to restrict the number of

[33] Mao, *The Question of Agricultural Co-operation*, first pub. July 31, 1955 (Peking 1956), 11.
[34] Chao, 72.
[35] Chen Chun, "Villages and Towns Draw Closer," *People's China* (Peking), III (February 16, 1951), 12.
[36] Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure," 363ff.

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cadres to those properly trained and to confine their role to the formation of policies rather than programmatic implementation. In this way, he held, cadres could remain dedicated to the Party ideal and could be sustained within the self-contained life of the Party. Yet, as they came to direct their activities to the local marketing and village communities, additional, less able cadres were recruited, and these became deeply involved in—or, in the Communist view, subverted by—the very local systems they sought to lead. The sheer number of posts to be filled in the marketing communities as well as in the political apparatus far exceeded the number of trained, reliable cadres. With the admission of large contingents of these cadres into the Party and with the involvement of these cadres in jobs close to the markets and lineages, bureaucratic habits hostile to the Yenan "style" grew apace.

Furthermore, by 1955, the Party's efforts to attain a higher level of collectivization in agriculture had produced only modest returns in production. Poised to launch the first Five-Year Plan in earnest, the leadership looked desperately for ways to strengthen its collectives. A solution to lagging production and cadre deficiencies appeared in the form of the so-called higher-level agricultural producers' cooperative. In 1955, the Party undertook to expand the scale of the lower-level cooperatives by establishing this new institution, which was to contain an average of 160 households, as compared to the average of twenty to thirty households in the lower-level cooperative. Communist leaders simultaneously decided to erase the discrepancy between the lower-level political apparatus and the standard marketing area.[37] This fateful alignment of local-level governments with the standard marketing community brought selected Communist programs into consonance with the more modern echelons of the Chinese economy, but also introduced a confusion in the minds of cadres concerning the difference between Communist and marketing systems of leadership. According to the Communist press, cadres in some areas were thus unable to distinguish the character and function of state power from the character and function of the agricultural producers' cooperatives.[38]

Within a few months, the higher-level collectives had been established on the Soviet model in the entire Chinese countryside. This momentous development occurred along with other favorable changes during these years, notably the apparently greater ease with which Chinese in more advanced rural and urban areas were being mobilized for economic construction. This general success, however, masked

[37] *Ibid.*, 367-68.
[38] *Hsüeh-hsi* (Peking), No. 8 (August 1956), 27.

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from view the trends less desirable from the Communist standpoint. This was the period when Chinese doubts began to grow concerning Soviet support abroad and the reliability of intellectuals at home. Also at issue were the precarious capital position of the Chinese economy, the excessively rapid growth of the urban population, and, on the political front, the drift by younger cadres and Party members away from the revolutionary ideal. Perhaps most important of all were the consequences of the decision to merge local governments and markets. That merger, as it turned out, brought new life to the marketing systems and the traditional institutions within them and promoted a strong spirit of localism at the very time that the Party hoped to instill self-sacrifice as the basis for the new Five-Year Plan (1958-1962) to come.

IV

Let me, without going into the numerous details of what happened thereafter, merely sketch the broad outlines of the Party's response to these conditions. First, the Maoist leadership considered the growing localism, the deterioration of the revolutionary spirit among the youth, Soviet revisionism, the mounting roadblocks to further industrialization, and the "rightism" of the intellectuals as ominous signs of an antirevolutionary trend that it abhorred. Urban populations had responded positively to programs for mobilization but had reacted "improperly" to the Yenan style. After considerable debate, in September 1957 Mao's spokesmen began to trumpet a new line of policy, the general line of Socialist construction. The effects of this line on educational policy are detailed in the Fraser study (pp. 49-61, 283-307), while Arthur A. Cohen deals with the more theoretical aspects of the announced line (pp. 139-87). For Mao, the choice was "revolutionization" (*ko-ming-hua*) in order to achieve modernization. The revolutionary "East Wind" said to be sweeping the world took form domestically as a "Great Leap Forward," a slogan that was to take on added significance with the establishment of the rural people's communes in mid-1958.

Huge and unwieldy, these communes provided the Maoist answer to village and marketing-area localism, on the one hand, and urban indifference to the revolution, on the other. Mao reversed his position adopted in 1948 on the key role of the city and shifted the "center of gravity" of the revolution back to the countryside.[39] Since the urban

[39] I have developed this theme in "Political Aspects of Mobility in China's Urban Development," unpubl. paper prepared for the Annual Meeting, APSA, September 1965.

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population could be mobilized but not effectively "revolutionized," the Party immobilized the city, leaving it in a political vacuum, and turned its sights to the vast countryside. In order to make his Yenan techniques relevant, all provinces were assumed to rank equally on Mao's revolutionization "scale." Real levels of modernization, and thus different potentials for mobilization, were ignored. Contained within the gigantic communes were several standard marketing areas that had only recently received official recognition. That recognition had helped produce both localism and an alignment of power that was conceived within the best Confucian and Communist traditions of face-to-face influence. Against that localism and power, the freshly imported commune cadres were helpless at the very moment that localized demands had to be carefully balanced. In order to maximize its role the Party merged the local governments with the commune and scrapped the system of local markets to make way for a "more modern" commercial system. The entire existing commercial apparatus of rural China was shut down.[40] Only with the most skillful leadership would it have been conceivable to establish the new commune-wide trading system with one bold stroke. Without that leadership, the results were factional strife and chaos.

The Communists thereupon experienced a major disaster.[41] By bits and pieces, the commune system fell apart, and by mid-1960 whole provinces flamed into open armed rebellion. This catastrophe forced the Party once again to make its peace with the standard market. While the effort to restore order and popular livelihood was under way, the communes of 1958 underwent a major overhaul. By 1963, the Party had settled on about 75,000 "new" communes, which in the main probably corresponded to the standard marketing areas.[42] Mao had taken a major gamble to achieve rapid social transformation and had decisively lost.

Many of the detailed developments in the people's commune movement help clarify the relationship between diversities in modernization and variations in popular reactions to Communist programs. For example, when the models for the communes were established in such nonmodern areas as Shang-ch'eng, in southeast Honan, the peasants were totally unprepared for the rude shock of the communization

[40] Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure," 371-72.
[41] Lewis, "China's Secret Military Papers."
[42] See Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure," 397; and the article on "restoring the traditional channels of commodity circulation," *Ta-kung pao* (Peking), July 3, 1962.

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effort, and they responded by banditry and open rebellion.[43] The model areas of 1958 became the "disaster areas" of 1960, except in those rural regions where modern development was sufficiently advanced to sustain the commune form. Among other things, this helps explain why the communes were later divided in some rural areas but not in others.

Perhaps the most significant data on the commune failure relates to developments in the urbanized parts of China during the aftermath of the three hard years. Consider again the set of conditions that held in 1961-62. The city as the political and administrative center remained the object of official scorn. Yet industrialization was still called the "leading factor," with agriculture given the role of the "foundation" in the national economy. The Party stipulated that industrialization must be advanced, while at the same time it awarded priority to the improvement of the countryside. Industrial cities thus continued to hold a valued place in Communist economic plans and the official dogma, while the intermediate towns and cities without industry lost such value. The Communists removed the political constraints on the formation of smaller, more traditional power systems corresponding to the standard marketing area and simultaneously authorized experimental sociopolitical institutions for the large urban-industrial centers. Variations in compliance with revolutionary programs, ranked on a scale of modernization, thereby determined the variations in the emergent power structure of the Chinese state. By allowing this, the Communists accentuated those social forces leading to a condition of urban primacy, a condition common to many underdeveloped societies.[44] Everything was set for the largest cities to grow and the smaller towns, particularly the *hsien* towns, to diminish in size and importance. This was precisely the policy determined in September 1962 at the Tenth Plenum of the Party's Eighth Central Committee.

That policy finally sealed the doom of the urban commune. Such communes, which had sputtered to life briefly in 1960, were simply too small to function economically as trading systems. They had also artificially and arbitrarily divided city from countryside. From the viewpoint of modernization at least, establishment of the urban com-

[43] Lewis, "China's Secret Military Papers," 76; and *People's Communes in China* (Peking 1958), 21.

[44] "Primacy" defines a situation in which a stratum of small towns and cities is dominated by one or more very large cities and in which there are deficiencies in the number of cities of intermediate size. See Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, XXIX (April 1939), 227; and Brian J. L. Berry, "Some Relations of Urbanization and Basic Patterns of Economic Development," in Forrest R. Pitts, ed., *Urban Systems and Economic Development* (Eugene 1962), 1-15.

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mune had constituted a step backward for most industrialized cities, especially those that straddled major rail and road systems. In the smaller, principally administrative, cities, moreover, commune authorities had capitalized on their newly-acquired official powers and, under the guise of enthusiasm for communization, prolonged the life of their constituencies. After the collapse of urban communization, the Party forced a mass exodus from the cities to China's "agricultural front," and it seems clear that this migration of over twenty million people disproportionately reduced the size of the smaller urban centers. This disproportionate loss probably was duplicated in the redistribution of urban cadres to the rural areas during the so-called *hsia-fang* ("to the lower levels") movement.[45] Most of the cadres transferred in that movement came from *hsien* and district towns that had not developed major industries.

At the 1962 Tenth Plenum, the Central Committee passed the still-secret "Decisions Concerning the Question of Commercial Work."[46] The burden of these decisions was that each industrial city should have its own economic region (*ching-chi ch'ü-yü*). These regions were to be independent of, and were eventually to supersede, the administrative hierarchy of municipalities, towns, and *hsien*, and the model place chosen to lead in their formation was the Tangshan special district, in Hopei.

Here is what happened in Tangshan.[47] In 1963, the Tangshan special district consisted of two municipalities and thirteen *hsien*. Prior to the Tenth Plenum, industrial goods from the northeastern city of Shenyang (Manchuria) which were needed in the eastern part of this special district had first to be sent to Tangshan city and then to be reshipped over the same route back to the district's eastern cities (such as Changli and Chinwangtao). A similarly uneconomic situation prevailed in the southwestern part of the special district in the case of goods coming from Tientsin. In these cases Tangshan city's marketing functions were too extensive to cover economically the entire political district.[48]

[45] See Lewis, *Leadership*, 220-32.

[46] These decisions (*Kuan-yü shang-yeh kung-tso wen-t'i ti chüeh-ting*) have yet to be published. Nevertheless, they have inspired a number of articles on the subject of "the rational simplification of links in commodity circulation." See for example, *Ta-kung pao*, February 1 and 24, and March 13, 1963.

[47] For a concise discussion of Tangshan, see Wei Hsin-chen and Chu Yün-ch'eng, eds., *T'ang-shan ching-chi ti-li* [The Economic Geography of Tangshan] (Peking 1960). This section is based on *Ta-kung pao*, April 8, May 13, and August 4, 1965; and *Jen-min jih-pao*, May 19, 1965.

[48] Ironically, the Chinese used Tangshan as the model area in 1958 in their attempt to set up high-level systems on the basis of district political boundaries. See *Shang-yeh shih-yung fa-kuei shou-ts'e* [Handbook of Applied Commercial Law] (Peking 1958), 154-77.

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The limits of the extension of the Shenyang and Tientsin markets into the Tangshan district could thus be computed simply on the basis of comparative transportation costs,[49] although the Chinese press also spoke of the need to define economic regions on the basis of "geography, communications, and production."[50]

While encroachment on the Tangshan district was occurring from the outside (from Shenyang and Tientsin), internal factors within the district were also helping shape Tangshan city's economic region. For example, it was seen that the other four major market cities along the railway in the district—Kuyeh, Luanhsien, Changli, and Chinwangtao—could have supply and marketing cooperatives[51] of the same level as Tangshan's. In April 1964, the Tangshan leadership decided that fifty-six basic-level supply and marketing cooperatives should go beyond *hsien* boundaries to procure goods directly from the nearest of the five principal market cities, including Tangshan city itself. At the same time, it was agreed that the Tangshan city market also extended too far when its goods had to pass through *hsien*-level markets before reaching cooperatives at the lower level. Given the existing transportation net, the city could ship goods directly to the lower-level cooperative without shipping them first to the *hsien* town. The same would be true of the other four market cities that were forming their own economic regions. Thus, in the arrangement of the new commercial regions around these larger cities, the function of the intermediate, *hsien*-level commercial worker was even further attenuated. Hundreds of *hsien*-town businesses were shut down and their workers transferred elsewhere.[52] Most went to the local supply and marketing cooperatives while a few ended up in the growing commercial centers along the railway. According to the Communist press,[53] "As the five principal market cities along the railway line have greatly increased their wholesale tasks, they are separately converted into substations of the second-level wholesale station or wholesale departments under it. Personnel are increased appropriately."

These new arrangements explicitly coincide with the modernization of each region. Again, the Chinese press makes the case: "Of course, economic regions are not unchangeable. They also develop and change following the development and changes of conditions in production

[49] See Chu T'ien-shun's article on the rational organization of transportation in *Hung-ch'i* (Peking), No. 23-24 (December 5, 1962), 35-39.
[50] *Ta-kung pao*, April 8, 1965.
[51] See the article written on the rural supply and marketing cooperatives at the time of the Tenth Plenum in *Kuang-ming jih-pao* (Peking), August 27, 1962.
[52] See *Ta-kung pao*, August 12, 1965.
[53] *Ibid.*, April 8, 1965.

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and communications. These changes must be observed and every effort should be made to cope with them if we are to organize commodity circulation in a rational manner."[54] These changing conditions, moreover, are being encouraged with a view to integrating the rural countryside around China's major cities into large modernizing units. The Communists have expressed the fear that such a unit will once again give rise to the "urban viewpoint"[55] and have said that the bypassing of the *hsien* town might lead the cadres in "Tangshan city . . . to favor the city and neglect the supply of the countryside."[56] They are willing to take these risks, however, and have actually applauded the emergence of new sociopolitical alignments in the economic regions whereby villages can bypass commune officials and go directly to the cadres of the supply and marketing cooperatives and whereby cooperative cadres can thwart *hsien*-level officials and deal directly with the city-level echelons. Municipal party officials also have a direct chain of command to the rural cooperatives, and district-level cadres formerly responsible for rural areas have declined in importance. Such "readjustments" of political power and economic regions, the Communist press has stated, will "arouse the masses" because "old habits, conservative thought, departmentalism, and bureaucratism have no place to hide."

Tangshan city's economic region now overlaps and effectively eliminates the boundaries of seven *hsien* in the special district, as well as those of the municipality—particularly since Kuyeh in the eastern part of the municipality has been allowed to develop its own economic region. These regions, each based on the highly developed commercial and industrial system in the area and now considered as an integrated socioeconomic whole,[57] are tied into the even larger economic regions taking shape around Tientsin, Peking, and Shenyang. In all of north and northeast China the fate of the outmoded standard marketing areas has been foreshadowed by the decline of the commune and the rise of new economic regions. These changes have been reinforced by the inauguration of novel procedures for commodity loans and credit payments.[58] The political forces that had held the modernizing trends in check have been discredited and largely eliminated. This has been crucial in the developments leading to the planning for the third Five-

[54] *Ibid.*
[55] See *ibid.*, April 3, May 5 and 7, 1965.
[56] *Ibid.*, April 8, 1965. Other statements in this paragraph are based on this same source.
[57] *Jen-min jih-pao*, May 19, 1965.
[58] *Ta-kung pao*, May 13, 1965.

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Year Plan, scheduled to begin in 1966. Important, too, are the facts that China's advanced areas are now progressing more rapidly than other regions, and that within them distinctive sociopolitical arrangements are emerging with official encouragement. At the same time, as noted in the discussion on the post-1962 rural communes, the leadership has allowed the less-developed areas in China to reestablish more traditional forms of production, social behavior, and elite control. To a remarkable degree, there has arisen a fundamental realignment of political structures and socioeconomic levels in Mainland China.

V

This realignment gives real content to the Chinese slogan "modernization with revolutionization." As an outline of that content, this review article sheds light on one of the central discrepancies present in the seven books at hand and in the general literature of Mainland China. Many gaps remain to be filled in the outline, but it seems clear that the variant patterns of political orientation and forms of authority fairly closely correlate with levels of modernization. The different environment at each level affects the potential for mobilization by the elite in power and for spawning revolutionary movements that can serve contending elites.

The least modern Chinese areas appear to be both difficult to mobilize and inhospitable to the production of revolutionary sentiments. Efforts to engender modernization in such places have produced extreme reactions and reversions to entrenched conservatism. The modern urban centers at the other end of the scale are more easily controlled (or mobilized) and are more often subject to the ferment of unorthodox ideas. In the cities, mobilization can produce organization and participation without the creation of desired responses by the populace. In localities between these two extremes, leadership techniques become relevant—indeed, crucial—to the guided promotion of revolutionary forces. In some of these "middle-range" places, however, rapid modernization has given rise to resurgent traditionalism and localism, while in other areas the sudden change in the economic function of localities such as the *hsien* town has produced a dilemma for the established government, both Nationalist and Communist. These towns may be the source of great revolutionary potential necessary for continuing a program of induced change, but this potential may also run counter to plans for mobilization and control. These towns lack stability and firm political loyalties. This may become particularly im-

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portant as the Party chooses to accelerate the tendencies toward the primacy of large urban centers at the expense of the middle-level towns.

For the Maoist leadership, modernization has related to "revolutionization" with unexpected variation and complexity. Because of the structural variations in the society, it is a mistake for us to assume as do most of the works under review that governmental policies are uniformly received throughout China. Contrary to the assumption of the literature represented here, the use of aggregate data on Chinese society erases the essential basis for determining the realities of Chinese politics. Central to an understanding of the present Chinese political culture—and perhaps of every modernizing political culture—is an awareness of the fact that the "typical" peasant or worker does not exist. Aggregate data that may be used to identify ideal patterns lose their value for analysis of actual political orientations and attitudes. As elsewhere, the modernization of China has begun to structure these orientations and attitudes along a broad continuum and has thereby rendered meaningless those simplistic interpretations of domestic Chinese politics based on general policy pronouncements and composite data.

Formerly, good reasons existed for concentrating on the systematic study of general principles and official doctrines. Given the limitations on our data, the analysis of ideal societal patterns held great scholarly promise. Now that China specialists have obtained documentary and interview data on political behavior in China, unstructured, aggregate data must inevitably play a smaller part in analysis. The foregoing outline of the political implications of marketing institutions has tentatively explained one such body of data that give structure to Chinese political life. Eventually, we shall have to study other comparable structures—Party, religious, lineage, legal-bureaucratic, and military—in order to evaluate the integration of the Chinese state and the cognitive orientations of its people. Only then will we have begun to understand China's political culture.

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TRANSFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Small Increments Along a Vast Periphery

By JAMES N. ROSENAU

Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964, 595 pp. $11.50.

MANY students of world politics take their subject so seriously that they often mistake their conception of reality for reality itself. There may be an objective truth about any given event or trend in world affairs, but the observer must use some method to comprehend it and, in so doing, he inevitably renders the truth subjective. The "established facts" of world politics are, in effect, no more than widespread agreement—what I shall call an intersubjective consensus—among actors and experts as to the existence and relevance of particular phenomena. Total comprehension of the realities of world politics can thus only be approximated. The greater the intersubjective consensus, the greater the comprehension and the more "real" the reality.

This is not to depreciate the seriousness of world politics. Great questions are at issue and the pleasures and pains of life often do depend on the conduct of foreign affairs. Yet—to repeat for purposes of emphasis—crucial as the course of events may be, our understanding of it can never transcend the limits of the concepts and data we use to describe it. As will be seen, this thought permits a perspective that neither minimizes the seriousness of world affairs nor places them out of our reach in the realm of objective reality.

An analogy with sports will make clear what I mean by the intersubjective nature of reality. I view the gathering of data and the structuring of concepts as a game one plays in order to move ever nearer to the truth. The game has its rules. These are sometimes codified and sometimes implicit but are always operative. Usually the rules are inhibiting and only rarely do they allow unrestrained action. The play is often dull as the opponent, elusive and stubborn, brings action to a standstill. Yet tense and exciting moments, full of the drama of forward movement, do occur as the opponent gives way in the face of a breakthrough. And who is the opponent? He is Man, both individually and

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collectively, acting in unexpected and complex ways that constantly challenge the researcher's ingenuity, resist his classifications, elude his disciplined procedures, and refuse to be arrayed in simple and clear-cut patterns.

We can, it must quickly be added, play a variety of games with our subject matter. We can play the scientific game or the historical game, the game of the journalist or the game of the preacher. We can abide by strict rules of evidence, heed our consciences, or rely on informed impressions. We can derive our findings from quantitative data, from the lessons of a single case, or from the values we espouse.

Furthermore, whatever the game, we can play it in a number of different ballparks. In the world politics league, our contests with human behavior are scheduled in a few supranational parks, many national sites, some conference rooms, and occasional foreign offices. Our opponent, in other words, is Man in a variety of guises—as international organization, national society, diplomatic situation, bureaucracy, or as individual decision-maker.

Finally, whatever game we play and wherever we play it, we can adopt a seemingly infinite range of styles and strategies. We can subject the opponent to the rigors of realism, to the tenets of idealism, to the precepts of decision-making analysis, to the assumptions of general systems theory, and so on through all the concepts, approaches, and schools that researchers have used to guide their play.

Let us carry the analogy one step further and emphasize that while it may be possible to rank the ballparks according to their elegance, and the strategies of play according to their effectiveness, we cannot do the same with the games themselves. Baseball is not better than football or worse than golf. They are different games that appeal to different people, require different skills, and serve different interests. If a person is small and prefers to compete against himself, then he plays golf, whereas football appeals to those who are large and like to engage in contact sports. So it is with the various games through which truth is acquired. Each can be played well or poorly, and each can be won or lost or stalemated; but none can be judged as inherently better or worse than any other. Each is played for different reasons and to attain different kinds of truth. The adequacy of the truth in each game is measured against the rules of that game, not against the truths achieved in other games. The assessments of world politics made by the journalist who depends on informed observation are neither more nor less accurate than those asserted by the preacher who relies on spiritual perceptions or those developed by the scholar who employs

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systematic analysis. These are simply three different sets of truth, derived from the play of three very different games. Likewise, the findings of the historian who uses the case method to search for meaning in a single instance of world politics are neither better nor worse than those of the political scientist who applies quantitative techniques in order to discern the patterns that emerge from a number of situations. Again these are different kinds of truth, answering different kinds of questions that stem from different kinds of scholarly interests.

While it is thus inappropriate to pass judgment on the value of the game that a scholar plays in order to acquire and interpret data, the question of how he scores against his opponent can and must be addressed. Distinguished performance in the various games of scholarship is marked by a processing of data that, within the rules of the researcher's own game, is so imaginative or persuasive as to fashion a wide intersubjective consensus among those who play the same game. A record-setting performance is achieved when a researcher's findings are so striking and so clearly a consequence of opportunities provided by the rules of his game that the scope of the resulting consensus is widened to include not only all the devotees of his game, but also a number of people who ordinarily prefer other sports. Contrariwise, low or losing scores will be recorded by researchers who either process their data in a pedestrian fashion or fail to live up to the rules of their game. Such performances are not likely to attract large crowds and those few who do attend are likely to drift away before the play is over.

I

The games scholars play in order to comprehend world politics can be reduced to two major types, the historical and the scientific.[1] The rules of the historical game are far less stringent than those of the scientific. In historical analysis the researcher may roam freely over a wide and varied expanse of data in order to tell his story. He scores well if the story is coherent and full of insight, but however high his score may be, the story is always his and its findings never become independent of the coherence and insight with which he organizes and analyzes his materials. To be sure, the rules oblige him to indicate where he obtained each component of his story and prohibit his mis-

[1] Still other types are of course played by journalists, politicians, citizens, preachers, and the many other actors who have occasion to discern and evaluate the international scene. Here we are concerned only with scholarly games, which are assumed to be distinguished from all other types by their goal of understanding *why* the course of events unfolds as it does. As will be seen, scholarly games can vary considerably in their rules and subordinate goals, but they do share an aspiration toward comprehension.

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representing the nature of his data. Beyond this, however, he is free to draw on archival materials for one part of the story, to cite a historical example in another, to quote respected authorities in still another, and to use common knowledge, anecdotal wisdom, rigorous logic, and sustained reflection to link the various parts to each other. If the resulting composite impresses players of the historical game as yielding new comprehension about some aspect of world politics, then it will assume a conspicuous place in the literature of the field.

The rules of the scientific game, on the other hand, are not nearly so flexible. The scientist must also piece together a coherent and insightful tale out of his data, but, unlike a player in any other game, he must do so in a way that renders his findings independent of himself. The distinguishing feature of the scientist's "truths" is that they must be susceptible to confirmation by independent observers. Thus the rules of his game require him to make his assumptions, concepts, and procedures sufficiently explicit to permit any researcher to arrive at the same conclusions by gathering the same data and processing them in the same way. The scientist is free to employ the views of respected authorities in developing his framework and there is nothing to prevent his constructing hypotheses out of historical example, anecdotal wisdom, or, indeed, sheer hunch. Once he proceeds to test the hypotheses, however, the rules of the game become stringent because, if they are not followed, the findings can never be dissociated from the finder.

The rules governing the processing and the interpretation of data are equally stringent. The researcher must indicate each operation performed in the gathering of the data, specify the boundaries of the categories used to classify the data, and note each step, both conceptual and statistical, taken in discerning patterns in the data. Further, he must explicate the criteria used to interpret quantitative differences in the distributions of the data and must indicate clearly how the relationships that emerge confirm or negate his hypotheses. Adherence to both sets of rules is necessary to achieve distinction in the game of science. If the player abides by the "process" rules but is lax in using the interpretation rules, then the same data will mean different things to different observers and intersubjective consensus will not develop. Similarly, fidelity to the "interpretation" rules will not offset laxity in those pertaining to process because, obviously, different observers will produce different data that are bound to mean different things even if common criteria of interpretation are employed.

In view of the assessments that follow, I perhaps should add that

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of the two basic types of games, I prefer the rigors of the scientific and I wish more students of world politics could be recruited to play it. Recruitment is difficult, however, because many students exaggerate the difficulty of acquiring the skills and training required for scientific play. In addition, many are also unaware that scientific analysis allows ample room for—indeed, invites—creativity and the application of imagination. Hence while they may perceive some virtues in quantitative procedures, they are hesitant to forgo the liberties provided by the historical analysis in which they have been trained. Ambivalence results, and in turn produces research that is neither science nor history but a confusing mixture whereby quantified data are processed in a less than rigorous fashion.

II

The foregoing considerations provide some perspective with which to assess the book under review. I had trouble making my way through its fourteen lengthy and complex chapters, but its concerns are too important and its author too distinguished to permit its dismissal for such faults as undue repetition and diffuse analysis. Haas has chosen to undertake a major contest with the boundaries of comprehension and his efforts merit respect. The reasoning outlined in the previous discussion enables me to evaluate the result at a level appropriate to the scope of the work even if I am unable fully to contribute to the emergence of a favorable intersubjective consensus with regard to it.

To anticipate the ensuing analysis, the main difficulty with the book is that Haas wavers between history and science, using the interpretation rules of the former to derive meaning from data gathered through application of the process rules of the latter. Stated more succinctly (and in the words the author uses to open his preface), "This book is self-consciously eclectic. It is neither a theory, nor a model, nor yet a case study" (p. vii).

Throughout the welter of concepts, hypotheses, data, and interpretations, however, the task he has shouldered never ceases to loom large and compelling. It is no less than the effort to determine whether an international organization can, through successful performance of its assigned tasks in a specialized sphere, contribute to an integrative transformation of the international system. More precisely, can an international organization by providing information, services, and direction that progressively facilitate satisfaction of human needs and wants in the less political, more technical spheres of life—i.e., in the social, economic, and welfare fields—transcend and thereby transform na-

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tional boundaries? And, if such an organization develops the habits of cooperation necessary to success in one sphere, will these tendencies spill over into other spheres, thus reinforcing the work of other international agencies and accelerating the pace of integration at the global level? Is there, in short, an international political equivalent of the old adage, "Big oaks from little acorns grow" (p. 252)?

Haas's book is divided into three parts. In the first he poses these questions, in the second he explores them through empirical materials derived from the experience of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and in the third he undertakes to answer them. Before evaluating each part, however, let me stress that Haas's questions are compelling and important for theoretical reasons as well as for the values they encompass. The policy implications of his queries and findings are self-evident: It *matters* whether international stability and progress prevail and whether international organizations can encourage the growth of stable patterns and the maintenance of progress. Less obvious, perhaps, is the significance of Haas's inquiry for the general study of politics: It *matters*, both theoretically and empirically, whether a political system functions differently in one issue-area than in another and whether the linkages between national and international systems can be so structured as to permit each system to operate as a variable in the normal functioning (not to mention the transformation) of the other. Yet neither the phenomena of issue-areas (what Haas calls "functional spheres") nor those pertaining to national-international linkages have been adequately accounted for in political analysis. Most theorists ignore the former and assume the latter. Political systems are treated as if they processed all issues in the same way, and while it is acknowledged that their external environments do condition their conduct of politics and government, these environmental conditions are usually presumed to be equally operative in all internal situations.[2] Hence any inquiry that provides theoretical and empirical materials in which both the boundaries of issues and the presence of linkages can be traced is bound to be of deep interest. At no point should the ensuing criticism be regarded as diminishing the contribution that Haas's book has to offer in this regard. Notwithstanding its diffuse analysis, the book

[2] Recently some thought and work on the issue-area concept have been reported and appear to hold considerable promise. See, for example, Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 677-715. Extended research into national-international linkages, however, has yet to be launched. For a discussion of both the issue-area and linkage concepts, see my "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston 1966), 27-92.

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is packed with insights into the permeability of one issue-area—social welfare—by the shifting tides of world politics. Similarly, the reader's involvement in the complex story that unfolds is sustained by the realization that Haas is probing changes in relations between states that can occur only if they are linked to changes within them.

III

Rather than devoting Part I of his book to a straightforward enumeration and analysis of the main questions that concern him, Haas chooses to follow the roundabout course of first identifying one particular "school of thought" (p. 5) or "ideology" (p. 8) or "theory" (p. 24) that claims to have answers to his questions and then assessing the validity of its particular answers. The school is "Functionalism" and Haas ascribes unequivocal answers to the devotees of this school: The Functionalist is portrayed as believing that specialized international organizations can successfully perform their tasks in nonpolitical realms and, in so doing, weave "an ever-spreading web of international institutional relationships" (p. 6) that will slowly transform the international system in an integrative direction. This conviction is posited as stemming from four "separability propositions" through which the Functionalist breaks down and "disputes" the inseparable foundations of another ideology, "the so-called Realist school of thought: . . . (1) The Functionalist separates power from welfare . . . (2) . . . various governmental tasks into discrete elements . . . (3) . . . the political and the technical . . . (4) . . . the [nationalistic from the other] loyalties imputed to the political actor" (p. 21). These four propositions "are the heart of Functionalist theory" (p. 23) because they allow for a projection of world order in which international agencies can redirect loyalties through authoritative activities, in nonpolitical areas, which do not jeopardize the power of national governments.

After outlining the tenets of Functionalism in the first chapter, Haas in the next three plays a variant of the game of historical analysis in order first to assess Functionalism's validity and then to refine it. Admitted, my preference for another sort of game makes it difficult for me to appreciate the nuances of performance in this one, but I stayed with it through a vast array of concepts and quoted observations and nevertheless came to the end of Chapter 4 perplexed by the purposes, rules, and outcome of Haas's analysis.

No doubt one reason for this reaction is that early in the contest

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Haas dampened my interest in the outcome by indicating that his main opponent, Functionalism, is something of a synthetic composite. He says that his opponent has no specific historical reality, that he has had to piece together from various sources the existence of the school housing Functionalism, and that his capital "F" use of the word is to distinguish it from its lower-case usage in sociology. Functionalism, in other words, is Haas's label for a host of diverse ideas held by a variety of observers who do not know they share a doctrine and whose analyses are as often discrepant as they are consistent:

> Functionalism has no single prophet, no scriptures, and no dogma. As an ideology seeking to reform the form and substance of international life it has had a variety of spokesmen since the 1870's. But far from constituting a coherent body of militants, these people are united only by a vague and shifting syndrome of common attitudes and propositions: in fact, it is of the essence of Functionalism to avoid rigidity and dogma. Those qualifying to be called Functionalist have been considered to include Paul S. Reinsch, Leonard Woolf, G.D.H. Cole, H.R.G. Greaves, Pitman Potter, Edgar Saveney, and a host of lesser-known writers preparing blueprints for the brave new world that was to arise at the end of World War II. The chief exponent of Functionalism, however, is undoubtedly David Mitrany; yet it should be borne in mind that no one work of his contains the Functionalist gospel, but that the component parts are to be found scattered in books, articles, and speeches. Nor do all Functionalists agree on all points or maintain consistency in their emphases over a generation of writing. Aspects of the Functionalist argument singled out by me as crucial have not necessarily been so treated by all Functionalist writers. Yet when I was convinced that a proposition was implicit in the Functionalist case, even though not necessarily given prominence by an author, I have felt free to incorporate it in the mainstream of the argument (p. 8).

A more important reason for my perplexity over the first four chapters concerns the nature of the data used to assess the adequacy of Functionalism. Haas does not analyze past events to see what light they might shed on the capacity of international organizations to foster systemic transformation. Rather his data consist of the ideas of other writers. Eclecticism runs wild as the ideas of sociologists (Robert K. Merton, Talcott Parsons, Amitai Etzioni, Philip Selznick, Gunnar Myrdal), anthropologists (Bronislaw Malinowski, S. F. Nadel), eigh-

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teenth- and nineteenth-century Liberals (Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, the Mills, Herbert Spencer), political scientists (Karl Deutsch, Stanley Hoffmann, George Modelski, Gabriel A. Almond, Morton A. Kaplan, Kenneth Waltz, Arthur Lee Burns, John Herz, Glenn Snyder), specialists in international law (C. Wilfred Jenks, Gerhard Niemeyer), psychologists (Harry Stack Sullivan, Kurt Lewin), and a number of other writers whose special fields are unknown to me are sifted, modified, accepted, reformulated, and/or rejected. Perhaps the presentation and analysis of all these ideas would be more meaningful if they resulted in a series of hypotheses that could be subjected to empirical verification. But the thrust of the analysis is not so clear. The subsequent examination of the ILO's experience is not anticipated, and even the more general question of the relationship between international-organization activities and systemic transformation becomes obscured by what is apparently an attempt to see whether sociological theorists, students of political systems, legal experts, and specialists in organizational behavior have any wisdom to offer on the adequacy of Functionalism. Haas finds that some do and some do not, but in the process he strays a long way from the empirical questions of primary concern to him. To be sure, a theoretical framework is necessary to guide the search for and the explanation of empirical data, but in these first four chapters Haas fails to make clear the relationship between his theory and his research.

A measure of the perplexing nature of these early chapters is the difficulty one has figuring out where Haas comes out in his assessment of the adequacy of Functionalism. On the one hand, he makes clear that Functionalism is wanting in several crucial respects and that each of its four separability propositions requires extensive modification (pp. 47-50). On the other, he does not dissociate himself from Functionalism but rather specifically identifies his elaborate critique of the separability propositions as "refining" rather than rejecting them.

IV

If the first four chapters are circuitous and confounding, the next eight are exciting and straightforward. No matter that Haas warns that "the magic words 'functionalism' and 'functional' will recur with astounding frequency in the pages that follow" (p. 140). And no matter that it is difficult to follow the logic of his assertion that the analysis of Part II derives from the formulation developed in Part I. In these later chapters Haas focuses directly on the empirical problem, and his

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handling of it is so engrossing that both he and the reader become unmindful of the previous formulation and its "magic words."

The inquiry begins with an explicit set of twenty-four hypotheses (pp. 134-36) pertaining to what must happen within both the ILO and the international system for the latter to be transformed by the former. Secondly, while it is regrettable that the hypotheses are not cast in operational form, Haas offers an abundance of quantitative materials with which to analyze those hypotheses that predict changes in the ILO's ideology, structure, and procedures. Thirdly, he conducts in Chapters 6-8 an exhaustive examination of the administrative history of the ILO from its inception in 1919 through the early 1960's, as recorded in the speeches of its five Directors-General, the programs and policies it adopted, and the several revisions of its procedures and Constitution. This examination yields the general finding that in the postwar years the ideology and efforts of the Organization's leadership were directed toward transforming the international environment in an integrative direction (a goal that Haas calls "Official Functionalism"). Such a finding makes it appropriate to examine the quantitative materials to determine whether they reflect systemic transformation stemming from ILO efforts as well as from other sources.

Lastly, but most important, there are the quantitative materials themselves. These are not simply tabulations of the recurring behavior (i.e., voting) that culminates participation in international organizations and that reduces many complex processes to a single yea-or-nay choice. Nor do the materials consist of second-hand interpretations of past or future behavior such as are developed in interview surveys. Nor are they mere attitudinal inferences derived from content analyses. Rather, the structure and procedures of the ILO have permitted Haas to accumulate—in thirty-seven tables—records of recurring behavior that is more multidimensional than the vote, more accurate than the interview, and more empirical than the attitude. And, if this is not enough to stimulate thought, his data involve behavior that is directly and centrally linked to the processes through which systemic transformation can occur. As will be seen, the question of whether the data reflect correlative or causal relationships is not easily answered, but in either case their distribution affords a rare and eye-opening insight into the interrelations, through time, between an international organization and its environment.

The existence of such data can be traced to several unique aspects of the ILO Constitution. Perhaps the most important is a series of pro-

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visions (Articles 19, 22, 23, and 26, as reproduced in the Appendix to Haas's book) requiring reports on the consequences of the Conventions and Recommendations through which the ILO takes formal action. All Members of the Organization are required to inform the Director-General "of the measures taken" to bring each Convention or Recommendation adopted by the ILO's highest body, the General Conference, before those authorities in the Member's decision-making structure who are competent to give effect to the Convention or Recommendation. Further, all Members must also report on what action the authorities take; and, even if the authorities do not ratify the Convention or apply the Recommendation, the Member is nevertheless obliged to report, "at appropriate intervals as requested . . . , the position of its law and practice in regard to the matters dealt with in the Convention [or Recommendation], showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be given, to any of the provisions of the Convention by legislation, administrative action, collective agreement or otherwise, and stating the difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification of such Convention [or the application of the Recommendation]." Moreover, in the case of each Convention that is ratified, every party to it is required "to make an annual report . . . on the measures it has taken to give effect to the provisions" constituting the Convention.

In short, Haas was not confronted with the task of finding and coding vast quantities of inchoate data in order to ascertain what happened in every national system each time the ILO sought to modify it. The national systems are themselves required to describe, systematically and regularly, the impact, or lack of impact, of the ILO. Furthermore, when it is realized that ILO Conventions and Recommendations have dealt with a variety of unrelated matters (Chapters 9-12 deal, respectively, with "International Labor Standards," "International Collective Bargaining," "Human Rights," and "Freedom of Association"), and that the Organization has developed an elaborate committee structure to handle the problems posed by this diversity of interests, it becomes apparent that Haas's data also allowed him to examine the ILO's impact in several different issue-areas. Indeed, in the "collective bargaining" area the work of the ILO is carried forward in eleven subareas by its ten Industrial Committees (Building Trades, Chemicals, Coal Mines, Inland Transport, Iron and Steel, Metal Trades, Petroleum, Plantations, Salaried Employees, and Textiles) and its Joint Maritime Commission, thus permitting comparisons of the Organization's impact on highly specific economic realms, both among countries and

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within them. The analytic possibilities become even more exciting when one also learns that at the General Conference each Member is represented by four delegates ("of whom two should be Government delegates and the two others shall be delegates representing respectively the employers and working people"), that a 2:2:2 formula is used for representation of the same three groups in the Industrial Committees, and that the Constitution permits the nongovernmental groups to request and secure ILO inquiries into the compliance of either their own or other governments. Not only do these unique characteristics of the ILO provide additional data with which Haas assesses the compliance of Members, but also the votes and complaints of the employer and labor groups enable him to break down the ILO's environment into functional as well as issue-area and national units. On top of this dazzling array of categories for which the ILO supplies systematic data, Haas has himself developed (pp. 129-30) a set of sixteen operational "indicators" for classifying the national units in terms of their political organization ("democracies, totalitarianisms, traditional oligarchies, and ['modernizing'] oligarchies"), their socioeconomic structure ("industrialized, newly industrializing, mature agricultural, and underdeveloped"), and their economic organization ("free enterprise, welfare statism, communism, or corporatism").

Viewing his materials as a whole, then, we see that Haas has quantified data for virtually every cell of what roughly amounts to an 83 x 16 x 3 x 4 x 11 matrix.[3] Nor is this all. He is able to quantify the data in seemingly endless ways: viz., by the votes of Members, subdivided into those cast by Government, Worker, and Employer Groups, on issues pertaining to "Conventions," "Agenda," and "Credentials," in three different time periods (Table 1, p. 214); by the number of Conventions on labor standards "ratified," "accepted" on behalf of "almost all" or "selective" Non-metropolitan Territories, or "applied" in "almost all" or "selective" Territories by countries with jurisdiction over such lands in two time periods (Table 7, p. 271); by the number of instances of "Full Compliance," "Partial Compliance," and "Good and Fair Conditions" (i.e., compliance not necessary) reported to each Industrial Committee (Table 12, pp. 314-16) by each country (Table 13, pp. 320-21) in answer to requests for information on "the extent to which the Committees' standards found their way into national policy and practices" (p. 308); by the number of "no replies," "evasive replies," and direct replies that all the Industrial Committees received from

[3] Eighty-three countries clustered into sixteen types and represented by three groups of actors operative in four issue-areas and eleven subareas.

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each country, broken down both by countries (Table 15, p. 324) and by Committees (Table 16, p. 326) under the headings "total number of replies possible" and the "number of Committees participated in" by each country; by scores on a weighted scale of "human rights observation," compiled by weighting and averaging responses to inquiries about, votes on, and ratification and application of each of six postwar ILO Conventions, and derived for each Member (Table 22, pp. 374-75); by the average scores on the "human rights observation" scale recorded by sixteen types of countries, classified by their political organization, socioeconomic structure, and economic organization (Table 23, p. 376); by the number of complaints against each country submitted to the Committee on Freedom of Association, as broken down into those dealing with "trade union," "human rights," "colonial," "cold war," and "other" issues (Table 24, pp. 388-90); by the total number of complaints in each issue-area made during 1950-1953, 1954-1959, and 1960-1963 (Table 25, p. 391); by the number of complaints in each time period lodged by the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions, "national unions vs. own government," "national unions vs. foreign governments," and "nonoccupational groups" (Table 26, p. 392) against each of the sixteen types of countries with respect to their practices in the "trade union," "human rights," "colonial," and "cold war" areas (Table 27, p. 394); by the number of complaints that the Committee on Freedom of Association dismissed outright (both "without" and "after" inquiry), dismissed "with request to review" (both "without" and "after" inquiry), accepted and issued "recommendation to change law or practice," or accepted and imposed "sanctions," as broken down by country (Table 28, p. 400-401), time period (Table 29, p. 402), identity of complainants and types of countries (Table 30, p. 404), and issue-area (Table 31, p. 406); and by the number of Committee recommendations for changes in law or practice that resulted in "great improvement," "some improvement," or "no improvement" in each country (Table 32, pp. 418-20).

One of the problems created by so many categories, of course, is that they can fragment data to such an extent that many cells are left with few or no entries. Haas does not avoid this problem altogether, but there are sufficient entries in many of the categories to enable him to discern a variety of reasonably clear patterns in the distribution of 416 roll-call votes, 3,248 ratifications or declarations of acceptance of Conventions on behalf of the Non-metropolitan Territories, 19,516

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possible replies to the Industrial Committees and 5,493 actual replies, 5,508 separate behaviors used to compute the scores on the scale of "human rights observation," and 272 complaints submitted to the Committee on Freedom of Association.[4]

V

The handling of quantitative materials is never easy and the critic, if he is so inclined, can always find flaws in the processing and presentation of data. In view of the magnitude of Haas's inquiry, however, it seems inappropriate to pick at the flaws in his quantitative analysis. To be sure, there are minor annoyances. Many of the tables are not complete in themselves and the reader is forced to hunt elsewhere for the meaning of abbreviations, the definition of categories, and the derivation of subtotals. Occasionally it is unclear whether the categories are created by the author or by the ILO officials who originally collected the data. In some instances the coding rules governing the allocation of data to categories are not given, and the reader is thus not sure where one category ends and another begins. Nor is it clear whether or not the coding has been subjected to reliability checks.

But these are only minor annoyances. In general, Haas reveals a sensitivity to the process rules of the scientific game and a disposition to make his operations explicit. For the most part his findings appear to have an independence of their own and to be subject to confirmation by anyone having sufficient time and resources to perform the operations.

It will be recalled, however, that adherence to the process rules does not guarantee a distinguished performance. The rules of interpretation must also be followed if data are to be fully utilized and findings clearly discerned. How well does Haas come out in these respects? Are his findings persuasive? Do his data seem consistent with his interpretations of them? Is an intersubjective consensus likely to form around his conclusions?

My answer to these questions is unfortunately not a positive one: Neither his interpretations of particular findings nor his overall conclusions are persuasive because the criteria used to derive them are not made explicit. The book is thus pervaded by inconsistency and ambivalence with respect to the ILO's impact on its environment. Hence the development of a wide and strong intersubjective consensus seems unlikely indeed.

[4] Two of the largest of these totals were not provided by the author but had to be calculated by the reviewer from data in separate tables and passages.

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Let us look first at the interpretation of particular findings. Throughout the data chapters the reader is aware of the absence of operationalized hypotheses that might provide criteria for assessing numerical differences. Should a difference of 2.2 percent be treated as small, one of 10.6 as moderate, and one of 18.2 as large? Or are all of them either small or large? Haas does not use statistical tests to determine the significance level of these differences. Nor does he explicate his own criteria for determining where in evaluating differences the cutoff points lie. At one point (pp. 402-4), for example, he uses the same word, "sharp," to describe all three of the differences cited above. (On an equally impressionistic basis I should be inclined to view the first as "small" and the last as "substantial.")

This is not to argue that the use of statistical tests is an essential aspect of science. As long as explicit criteria for deriving substantive meaning are available, there is no inherent reason why statistics must be used to interpret numerical differences. As indicated, however, Haas's hypotheses are not cast in such terms as to specify whether a particular finding would or would not be indicative of systemic transformation and of an ILO role in the process. As a result, considerable variability marks his interpretations.

A few examples will suffice to illustrate the problem. As I have already implied, one way by which the ILO seeks to transform practices in national systems is through the publicity that can result from compliance or noncompliance with the constitutional provisions requiring reports on the status and application of Conventions and Recommendations. Let us concentrate on three aspects of the data Haas has compiled pertaining to what he calls "the ILO's authority in extracting annual reports" (p. 261). These data are only one small part of his quantitative materials, but the inconsistency among the three interpretations he sets forth is, I think, a recurring feature of all the data chapters. With respect to the reports on ratified Conventions, Haas finds (Table 3, p. 261) that between 1946 and 1962 forty-two nations submitted reports "regularly," twenty-four "intermittently," and ten "sporadically." Since reports of nonimplementation of ratified Conventions can be both internally and externally embarrassing for the reporting country, this pattern can readily be interpreted as indicating that the national systems in the ILO environment have been predisposed to comply with its authority. Haas concurs in such an interpretation and goes beyond it to suggest that this predisposition has increased over time. He is especially impressed by the fact that the first two categories ("regularly" and "intermittently") subsume nine

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Communist Members, while only Albania falls into the "sporadic" category:

> [The Communist Members] uniformly show a trend of moving from complete noncompliance to increasing efforts to send reports in on time and to respond to requests for supplementary information; they thus show some sensitivity to ILO authority. . . . In their case, international criticism was undoubtedly one fact that prompted them to comply with ILO requests. It should be noted that, for them, this was an unintended consequence of participation in the ILO to which they submitted, not always in the best of grace, because they felt they could not risk continued exposure as violators when they also sought to convey a picture of dogged work toward a new society (pp. 262-63).

This attribution of authority to the ILO does not persist, however, when Haas turns to the question of whether or not Members abide by the constitutional provision that requires them to submit unratified Conventions and Recommendations to the authorities competent to effect ratification. The data for submission are presented here as they appear on page 263 (Table 4), with my addition of a column of percentages. The first, second, and third columns of figures refer to the number of ILO Members that reported submitting, respectively, all, some, or none of the annual output of Conventions and Recommendations to their competent authorities. The percentages refer to the proportion of the total membership that submitted all of each year's output of ILO instruments to the appropriate agency. Haas is unequivocal in his interpretation of the patterns depicted in the table: He concludes that the Organization's record in this regard is "poor" (p. 263) and "shows no growth whatever in ILO authority" (p. 264). In the absence of explicit criteria for distinguishing between a "good" record and one that is "poor," these interpretations strike me as extreme. Certainly they are at variance with the earlier conclusion about the ILO's relationship to the Communist world. On the face of it, to be sure, the data presented in the table do suggest a decline in the ILO's capacity to require processing of its instruments by Members. Yet obviously the figures for the last few years do not reflect late submissions and thus cannot be regarded as final.[5] If the records for 1956

[5] Haas readily concedes this criticism by noting that the annual publication of the list of Members failing to submit the instruments to competent authorities "often . . . results in improved conduct the following year," albeit "in many cases the appeals fall on very deaf ears" (p. 263). A quantitative measure of the success of this prodding through publicity is provided by comparing the table reproduced here with one in-

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FIDELITY OF SUBMISSION OF ILO INSTRUMENTS TO COMPETENT AUTHORITIES

Session[a]	NUMBER OF DECISIONS SUBMITTED *All*	*Some*	*None*[b]	*Total Members of Organization*	*Percentage of Members Submitting All*
31st, 1948	46	9	5	60	76.7
32nd, 1949	44	12	5	61	72.1
33rd, 1950	44	—[c]	19	63	69.8
34th, 1951	46	12	6	64	71.9
35th, 1952	45	9	12	66	68.2
36th, 1953	48	—	18	66	72.7
37th, 1954	45	—[c]	24	69	65.2
38th, 1955	49	5	15	69	71.0
39th, 1956	56	1	19	76	73.7
40th, 1957	55	10	12	77	71.4
41st, 1958	51	2	26	79	64.6
42nd, 1958	51	8	20	79	64.6
43rd, 1959	43	7	30	80	53.7
44th, 1960	39	1	43	83	47.0

SOURCE: International Labor Office, *Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations* (Geneva 1962), p. 187 (slightly altered). A similar table, summarizing the situation as of March 15, is published annually in the *Report*.

[a] Except for the 41st Session (April-May), all sessions of the Conference were held in June.

[b] Includes cases in which no information has been supplied by the government.

[c] At this session the Conference adopted one Recommendation only.

and 1957 were taken as the measure of change, the overall pattern could hardly be called "poor" unless the word is treated as simply equivalent to the absence of growth.

Similarly, it will be noted that the figures in the "none" column grow along with growth in the ILO membership. Since the new Members consist largely of the new states of Asia and Africa (which no doubt are slow to develop the administrative machinery for implementing and reporting action), and since note *b* of the table indicates that the "none" column includes those Members who did not report back to the ILO as well as those who reported not having made any submissions to competent authorities, conceivably the post-1957 data consist of a high proportion of Members who made, but did not report, the appropriate submission. If half of those in the "none" column for the last four years were actually "no information" entries, and if two-

cluded in the book's footnotes (p. 558) which, using the same format, gives the annual figures for submissions "within the prescribed time limits." Such a comparison reveals that, indeed, a large number of the submissions do occur subsequent to the date they are due: The percentages for 1948 through 1960 in the table reproduced here are higher by, respectively, 50.0, 44.2, 35.5, 32.8, 30.2, 30.3, 23.2, 36.2, 23.7, 22.0, 22.8, 19.0, 11.2, and 0.0 percentage points than the equivalent figures for submission within the prescribed time limits.

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thirds of these actually submitted all the instruments, then the last four percentages would read 74.6, 73.4, 66.3, and 63.9, without allowance being made for late submissions. In any event, whatever one concludes from these data about the growth of the ILO's authority, certainly it is a very stringent criterion that leads to the judgment that submission rates in excess of sixty percent constitute a "poor" record. "Poor" judged by what standards? Haas does not say, but if his earlier interpretation of the behavior of Communist Members is any criterion, he could have been expected to come to a more positive conclusion, reasoning that the submission of ILO instruments to competent authorities can prove risky, or at least embarrassing, to Members who are disinclined to use them and that, despite the risks, an average of two-thirds of the Members ultimately fulfilled their obligations for each year.

Another indicator of organizational authority, even more sensitive "because of the onerous nature of the burden and the possibly embarrassing character of the member state's response" (p. 264), is the requirement that Members must reply to requests for information on national practices even though the relevant ILO instruments have not been ratified. Again Haas's data (Table 5, p. 265) impress me as consistent with his early assessment of what constitutes a predisposition to comply with the ILO's authority: Thirty-five states were found to reply "regularly," twenty-two "intermittently," and twenty-two "poorly" between 1950 and 1962. However, instead of combining the first two categories (as he, in effect, did with the first set of data) and observing that more than two-thirds of the Members are at least periodically deferential to ILO authority in this regard, Haas prefers to combine the last two categories and to conclude that "less than half of the ILO membership defers to such authority" (p. 264).

This inconsistent and ambivalent mode of interpretation is even more evident in the concluding chapters (13 and 14) of the book. Indeed, it is so prevalent that discerning the overall conception of what Haas thinks he found is far from easy (and it is not made simpler by his failure to take up the hypotheses presented in Chapter 5 one by one in order to reexamine them in the light of the findings). On the one hand, Haas concludes that the postwar years have witnessed "growing heterogeneity in the [international] environment, rather than greater integration" (p. 442), and that "the environment was not *markedly* influenced by the program[s of the ILO]" (p. 444, italics added for reasons noted below). On the other hand, he seems to be no less clear in his conclusion that "the environment has changed so as to make

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national units converge in terms of policies and values; and in many respects this reflects convictions dealing with welfare" (p. 430). He states that "even though the major powers do not share or show any great enthusiasm for the [ILO's] new program, they have acquiesced in it and legitimated it in their national demands and general compliance with ILO measures," all of which "has meant an increase in the authority and autonomy of the Organization itself" (p. 441).

Haas is not unaware of these contradictory conclusions, but for him they are not contradictory. On balance, his overall conclusion seems to be that the international system has been transformed and that nations have been increasingly acquiescent in ILO efforts (as well as in those of other international organizations). But at the same time this conclusion does not negate his interpretation that little influence accrues to the ILO because, in effect, its success is a dependent and not an independent variable in the processes through which systemic transformation has occurred. That is, Haas resolves the apparent inconsistency by insisting that any conception that posits systemic transformation as having been " 'caused' by the outputs of the ILO would be ludicrous" (p. 430):

> The overall conclusion is inescapable: organizational autonomy has increased despite the fact that organizational outputs had little to do with the transformation of the environment. The Organization grew and the structures developed *even though* structures in the previous system had not discernibly changed the environment of that system. In other words, organizational autonomy grew as a result of later environmental inputs that owed little or nothing to what the Organization had previously done. The ILO was the unwitting beneficiary of changes in the system that had occurred autonomously (p. 443).

And again:

> Our survey of international social policy in a nexus of functional integration ended in a paradox. We discovered that the international system changes without the occurrence of a striking feedback at the national level. We found instances of increasing international legitimacy and occasional examples of heightened authority as well. But these developments took place for reasons connected with the changing nature of the environment and the adaptations of the total global system. They could not be related

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to the effects of the subsystem connected with social policy [i.e., the ILO] (p. 459).

I find this major conclusion quite unsatisfactory. It may well be that the ILO did not and does not operate as a causal agent in the international environment. And it is certainly true, as Haas notes, that "it is difficult to relate the performance of a given organization to a change in values, habits, and institutions in the environment of the system; it is hazardous to argue a direct integrative impact attributable to organizational performance" (p. 431). Yet, if this is so, the reverse is equally the case, namely, that it is difficult to contend that the ILO was *not* the cause of any systemic transformation. On bases that seemingly have little to do with the quantitative data presented in Chapters 5 through 12, however, Haas accepts the negative conclusion and ascribes his own findings of an ILO impact to sources other than the ILO. His concluding chapters suggest that these other sources consist largely of factors inherent in the cold war, the multipolarity of the international system, and the surge toward development in the underdeveloped world. These factors may well be relevant, but the quantitative data do not reveal their effects in any clear way, whereas they do reflect some, if not overwhelming, compliance with ILO authority.

One reason for this unsatisfying conclusion lies, it seems to me, in Haas's tendency to posit consequence and causation in grand terms. The whole thrust of the analysis leaves no room for treating the ILO as contributing to systemic transformation in a small way—for recognizing that little as well as big oaks from little acorns grow. Yet I would argue that progress toward international integration must be measured in terms of small increments and that it is at only a few points along the vast periphery, and not at the center, of world politics that these small increments of integrative experience become part of the patterns of international behavior. Haas's data, considered from this perspective, do seem to be patterned in an integrative direction. The ILO may not have *markedly* influenced the course of events since 1919, and other variables have unquestionably been more potent sources of change; but the findings of this book make it reasonable to presume that, in the absence of such an organization, the international environment would not have been transformed quite as much or in exactly the same way as in fact it was.

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VI

In short, Haas does not complete the scientific game before he returns, in the last two chapters, to a more historical kind of analysis. In so doing he illustrates again what I believe to be the central problem of the book, namely, that Haas does not fully believe in the game he undertakes to play in his middle chapters and resolves his ambivalence by abandoning the game at the very moment of triumph. Instead of interpreting his data in the same cautious way in which he processed them, he moves directly to a level of analysis and discussion that could have been undertaken even if the quantitative materials had never been gathered. What could have been a landmark in empirical international-relations research thus ends as more impressive than conclusive and more stimulating than clarifying.

It should be added, however, that Haas would probably not have it any other way. His premature abandonment of scientific analysis and his return to more speculative concerns is clearly the game he regards as best designed to combat the elusiveness of human behavior: "The statistical, as opposed to the historical-clinical, mode deduces trends and verifies hypotheses purely on the basis of quantitative aggregates, without concerning itself with clinical interrelations or historical confluences. The statistical practitioner tends to exhibit wide-eyed wonder concerning the unexpected nature of his conclusions, whereas the historically sensitized observer begins his work with a far more jaded vision" (p. 83).

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RISE AND FALL OF THE ZULU POWER

By E. V. WALTER

Donald R. Morris, *The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and Its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1965, 655 pp. $12.00.

THE Zulu kingdom is not extinct. It survives in the imaginations of many Bantu people, and remains latent in their social practices. Historically, it is as old as modern France, but it remained an independent state for a brief seven decades, its glory ending in the Zulu War of 1879. The period is spanned by the reigns of five monarchical figures: Dingiswayo (c. 1808-1818), who laid the foundations; Shaka (1816-1828), who established the kingdom and ruled at the zenith of Zulu power; Dingane (1828-1840), who continued the despotism as European settlers began to entrench upon the Zulu domain; Mpande (1840-1872), whose sovereignty was limited by accommodation first to Boer, then to British, power; Cetshwayo (1872-1884), who sought to break free but lost independence in a war against the British. Shaka stands out as the greatest of them all—both Romulus and Napoleon to the Zulu people—and his legend has captured the imaginations of both European and African writers, inspiring novels, biographies, and historical studies in several tongues. As a violent autocrat he is both admired and condemned: admired by those who love conquerors, condemned by those who hate despots. The internal transformations wrought by his regime were accompanied by enormous devastation and dislocation throughout South and Central Africa, disrupting a third of the continent. Some estimates of the slaughter in Shaka's total wars and in the mass migrations caused by them have placed the number of dead at close to two million. It is also estimated that by 1820 Shaka had deprived some three hundred tribes of their independence, had commanded a force of more than a hundred thousand warriors, and had brought half a million souls under his rule. Several of his generals fled with their armies to make empires of their own. Thus, even after his day had passed, Shaka's influence remained, for his model of military despotism was replicated in kingdoms such as the Matebele under Mzilikazi in Southern Rhodesia and the Gasa (Shangane) under Soshangane in Portuguese East Africa, and in several groups of Ngoni north of the Zambezi River. These kingdoms for some years preserved the Zulu pattern, coupling internal despotic power with external military terrorism.

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Even the most jaundiced historians of the Victorian age, Boer as well as British, obsessed with the putative ferocity and rudeness of the Bantu people, agreed that despotism among them was "abnormal." George McCall Theal, the exemplar of those historians, observed that in contrast to the unusual "pure despotism" observed under Shaka and Dingane, "the normal system of government" among the Bantu was patriarchal rule in a familiar tribal pattern of checks and balances.[1] But notwithstanding the limitations of a primitive technology, Shaka was able to utilize violence on such a scale as to create a model of terroristic despotism, which has been considered by some social scientists as a proto-totalitarian form. Since technology in a primitive society is rudimentary, the Zulu case contravenes the artless notion that extensive systems of terror are produced only by advanced technologies.

The author of the present volume on the rise and fall of the Zulu state is a man of parts. Naval officer, historian educated at the Naval Academy, and writer of fiction, he combines technical knowledge of military affairs, historical skill, and a rare gift for narrative to fill the book with interest and to remove the tedium from over six hundred pages crowded with details of complex events. He writes history in the manner of Herodotus. The center of interest is the Zulu War of 1879, which is the substance of Part Two and occupies two-thirds of the book, but he cannot tell that story without reviving the events that preceded it, recounting the political history of the Zulu people, unfolding the reigns of despots and kings, probing the origins of the kingdom, and giving a picture of the old Bantu culture. Before he gets to the main thread of his yarn—the British defeat in the Battle of Isandhlwana, their subsequent gallant defense of Rorke's Drift, and the ultimate collapse of the Zulu forces—Clio becomes more a demon than a muse, and the author gropes, possessed, through a maze of anecdotes and digressions. For example, the story of the European settlement in Natal in the middle of the nineteenth century includes over fifteen pages on the conflict between Bishops Colenso and Gray—an ecclesiastical struggle between Low Church and High Church positions—which leads to reviewing the split in the Anglican Communion in South Africa, which the author cannot let go without traversing place and time as far back as the conflict between Henry VIII and the Church of Rome.

Yet, if the author had stuck to his major point—the history of the Zulu War—he would have written a less important book. His fascination with the drama of a gallant and tragic people and his desire to

[1] *History and Ethnography of Africa South of the Zambesi* (London 1907), I, 76-78.

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write coherent history from many pieces of evidence have produced a volume that should draw the attention of political sociologists, anthropologists, students of government, comparative historians, Africanists, and anyone concerned with such familiar issues as the origins of the state, the development of traditional societies, the military organization of primitive peoples, the dynamics of terrorism, the conflict of cultures, imperialism, reaction to conquest, patterns of colonial administration, and social change, to mention a few. For students of society and government, the pages of Part One are a treasure map that hints at the riches which may be found by exploring Zulu history.

The book conveys the drama and vitality of the Zulu story, but the author's skill at social and political interpretation is far less than his talent as a raconteur. Defective and misleading interpretations unfortunately impair the usefulness of the history, for the incautious reader might accept certain questionable inferences as statements of fact. At other points, the author seems oblivious to inferences that the data beg to have drawn—inferences that indeed were made by participant observers who also provided the very pieces of information from which early Zulu history must be written.

One issue that often comes up in discussions of Shaka's regime is the question of his abnormality. In a history based on the oral tradition as he gathered it, J. Y. Gibson puzzled over the mixture of benevolence and cruelty in Shaka's character, but did not conclude that the contradiction was caused by insanity.[2] Other accounts have stipulated that his unusual behavior was the result of psychosis, or even —as is proposed in Thomas Mofolo's exceptionally fine novel— diabolic possession.[3] More recently, Max Gluckman has used the theory of Shaka's abnormality to explain policies that affected sexual behavior and produced certain social innovations:

> Shaka himself had no children. He said that a son would kill him for the throne. He had many concubines but no wives, and any concubine who became pregnant was killed. I believe that this, and other data on his sexual life, show that Shaka was at least a latent homosexual and possibly psychotic. Very likely this motivated another of his military innovations: he forbade his men to marry or have sexual relations with women until he gave them permission to do so in middle age, and he quartered all his men in great barracks, as in any modern army. It is significant

[2] *The Story of the Zulus* (London 1911), 37.
[3] *Chaka: An Historical Romance*, trans. F. H. Dutton (London 1931).

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

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AND ORIGINAL:

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that his regimental barracks system was not retained by his successors and imitators, although they used his other inventions.[4]

This explanation is shaky indeed, for every item may be explained with equal cogency as a product of calculation rather than the outcome of impulses that were abnormal in a clinical sense. Shaka's refusal to generate heirs, fearing they would covet the throne and be potential patricides, is well known. It is reported that he destroyed one infant who was presented as his child; still, the chronicles tell a story of his permitting another child, obviously his own, not only to live but to escape to Tembeland. His brother, Dingane, who succeeded him on the throne, also refused to marry and to beget heirs. Moreover, like Shaka, Mzilikazi forbade marriage to the Matebele warriors. It is difficult to know what "other data on his sexual life" Gluckman means, but there is ample evidence, from the descriptions of his conduct as well as anecdotes in the chronicles, that Shaka enjoyed his women.[5] The organization of bachelor warriors is nothing unusual, since it is a widespread institution to be found in the military systems of people as diverse as the Nilo-Hamites and ancient Dorians as well as in that of the Bantu. What Shaka did was to assume control of his warriors' career, extending the time they remained unmarried and making a matter for his decision the sequence of age grades that was previously regulated by the natural progress of the life cycle. The rule of celibacy forbade impregnation but not sexual contact, and the warriors were expected to have sweethearts and to gratify desire by *ukuhlobonga*, a traditional method of external intercourse.[6] The problem of the *ikhanda* system, or the pattern of barracks life in military kraals, is more complex than Gluckman here suggests, and its introduction under Shaka and subsequent fate under Dingane are more reasonably explained by the vicissitudes of the power system than by Shaka's putative sexual attitudes. Indeed it is surprising that Gluckman should take such a position, for he has gone on record declaring that it is out of respect for psychology and not through contempt for it that he deliberately eschews psychological analysis, and agrees that it is "fatal to use a psychological theory, stemming from an analysis of individuals, to explain a social and cultural phenomenon."[7]

Without explicitly referring to Gluckman, Morris adopts the same

[4] "The Rise of a Zulu Empire," *Scientific American*, Vol. 202 (April 1960), 168.
[5] Cf. A. T. Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal* (London 1929), 573; E. A. Ritter, *Shaka Zulu* (New York 1957), *passim*.
[6] Ritter, 11; J. Stuart and D. McK. Malcolm, eds., *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn* (Pietermaritzburg 1950), 295.
[7] Gluckman, *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa* (New York 1963), 2-3.

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interpretation of Shaka's relationship to women. The author asserts that Shaka "was unquestionably a latent homosexual" and "probably impotent" (pp. 46, 91-92). Against the tradition that Shaka limited his sexual activity to *ukuhlobonga*, Morris conjectures, "in view of the utter lack of control that characterized every other facet of his personality, it is probable that he never managed to consummate a full relationship" (p. 54). Then what of Dingane, Shaka's successor, who also kept a seraglio but refused to marry and to beget? Unwilling to stretch the assertion of impotency to include the next reign as well, Morris blithely declares that Dingane "was most likely sterile" (p. 117).

Similarly, Morris prefers impulse to policy as an explanation of Shaka's violence, and remains apparently oblivious to the terroristic pattern of his domination. He writes:

> His rule was based on a fear so profound he could afford to ignore it; his subjects would no more think of resisting him than a mouse would gainsay an elephant. He moved through his daily routine surrounded by a retinue that included a group of executioners, who, a dozen times daily, bashed in skulls or twisted necks at a flick of Shaka's hand. The lives he snuffed out in this fashion were guilty of no great crimes; they might have sneezed while he was eating, or made him laugh when he was serious. *It was not set policy that made him act like this*, nor was it cruelty, which implies a desire to inflict pain. It went beyond cruelty, it ignored pain, and the people he killed meant no more to him than so many ants (p. 67, italics added).

Even sophisticated social scientists have overlooked the method in Shaka's violence. For example, commenting on the most extensive slaughter of the despot's career—the massacre of tens of thousands at the death of Shaka's mother—Barrington Moore has concluded "that this outburst of cruelty, even if on a mass scale and triggered by the actions of a despot, does not appear to have been part of any over-all political objective. Cruelty here seems to have come mainly from outbursts of rage instead of being primarily a deliberately chosen instrument of policy."[8] This conclusion, essentially the same as that of Morris, is contradicted by the judgment of men who observed Shaka's behavior and experienced his regime. Nathaniel Isaacs was convinced that the appearance of Shaka's grief was a ruse, and that the king was "a dissembler and a most professed hypocrite." He be-

[8] *Political Power and Social Theory* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 35.

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lieved that the function of the massacre was partly to inhibit possible designs on the king's life.[9] Henry Francis Fynn declared that "the whole scene was a political scheme in furtherance of Shaka's vain imaginations" and that "reasons of state policy had as much to do [with it] as any feeling of regret for his dead mother. . . ."[10] Fynn and Isaacs, intelligent and perceptive observers, both recognized that Shaka "ruled his people by perpetually keeping them in a state of terror" and that his people "lived in perpetual alarm lest the finger of the despot should be held up as a signal of death or of devastation."[11] It is important to correct judgments that fail to admit Shaka's intent because they lend support to the prejudice that primitive rulers are not capable of sophisticated policy and to the false theory that systematic terrorism is exclusively a function of advanced technology.

Without gas chambers, machine guns, or a guillotine, Shaka managed to establish one of the most effective regimes of terror on record. The only material instrument he required was the assegai, and with it he constructed a pattern of terroristic controls more efficient, although smaller in scale, than the techniques of totalitarian states with all their deadly apparatus.

Fundamentally, a system of terror depends not on the instruments of violence, but on techniques of social control. The secret weapon of a terroristic regime is its social organization. It also depends on the effect deliberate violence has upon those who witness it or learn of it indirectly. Again, Morris misses the point as he writes,

> Time and again, for no discernible reason, Shaka, with a flick of his hand and no further attention, ordered the execution of some member of his entourage. It was a phenomenon that was noted on every occasion on which a European paid a visit to the royal kraal, and despite the initial impression that Shaka merely wished to impress his visitors with his absolute powers, it gradually sank in that the executions were a normal part of Zulu court life, and that *Shaka gave as little heed to the impression left on his visitors as he did to that made on the victims or their families.* The power was indeed absolute, and it had reached the ultimate corruption (p. 79, italics added).

Actually, the impression left by the violence was the linchpin in Shaka's system of power. The effect of the terror depended on the

[9] *Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa,* 2 vols., first pub. 1836 (Cape Town 1936, 1937), I, 199, 203.
[10] Stuart and Malcolm, 137, 139.
[11] Isaacs, I, 276, 280.

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impact that violence made on the consciousness of witnesses and on the communication of their fear to others more remote.

Morris insists that he does "not wish to claim for this work an academic status to which it is not entitled" (p. 617). This disclaimer is excessively modest, for the scholarship is meticulous and the prose better than that of most academic histories. The errors of inference criticized above are shared, as I have demonstrated, with some distinguished social scientists. Still, the author has also made historical errors, which should not, however, be understood to impugn the work as a whole. Were it not an important historical study, it would not deserve careful criticism.

Commenting on the patronizing attitude of Theophilus Shepstone, skilled and perdurable Secretary of Native Affairs for Natal, Morris writes (p. 172), "Unable to credit Shaka with sufficient invention to have developed his military innovations by himself, he adopted and spread the canard that he at some time had lived in the Cape Colony, where he had picked up his military ideas while watching European troops at drill." Such an error by a careful historian is remarkable, for the story is about Dingiswayo, not Shaka, and is part of the Dingiswayo myth perpetrated by Shepstone, preserved in his well-known "Historic Sketch of the Tribes anciently inhabiting the Colony of Natal," and destined to become one of the obstinate fictions that has had to be purged from early Zulu history. Bryant thought the Shepstone legend of Dingiswayo pernicious enough to condemn it in his own monumental history of the Zulu tribes.[12]

A most important source for the transitional period in the early reign of Mpande is the two-volume work by the French traveler, Adulphe Delegorgue, relevant passages from which are translated in Bird's *Annals of Natal*.[13] Morris makes no reference to this source and it is absent from his bibliography. Yet it is unmatched for information about the culture and social organization of the Zulu in the time of Dingane and Mpande. What is especially useful is Delegorgue's perspective—so different from that of the English and American missionaries as well as of the Boers, who provided the other sources of information for the period. Delegorgue was not Victorian but Rousseauan in his outlook, and he did not perceive the Zulu as a backward race or as depraved heathen, but admired them as a great people full of intelligence and dignity. For him, Mpande was not a fool, as

[12] P. 91.

[13] Delegorgue, *Voyage dans l'Afrique australe*, 2 vols. (Paris 1847); J. Bird, *The Annals of Natal*, 2 vols. (Pietermaritzburg 1888).

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one historical interpretation makes out, but the very prince of noble savages. As Delegorgue saw him, "An ample cloak, in Roman fashion, with which he draped himself in an eminently majestic guise, gave an exaltation to his features, in which the habit of command was boldly traced." He compared the king to the Boers, much to the disadvantage of these travelling companions, whom he considered as no more than "people made to drive oxen and to hold converse with them."[14] Even while discussing what he considered to be certain evil practices in the Zulu system, he recognized their place in the configuration of social institutions, and reflected, "To change customs of this kind one would first have to remodel everything, and establish everything anew; and, as a consequence, to impose on such a people the burdens borne by civilized communities."[15] Any history of Zulu society in this period that does not take Delegorgue's vision into account to balance the outlook of other European observers suffers from the omission.

The commonly accepted picture of Mpande as an inept ruler—based on his seeming mildness as compared to his predecessors, Shaka and Dingane, and on his political accommodations to the Europeans—has some basis in fact, but it has reached exaggerated proportions. It is true that, according to Zulu tradition, Mpande survived the violence of Shaka and Dingane by playing the fool, but his story suggests the legendary account in Roman history of Lucius Junius Brutus, who feigned stupidity to escape the tyrannical violence of the Tarquins. There is sufficient evidence to contradict Morris's judgment that Mpande lost political control of his own people in the early days of his regime. Had the author consulted Delegorgue, he would have had to struggle with a different version.

Toward the end of October in 1839, Mpande crossed the border of Zululand and entered Natal with 17,000 followers, afraid that his brother Dingane, the Zulu despot, had made plans to destroy him.[16] The Boers permitted him to settle temporarily with his following, and a deputation from the Volksraad proclaimed him "Reigning Prince of the Emigrant Zulus" until he should be confirmed as the successor to Dingane. The leader of the deputation asked Mpande to produce three indunas—ministers or chief officers—who were to bear responsibility for the conduct of the prince. Delegorgue reports that Mpande sent for two, and then, after reflection, called for a third. Roos, the Landdrost in charge of the Boer deputation, reported that shortly thereafter a

[14] Bird, 1, 558.
[15] *Ibid.*, 715-16.
[16] For a useful summary of the events at the end of Dingane's reign, see Peter Becker, *Rule of Fear* (London 1964), chaps. 24, 25.

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throng of several hundred men were observed to surround one of the indunas just appointed and beat him to death.[17] Mpande appeared and publicly condemned them for this act, claiming that it would jeopardize the position of the refugees. Morris interprets the episode to mean that "his subjects showed the visitors what they thought of the new prince by murdering under their eyes an inDuna he had just appointed" (p. 151), a judgment that fits the picture he draws of Mpande as a nominal ruler with no control of his people. Delegorgue writes of the event as follows:

> Panda [Mpande] was called upon by us to explain the scene which we had witnessed with regret. He came, pretending to be in great anger. . . . In our eyes Panda had cleared himself of the crime. His eloquence made us believe him innocent. Some days elapsed before we learned that the act had been his first exercise of kingly authority, which had a cause quite recent and concerning us nearly. On the day when we acknowledged him chief of the tribe, it was necessary that a man should die by his order, and the forfeit was paid by the unhappy Pangazoaga: and the blood of the man was to serve as an ointment for his limbs that night; the heart was to be roasted and presented to him to be eaten, as if to strengthen his body and double his heart. Such are the influences actuating the Zulu Kafirs. I know that several with whom I have been acquainted in Natal will not admit these things to be true; but I may state that I am the only one who has lived nearly ten months in the heart of the country of the Zulus, and that I have been in every respect too well informed to have any doubt upon the subject.[18]

Even if one were to suspect Delegorgue's credulity about the cannibalistic features of Zulu despotism, the description of his experience in Zululand would still convey the limitations of Morris's perspective and suggest that there is another way of looking at Mpande.

His reign is, in my opinion, the most problematic one of all, raising some of the most interesting questions, for he was something between a despot *manqué* and a limited monarch. The simplest interpretation—which seems to be the standard version—is that he was an indolent, apathetic, inadequate ruler, whose ineffectiveness permitted civil war between factions led by his sons and allowed his successor, Cetshwayo, to take over the royal power while Mpande was still on the throne.

[17] "Report of the Landdrost of Tugela on the Embassy to Panda," in Bird, I, 541.
[18] Bird, I, 560-61.

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There is much more to Mpande's reign than meets the eye, however, and careful inspection of the evidence contradicts the simple interpretation, and reveals complex and prudent policy, which realistically did not pit Zulu strength against European technological power, yet worked to preserve the integrity of Zulu institutions in new conditions. It was a period of replenishment, and, in Morris's own words, "The kraals were flourishing, and the cattle had long since made good the losses from the Boer depredations. All the men between twenty and sixty years of age were enrolled in regiments which could be mobilized in a few days, and the nation was more powerful than it had ever been before" (p. 204). One may reflect on the wisdom of the policy of those fruitful years by considering how Cetshwayo, impatient and apparently contemptuous of his father's quiet rule, bent the enlarged resources of the Zulu to an alternative course. Repudiation of the political and social equilibrium established in Mpande's reign brought the ruin of the Zulu kingdom.

Thomas Mofolo in his fascinating novel, originally written in Lesuto—the tongue of the Zulus' neighbors to the west—declared, "Even to-day the Mazulu remember how that they were men once, in the time of Chaka, and how the tribes in fear and trembling came to them for protection. And when they think of their lost empire the tears pour down their cheeks and they say: 'Kingdoms wax and wane. Springs that once were mighty dry away.' "[19] Explaining how that spirit came to be, Morris has given us an important book. The defects of his work will also serve a useful purpose if they move readers to turn to the sources of Zulu history to seek out the truth for themselves.

[19] P. 198.

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James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., editors, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964, 730 pp., $10.00.

Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence*, Princeton University Press, 1965, 659 pp., $12.50.

As the revived study of the politics of tropical Africa by Americans enters its second decade,[1] scholars have on the whole tempered youthful enthusiasm with an adolescent awareness of the complexity of their subject.

The frantic expansion of academic opportunities and the accompanying hectic publication rate of the boom years has been succeeded by more leisurely growth. Committed Africanists seem less numerous (as policy priorities have changed, so research interests have shifted to Latin America or Southeast Asia), students fewer (although more dedicated and better educated), and grants less lavish. Quantitatively, Africanists also appear less productive.[2] Yet there is no cause for alarm. On the contrary, there is every reason to think that the removal of matters African from the world spotlight and the corresponding diminution in their short-run impact upon the American consciousness have accelerated the rate at which the study of tropical Africa in America has matured. Bandwagon-climbers have largely departed, leaving in positions of prominence many of the earliest Africanists and a number of younger scholars formally steeped, as some of their predecessors were not, in a wide range of African lore. Many of the new group have done extensive field work *in situ* and are products of, rather than converts to, regional specialization.

With some outstanding exceptions, much that was published on the politics of tropical Africa during the first decade of American concern was of little lasting significance. It served, some would say, merely

[1] For practical purposes, the publication of David Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton 1955), inaugurated a decade of intense American inspection of the politics of modern tropical Africa. A few important articles and collections of articles appeared before then, and some theses had already been written, but nothing of monographic or synthetic substance appeared anterior to Apter.

[2] This is an impressionistic view, shared by others but unsupported by carefully gathered statistics.

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to fill an intellectual vacuum at a time when the problems of Africa had worried a nation unprepared to understand or to cope with Africa's unfamiliarity and seeming confusion. Although anthropologists had long observed Africa and used it as a laboratory setting, students of politics and history had with rare exceptions[3] neglected the tropical area of the continent. Thus, when in a rush, teachers and then students turned in the 1950's to Africa, their research often proved devoid of significant results. A few dozen articles and a handful of books of lasting value are all that remain of the enthusiasm of a decade.

Without necessarily agreeing upon specific titles, Africanists generally acknowledge that their own libraries contain too many books to which neither they nor others are ever again likely to refer. Those who seek analyses of political behavior or theories of action based on African experience will search long for sophistication; those who would be content to read good case studies or carefully documented political histories will find few products to their liking and many that bear the marks of haste and superficiality.

If we are to understand tropical Africa well enough to be able to develop a general framework that will survive, we need to amass historical and empirical data on events, personalities, institutions, and the factors that collectively mobilize populations. Too little is known, for example, about the characteristics of African institutions and the nature of institutionalization,[4] the role of ethnicity, the distribution of power, and the impact of traditionalism. Only by the accumulation of such data can we validate theories of political development and political modernization or rationally prepare policy alternatives for the future.

One of the two books under review, Coleman and Rosberg's *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, epitomizes the state of the field as we enter its second decade. With a few outstanding exceptions, its sixteen essays essentially describe the nature of politics and the variables peculiar to the political life of countries that had been selected for study either because they are obviously important (Nigeria, the Congo, and so on) or because of the availability of talented authorities with recent research experience therein. With the

[3] Among the exceptions, Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, 2 vols. (New York 1928); Marjorie Ruth Dilley, *British Policy in Kenya Colony* (New York 1937); Harry R. Rudin, *Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914* (London 1938); Arthur Norton Cook, *British Enterprise in Nigeria* (Philadelphia 1943).

[4] See the persuasive argument in Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 393-405.

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exception of an article on Zanzibar, there is no material on the parties of East and Central Africa. The resulting articles therefore do not necessarily validate the promise of the introduction or contribute to the analytical content of the editors' conclusions. Although some contain the germs of generality, most follow in the mainstream—alas, a languid, largely unedifying current—of African political history. They provide background summaries, trace the origin and rise of parties, detail the triumph of anticolonialism, and then go on to examine the programs, structure, strategy, membership, finance, and electoral victories of parties in the postindependence era. The better essays also relate party mechanisms both to organs of government and to nonparty groups, and describe the distribution of power within total systems. But the precision of detail and corroboration of evidence that are so essential to good political history are largely absent; the reader is left with impressions and a variety of empirical, but otherwise untested, generalities that add little that is original to our store of political or historical understanding. Admitted, the book was so long *in utero* that much of its timeliness was lost; several of the contributing authors either preceded or shortly followed the publication of *Political Parties* with full-length monographic studies that supersede their short, much less satisfactory, articles.[5] And the entire collection has, with the notable exceptions of the essays on Liberia, trade unions, and students, largely been overtaken by events.

Part of the problem is that parties in Africa are less important now than they once were. "It has been and remains our assumption," the Preface says, "that political parties are the most crucial political structures shaping the new African polities, and that the crisis of national integration is the major hurdle in nation building." The Introduction goes on to affirm (p. 1) what the second book under review, Crawford Young's *Politics in the Congo*, emphatically denies, that "at this stage of Africa's development political parties not only illuminate most clearly the nature of African politics, but also are important determinants of the unfolding African political scene." In a general sense, this is bound to be true, and at the time several years ago when this volume was conceived and its individual chapters were commissioned, few would have denied the important role of parties in the political process. But to describe the political process is not, as Young demonstrates so dramatically in *Politics in the Congo*, simply

[5] See especially Aristide R. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton 1963); Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Oxford 1964).

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to describe parties. Indeed, the very contributors to the Coleman and Rosberg volume would agree. Although they wrote, perforce, about parties, the best among them went beyond parties to analyze the institutional and social forces that have in many African countries already become more crucial determinants of political life than have the parties that nominally occupy the center of the African stage.

Although "political party" usually denotes a group of individuals who have organized themselves in order to gain control—typically by means of elections—of the decision-making machinery of a national government, in tropical Africa parties emerged during colonial times as nationalist movements dedicated to accepting nothing less than the transformation of entire political and social systems. They concentrated upon anticolonialism, and, eschewing methods that might gradually have given them mastery of the machinery, many fought martially and nearly all negotiated for the wholesale transfer of governments. In the process, victorious parties formed and became governments. But as they did so, the parties lost functional relevance and coherence. The party became largely an agency of the governmental bureaucracy or, at the expense of its rank and file, in certain cases it became a mere extension of the personality of a strong president or prime minister. No matter what roles parties have been assigned, almost everywhere in tropical Africa—whether in single-party, multiparty, or nonparty states—they perform few. (In order to prevent a sharp break with the past, one virtually single-party legislature still convenes a party caucus in order to discuss matters that are later debated by the same assembly on the floor of the house.) For parties, especially in the many areas where competition is proscribed or limited, independence has often meant institutional atrophy.[6]

This is true equally in the states where single parties dominate and in the Congo, which until recently in practice approximated a nonparty state. There, although parties existed and even contested elections, they remained (as Young describes them for the 1963 period, pp. 370-85) no more than loosely knit parliamentary caucuses with some ethnic and geographical rationality. Symptomatically, in the countryside, Congolese stopped paying dues to parties of their choice shortly

[6] In East Africa, there is some evidence that independence need not mean institutional atrophy for parties. A forthcoming paper by Joseph S. Nye, "The Impact of Independence on Two Nationalist Parties [The Uganda People's Congress and the Tanganyika African National Union]," makes this point, as do two recent articles: Colin Leys and Malcolm Valentine, "The Party After Independence: The Case of the Uganda People's Congress," *Proceedings of the East African Institute of Social Research* (January 1965); and Henry Bienen, "The Party and the No-Party State: Tanganyika and the Soviet Union," *Transition*, XIII (March-April 1964), 25-32.

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after independence. The subsequent lack of national stability and the collapse of parliament and the various provincial legislatures as effective institutions have not encouraged them to resume allegiances that were, in any event, transitory. Created hastily in the last years prior to independence, the various Congolese parties lacked the institutional flexibility and coherence necessary to survive the turmoil of 1960-61. Moreover, none of the parties was national; most linked ambitious townsmen with rural kin in arrangements of political convenience that had been encouraged almost solely by the prospect of elections. They were ethnic groups that possessed only ethnic, not national, goals. But why the Congolese should have organized themselves ethnically is nowhere in the Young book conclusively explained.

Before 1960, few imagined that tribalism (which the Belgians, from the days of Léopold II, had always refused to tolerate) would prove to be so divisive a factor. Unlike Britons in parts of East and Central Africa, the Belgians consistently denigrated the traditional forms of authority and were uninterested in their preservation. Yet Young traces the origin of parties to the ethnic associations that existed among "strangers" in each of the major urban complexes of the colonial Congo. And since the Belgian authorities permitted the free organization of political movements only very late in the colonial day, no other adequate structural channels existed to handle the rapid flow of articulated grievances (p. 267). In looking for other contributing factors, the author in a number of places accuses several prominent Flemish missionaries and administrators of arousing and, in one case, of creating fervent ethnic awareness where previously only vague feelings of sentiment had existed. But equally, the very size of the country, the vast distances that separated each of the main industrial and commercial centers from the others, and the way in which the government—apparently unintentionally—compartmentalized the Congolese peoples for administrative purposes all probably contributed to the display of ethnic chauvinism that has in recent years so markedly separated the Congo from its neighbors.

In Zambia to the south, despite the existence of numerous tribes that have always regarded themselves as ethnically distinct, the continuation from precolonial times to the present of one strong indigenous monarchy, and the British attempt to direct the expression of grievances along exclusively tribal channels, ethnic consciousness now, more than a year after independence, remains of exiguous political importance. Not only is Zambia geographically more compact than the Congo, but its ethnic groups have also always mixed freely

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there in urban settings that, in contrast to the Congo, are interconnected. No tribal group captured control of any single town, or regarded itself as "entitled" to one or another area. Furthermore, from the 1920's, Zambians gained political experience in a number of urban "native associations" that derived neither their leadership nor their following from any particular tribal element. Ethnic societies existed, but everywhere in the Protectorate intellectuals (a class conspicuous in the Congo before 1950 by its absence) scorned traditionalism and consciously opted for "the European way." Their "native associations" in time became a federation of associations and, in the 1940's, a single Congress that has flourished as a party throughout the period from 1951. Moreover, unlike the Congolese, Zambians in innumerable ways gained experience in the organization and management of institutions of the Western type. From the early 1940's, they debated political matters in a variety of legislative settings; beginning in 1949 a few Africans even sat in the territorial Legislative Council. The Zambians' battle to prevent the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland gave them valuable experience. At first a mere handful and then increasing numbers went to universities overseas. It is important, too, that the government harassed but refrained from suppressing political agitation. But of all such things the Congolese knew nothing. Instead, they suffocated under a form of paternal governance that, when the mortgage of its stewardship came due, proved bankrupt of innovation.

Others have written at length of the many reasons for this bankruptcy. Few, however, have synthesized so shrewdly as Young. The first half of his book contains twelve functionally arranged chapters that, by drawing largely upon a wide range of secondary sources, provide a damning profile of colonial failure. Unlike *Political Parties and National Integration*, this is potted political history harnessed (although one could complain about its organization and methodological presuppositions) to a precise analytical purpose. The remainder of the book contains separate narratives of the rapid rise of nationalism and of political events from 1960 to 1963,[7] followed by descriptive

[7] Two recent books have lessened the importance of Young's historical résumés. For a more complete understanding of the emergence of Congolese self-expression, the careful reader should consult René Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo* (Berkeley 1964). Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961* (London 1965), contains a careful, detached analysis of the first year of independence, together with an especially valuable critique of the role of the United Nations. Beside her work, the tendentiousness of Ernest W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo* (Washington 1965), provides a glaring example of an earlier kind of American writing on tropical Africa.

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chapters on parliament, parties, and politicians; the judiciary and the administrative bureaucracy; the dialogue between federalism and centralism; the new provinces; and an epilogue that deals with the civil war of 1963-64.[8]

It is in these latter chapters that the functionalism of Young's approach proves most effective. Yet at the same time it leads to repetition and to what can only be called a fragmentation of analysis. (This is not an argument in favor of a chronological approach. But even a functional approach needs constraints, and implicit arrangements or orderings are best perceived if expressed explicitly.) Although Young's lucid conceptualization of the role of bureaucracy offers much of relevance to students of contemporary tropical Africa, the scattering of its presentation obscures the importance of the bureaucratic tradition—especially its provision of a beneficial administrative continuity in the rural areas—to the future of the Congo. We learn little about the impact on the Congo of the policies of the United Nations, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the countries of independent Africa. The recent politics of the Congo is seen—and nowhere, paradoxically, more obviously than in Young's best chapters—through a series of separate prisms, not under a single high-power microscope. The author refrains from putting Humpty Dumpty back together again—indeed, he seems unsure why or how the Congo has managed to weather its many crises—yet he more than most observers views the prospects of the Congo optimistically. He expects that the people and politicians of the Congo will somehow emerge united, masters of their army, and in control of their provinces.

Has the study of African politics in America come of age? The scope of the two volumes under review gives us some hope that it has. At least Young's perceptive dissection of an ongoing system and the range of essays in Coleman and Rosberg's collection provide the promise that many hands are mastering important sections of the African continent. Furthermore, nearly all the authors show a willingness and an ability to draw relevant lessons for contemporary dilemmas from the discrete data of different political histories. Nowhere in these volumes is this more effectively done than in Coleman and Rosberg's descriptive concluding comments on the origins of the single-party phenomenon (pp. 656-64).[9] But neither book produces

[8] Crawford Young's more recent article on the civil war ("The Congo Rebellion," *Africa Report*, x [April 1965], 6-11) supersedes the epilogue because of its perceptive analytical insights as well as its relevant timeliness.

[9] The reader should also consult the illuminating discussion of single parties in Martin L. Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single-Party Tendencies in African Politics," *World Politics*, xv (January 1963), 262-94.

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much in the way of a paradigm for the study of politics in tropical Africa; indeed, on methodological grounds, Young appears to argue that, considering the state and level of our knowledge of Africa, over-elaborate model-building on a general scale is premature. This is not to say that students of Africa should compile rather than conceptualize; obviously they need to do both, but without assuming that frameworks necessarily result in generalizations of continental or global validity. Generalizations depend upon data, and among the important tasks to which Africanists of this new decade will address themselves is the provision, whether in a quantitative or humanistic fashion, of basic data about a vast range of political, social, and economic phenomena. The most useful work will probably be done by students of local micropolitics, but there is also need for detailed factor analysis on a national or supranational level.

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